THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN

F. R. TENNANT

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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,
C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.
London: FETTER LANE, E.C.
Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.



Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.
New York: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS.
Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN & CO. LTD.

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THE ORIGIN

AND

PROPAGATION OF SIN

BEING THE HULSEAN LECTURES DELIVERED
BEFORE THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
IN 1901—2

BY

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CAMBRIDGE:
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1908

First Edition 1902.
Second Edition 1906.
Reprinted 1908.

TO MY FATHER

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE present work practically consists of four lectures which I had the honour to deliver before the University of Cambridge. They have been made rather more suitable for publication by such expansion as was necessary for clearness of expression, and by the addition of a few appended notes.

It was my original intention to incorporate the substance of these lectures in a larger work dealing for the most part with the early history of the development of the doctrines of the Fall of man and of Original Sin. When the end of that work was beginning to come in sight, however, circumstances necessitated considerable delay before it could be carried to completion. I therefore decided to publish the smaller portion of my material first; and this plan was the more readily adopted for the reason that the lectures, being of a critical and speculative nature, were easily and naturally separable from the matter furnished by a historical investigation. It is inevitable that the results of the historical study are sometimes presupposed in the addresses contained in this volume, but I hope to

submit them also to the reader who may be interested in the subject before many months have elapsed[1]. Until this can be done the argument of the present work will lack a very necessary supplement. For it is such a historical study of the development of the doctrines here examined, such a taking of them to pieces, as it were, to show the nature of their material and the processes by which they have been constructed, that destroys the one ground upon which their validity has hitherto been assumed by theologians[2].

Meanwhile I attempt to supply a criticism of the implications of a traditional doctrine, and a restatement of so much of its essential meaning as can be retained, rather than a commentary upon it; and, in doing so, to offer a small contribution to inductive and critical theology. It is hoped that some little service may be thereby rendered in meeting an increasing, if a silent, demand from persons who approach theological literature from the point of view of natural science or philosophy.

It is made sufficiently plain in the course of the lectures that the repudiation of the doctrine of Original Sin is not new to Christian theology, and that in some features of the reconstruction which they endeavour to supply I have already been anticipated.

[1] The author's promsied work on *The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin* has since been published.

[2] This sentence has been altered from its original form.

It can scarcely be hoped that the change of view advocated in this book will be at once produced in those of its readers to whom the appeal may present itself with some abruptness. It can well be understood that the consequences of the new standpoint will prove, in many cases, a greater obstacle to its acceptance than the lack of cogency or persuasiveness with which the argument is presented. One may safely assume, however, that the evidence for the necessity of a restatement, and not the consequences thereof, will be allowed to be the only ground upon which the reader's judgment will be based. And if that evidence be insufficient, or its manipulation be fallacious, it can only be hoped that the book may be found worthy of the attention of those competent to expose its errors.

My indebtedness to previous writers is, I trust, sufficiently acknowledged in the places where I have relied upon their help. I have to thank the Editor of the *Church Quarterly Review* for kindly allowing me to reproduce in Lecture IV. some sentences which occur in an article previously contributed to his journal. The index of authors to whom reference is made in the book, and the revision of the proof-sheets, I owe to ever ready help at home.

F. R. TENNANT.

CAMBRIDGE, *April*, 1902.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE hope expressed in the Preface to the first edition of this work, that "the book might be found worthy of the attention of those competent to expose its errors," has not been entirely unfulfilled. I am far from having been convinced that my criticism of the traditional doctrine of Original Sin is unsound, or that the theory of the origin of sin which I expounded is untenable or unsatisfying. But I have learned, with the aid of some of my reviewers, that several passages in the former edition contained faulty statements, and expressions sufficiently inadequate or obscure to leave the larger share of responsibility for their misinterpretation with myself. In the present edition I have endeavoured to correct such faults and to supply a few additional touches to my argument.

I am the more pleased to comply with a call for another edition of these Lectures because I have received from numerous individuals expressions of gratitude for help which they affirm they have derived from them in formulating a doctrine of Sin

such as involves no conflict with their reason and no burden to their conscience.

Several of my readers, as I anticipated, find the greatest obstacle to their acceptance of the theory of the sources of sinfulness elaborated in this volume in the consequences which they suspect it may involve, through its relation to other departments of theological dogma. Christian theology, they maintain, is a unity; and reluctance to embrace a restatement of any one article of belief, such as appears to necessitate a change of attitude towards others, is very natural, until the full extent of such necessary change has been exhaustively considered. I do not believe, however, that the change of view which I have advocated with regard to Original Sin involves any interference with really vital elements in Christian theology. The doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, it is true, in so far as this is concerned with the remission of Original Sin, is certainly affected; but only so far. A few words in this connexion have been added on the last page of the present edition. With regard to the bearing of the evolutionary theory of sin on the doctrines of Grace and the Atonement, I can only repeat what I have said before: that these are not in the least endangered, because they have their sufficient basis in the fact of universal actual sinfulness, and are independent of theories as to how sin takes its rise. The question of the inter-relationship

of doctrines, however, is perhaps more relevant in connexion with the discussion, contained in Lecture IV., of the wider problems of evil and theodicy. But the speculations there advanced are not so necessarily and logically connected with the empirical theory of the origin and propagation of sin developed in Lecture III., that both stand or fall together. The discussion of the wider, philosophical problem is much the more tentative in nature; and its rejection as unsatisfactory would, I think, in no way affect the empirical doctrine. But the task of further tracing out the influence of the newer theory of sin upon other branches of theology is one which must be left to students less preoccupied than the present writer with more congenial lines of study, and better equipped with that intimate knowledge of the field of ecclesiastical doctrine which would be essential for a profitable investigation.

With a view to enabling the future reader better to decide as to the validity of the views submitted to him in the following pages, I would conclude this preface with a brief statement of what I take to be the more pertinent and weighty of the objections that have been urged against individual points in my argument, and with such a reply to each of them as I am capable of offering. It would render no service to theological truth to deal with criticism which is relevant to the reviewer's misinterpretation, through carelessness, of what I have *meant*, but not to what

I have actually *said*; or with criticism which meets one's conclusions with dissent but no disproof[1].

1. Objection has been taken (*Hibbert Journal*, Vol. II. No. 4) to the assertion that heredity cannot take place in the region of the spiritual personality inasmuch as traducianism is an untenable doctrine. It is said that traducianism does not necessarily involve a semi-materialistic doctrine of the soul such as I have attributed to it; and that, if God can produce new spirits, then there is no impossibility in the reproduction of spirit by spirit.

In reply to these remarks, it may be urged that because God, who is spirit, must be held, on the theory of creatianism, to reproduce spirits of Himself, it does not follow that such a capacity belongs to spirit as such. The power which we must ascribe to God may belong to Him not as spirit, but as Almighty or Infinite Spirit. That reproduction of the finite spirit is a possibility must, perhaps, be admitted; but, until some evidence is adduced for it, it is a pure assumption somewhat difficult to reconcile with the facts at present

[1] The lengthy review of my two books dealing with Original Sin contributed to *The Expository Times*, May, 1904, by the Rev. W. Mackintosh Mackay, B.D., is, I fear, of no service to me because its criticism belongs almost entirely to one or other of these classes. On the other hand, I gratefully acknowledge the helpfulness of much contained in the critiques of Mr S. C. Gayford, Dr A. J. Mason (*Journal of Theological Studies*) and Mr A. Boutwood (*Hibbert Journal*).

known with regard to the reproduction of human beings. The only traducianist theories of which I am aware certainly imply a conception of the soul as an entity existing apart from its activities, as spatial and divisible. When traducianism is able to present itself in terms which do not conflict with modern psychology it will be time to consider its merits afresh; at present, however, it can hardly claim to be a possible explanation of the facts[1].

2. The same review objects to the argument, developed in my larger work but presupposed in my *Hulsean Lectures*, that the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin are shown to be invalid by a critical examination of their origin and growth. A doctrine,

[1] Prof. Orr, in his recent treatise *God's Image in Man*, pp. 236, 242, somewhat mistakes the meaning of my statement that heredity cannot take place "in the region of the spiritual personality." I admit the heredity of mental and moral characters, but not by such means as traducianism asserts. On the ordinary dualistic theory of the interaction of body and soul, I regard their reappearance in the offspring as due to the physical inheritance of their corporeal equivalents, on the ground that if the soul is an entity it is hard to conceive it as endowed with a reproductive mechanism. I may here add that there is certainly a much more widely spread scepticism as to the inheritance of acquired modifications than is suggested in this writer's footnote (*op. cit.* p. 237), and that the instances of inherited consequences of drunkenness cited on p. 241 of his book are precisely of the kind which many specialists regard as highly doubtful. I am far from recognising mechanical theories of heredity, such as science is endeavouring to provide, as of metaphysical validity; but if appeal is made, on behalf of the doctrine of Original Sin, to physical science, I would plead that the verdict of science is inconclusive if not unfavourable.

it is urged, cannot "be proved invalid by the history of its formation." This was not exactly my meaning. Just as a proposition deduced syllogistically may be true, though one or both of the premisses on which, in a particular argument, it rests may be proved false, so a doctrine may embody actual truth in spite of the illegitimacy of the steps by which the human mind attained to it. Then, however, its truth must rest on other foundations. The argument here called in question is as follows: the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin have hitherto been believed by theologians to be sound because they have been held to be logically developed out of scriptural statements whose inspiration guarantees their historical truth; the Fall-story, however, must now be held, for divers reasons, not to be of this nature, and some of the steps by which the doctrines have been derived from it, even granting its asserted historical value, are illogical; therefore, so far, the doctrines are not established. If they are true, their defenders must henceforth base them upon other foundations. My argument, therefore, does not make "genesis the determinant of validity," but it implies that proven validity is not established by genesis in fiction. Some words in the footnote to p. 26 (ed. i), which appeared to give colour to the view thus attributed to me, have been made less ambiguous in the present edition. Cf., in this connexion, note 1, p. 112; note 1, p. 146.

3. It has been asserted that my doctrine of man does not much differ from that of naturalism. Inasmuch as my account of man is professedly expressed in terms of scientific fact or scientific theory, and since science, as science, can use the language neither of philosophy nor of theology because indifferent to the principles of both, this is perhaps not to be wondered at. A very similar objection was indeed anticipated and met in the earlier edition; see pp. 143—4 below.

4. My account of the origin of sin in the race and the individual, with its repudiation of hereditary sinful bias, has been pronounced inadequate because it really evades the fundamental aspect of the problem.

"Granted that the propensities which constitute the *fomes peccati* come to us from our animal ancestry, and are in themselves non-moral, the last step in the evidence should tell us what attitude the will itself at its first appearance is seen to adopt towards these propensities. Is it neutral? Does it incline towards that 'higher law' which is just beginning to dawn upon the consciousness? Or is it found from the first in sympathy and alliance with the impulses which it ought to curb? This goes really to the root of the whole matter: and to most thinkers, not only the theologians, but also the philosophers, the phenomena have seemed to point to the last of these alternatives. It is this aspect of the question, the fundamental aspect, which Mr Tennant really evades. He assumes

without proof that the will from the first has been neutral as towards the lower impulses[1]."

If the will emerge before the moral consciousness; if, in other words, man's attitude towards his inborn propensities is volitional before it can possibly be influenced by any sense of right or wrong, then it must surely follow the will "from the first has been neutral as towards the lower impulses"; it could not be anything else. The impulses are non-moral and the will is as yet non-moral; the being is purely animal at this stage. No proof, then, is needed of the will's original neutrality, unless the priority of volition to moral consciousness, which I have assumed on the authority of psychologists, be called in question. What attitude the will takes towards our inborn propensities in the pre-moral stage of our development, is not for me an ethical problem: it has nothing to do with the origin of sin. I am aware that because, from the first dawning of his knowledge of what he ought to do, every human being has failed always to avoid doing what he has known he ought not to do, some philosophers as well as most theologians have attributed a 'bias' to the human will, or spoken of 'radical evil.' But I have given full reason, I trust, for holding that what is 'radical' cannot, *ipso facto*, be 'evil,' and have shown that post-Kantian psychology, or, at least, the recent sciences of child-psychology and race-psychology, render the

[1] Mr S. C. Gayford in *The Journal of Theol. Studies*, April, 1903.

assumption of any warp in our nature unnecessary and improbable, if not impossible. The hypothesis of a 'bias' is purely gratuitous, and could never have presented itself, perhaps, but for the dominion over men's minds of the doctrine of Original Righteousness. Taking the facts of child-psychology and the theory of man's evolution simply as science presents them to us, it is at least as legitimate to go out of our way in search for a bias towards good, to explain the cases in which the moral sanction is obeyed, as for a bias towards evil to explain the cases in which it is disobeyed. That the child, on acquiring voluntary activity, uses its activity sometimes, or even habitually, to satisfy freely any impulses or appetites whose gratification is attended with pleasant feeling, is as natural as that water should flow down-hill, and as little a fact of any moral significance. That the child should even continue sometimes to do so after having come clearly to understand that it ought not, is a serious moral fact; but, in order to explain it, it is not necessary to postulate any 'sympathy and alliance' with natural impulses, hitherto habitually gratified, more mysterious than the continuance of the capacity to feel pleasure in their satisfaction. There is, I believe, no "root of the whole matter" deeper than that which my investigation of the sources of actual sin sought to lay bare.

5. If this alleged difficulty to the acceptance of the evolutionary theory of sin has been satisfactorily

met, its more serious corollary, that the theory necessarily minimises the sinfulness of actual sin, is so far baseless. In so far as the same objection is grounded, as it would appear to be in Canon Mason's review of my two books, on an awkward and easily misinterpretable phrase in the earlier edition of these Lectures, it will, I trust, be incapable of being renewed now that my meaning has been more clearly expressed[1].

I have reason to believe that many amongst my readers have agreed with me that the sinfulness of sin is really more stoutly maintained by a theory which makes all sin actual and a matter of personal accountability, however less guilty its earlier stages may be than its later, than by a theory which finds the source of sinfulness in a supposed hereditary state for which no person is responsible. This, however, is not the opinion of all. In spite of my repeated warnings that language professing to describe only the initial stages of the life of sinfulness is necessarily very different from such as the Christian penitent, for instance, uses of the sin whose exceeding sinfulness only he can know: in spite of distinct assertions that the holder of the newer view of Original Sin does not, as a matter of fact, consider sin, in any of its stages, as unaccompanied by

[1] I allude to the words, to be found on p. 91 of the 1st edition: "and the first sin, *if the words have any meaning*...." The context in which these words occur has been re-written in the present edition.

some degree of guilt, or in any way less sinful than it would be on the rival theory of its origin, it has been represented by some of my critics, whose opinion deservedly carries weight, that such an implication is necessarily inherent in my account of how sin takes its rise and spreads throughout the race.

In an age which is inclined to take sin lightly it is the more incumbent on a Christian theologian to be careful lest his words upon the subject really lend themselves to encourage such a tendency. I am convinced that the objection, brought against my attempt to explain universal sinfulness without recourse to the idea of an inherited warp in our nature, that it explains sin and its sinfulness away, rests upon a misunderstanding, at some point or other, of my account of the matter. And, in the interests of the vital truth which is at stake, it will be well to take the opportunity here presented to state, in propositions as clear and concise as may be, the essential elements in the theory I have advocated, and to challenge future criticism to say precisely which of them it is to which the Christian consciousness cannot reconcile itself.

The following, then, are the essential positions, with regard to the source of sin in the individual and the race, which I have endeavoured to establish:

a. Man inherits the natural and essential instincts and impulses of his animal ancestors; these are neces-

sarily non-moral, and there is no reason to ascribe to them any kind of abnormality.

b. Voluntary action in man appears before any consciousness of right and wrong. There has been a period, therefore, in the history of both race and individual, in which even volitional conduct has been innocent, however far such conduct differs from that later prescribed by moral sanctions and the conscience.

So far, sin has not emerged at all.

c. A period is reached during which moral sentiment is gradually evoked and moral sanctions are gradually constructed. Acts once knowing no law now begin to be regarded as wrong. The performance of them henceforth constitutes sin.

d. The earliest sanctions known to the race were but crudely ethical, and their crudity was but gradually exchanged for the refinement characteristic of highly developed morality. Similarly, the subjective sense of guiltiness, in the primitive sinner as in the child of very tender years, would at first be relatively slight, and would increase *pari passu* with the objective holiness and severity of the ethical code.

If I myself judge rightly, it is at the words "So far sin has not emerged at all," that most critics of the evolutionary doctrine of the origin of sin begin to take offence. Theologians who are willing to admit that the infant's unchecked greed, for instance, is less guilty than the adult's yielding to the allurements of the

flesh, or that the savage's unconscious transgression of the perfect moral law is less sinful than the Christian's deliberate trespass, refuse to allow that such acts of the infant or the primitive human being are not sins at all. The difference, it is said, is one of degree; not of kind, as I maintain. Christianity has erected an absolute ethical standard, and any falling short of that standard in any human being at any stage of his existence or development is therefore asserted to be necessarily sinful. To deny this, we are told, is to say that sin is not sin.

I admit that to deny this is to say that what is commonly called sin is not sin. But the possibility is overlooked that, in such cases as those above mentioned, what is commonly called sin is not rightly called sin. And this is precisely my contention. The whole question turns on this point. Hence, perhaps, Note B appended to these Lectures is the most important portion of this volume. And I would urge that those who regard the evolutionary theory of sin as declaring sin not to be sin are not entitled thus to condemn it until they have refuted the restriction of the usage of the term sin for which I have contended: until, that is to say, they have justified the application of such terms as 'sinful' and 'guilty,' in howsoever low a degree, to conduct which either *could not* have been other than it was, or at least *knew no moral reason* why it should have been other than it

was. If such conduct is correctly included under the term sin, then, truly, my theory calls sin not-sin. But it is the very kernel of my argument that such usage of the term sin is incorrect, and rests upon a confusion. It involves, in short, the dominion of the moral law over non-moral agents.

That the human infant is at first an absolutely non-moral being, that it possesses no conscience, no power to discriminate right and wrong, will not, I presume, be disputed. That the savage, or the type of primitive man, though already recognising ethical standards of some sort, is, *relatively to such moral sanctions as are unknown, and, as yet, unknowable, to him*, on the plane of non-morality, will similarly be granted. If then either is to be held in any degree sinful for the transgression of unknown ethical standards, it follows that the moral law is taken to apply to non-moral beings and to be binding upon them as upon the adult Christian. But it then becomes purely arbitrary to limit the dominion of moral law to the human race. The infant, as subject to any moral law at all, and the primitive man of necessarily crude moral conceptions, as subject to the higher requirements of moral law as yet foreign to his conscience, are on precisely the same footing as the lower animal. Thus the cat's play with a captured mouse, because it falls short of the absolute ethical standard of conduct, must be called sinful; cruelty must be attributed to

the cat if greed is imputed to the infant. And why stop here? Possession of conscience, knowledge of a restraining law, being no longer the endowment which solely renders an agent liable to ethical condemnation, why should sentiency or organic life be the condition for accountability and guiltiness? The rock which, falling from a cliff, causes the death of a man below, must, on such a definition of sin as is now under consideration, be pronounced sinful. And herein lies the *reductio ad absurdum* of such doctrine. If it be represented that the behaviour of the brutes, or the activities of the forces of Nature, exhibit instances of what, though not rightly to be called sinful, nevertheless "ought not to be," it may be asked what precisely is meant by the word 'ought.' If the term is not intended to refer accountability to the agents in question, would it not be more conducive to accurate thought to substitute another?

I would submit, then, that if sin is to be imputed in any degree where there is no law, *i.e.* no consciousness of a restraining moral sanction, there is no logical halting-place in the world of organic and inorganic 'agents' at which we may cease to impute sin. Sin is therefore not sufficiently defined as 'transgression of law'; it is 'transgression of law by a moral agent.' Two acts in all respects identical, performed, one the day before, and one the day after, the recognition that a moral sanction is thereby transgressed, differ, for the

ethicist, not merely in degree, but *toto caelo* in kind. The one no more comes under ethical categories than does the fall of an avalanche; the other is distinctly and definitely a sin. If actions of the former kind are still classed along with the latter under the term 'sin,' it is surely time that they were provided with another name; and that 'unconscious sin' were accounted a contradiction in terms. The distinction between the objective and the subjective points of view is here vital[1].

[1] The falling short of the absolute moral standard on the part of the child or of man in a primitive condition needs to be very clearly distinguished from that of the person who approves better things and follows worse. The one 'knows better,' the other does not. It is through identifying these totally different states, it would seem, that Mr Bethune-Baker (*Cambridge Theological Essays*, p. 559) is led to regard the evolutionary view of the origin of sin as incompatible with any estimate of sin which could be formed in the light of fundamental Christian doctrines. The moral state of the man who recognises the authority of the dictates of an ethical system but "does not feel within himself constraint to follow" them, instanced by the case of S. Augustine praying 'Give me self-control, but not just yet,' and answering his conscience 'Let me be a little while,' appears to me to offer no parallel to that of the child violating an ethical sanction of whose existence it is wholly unaware, or of the uncivilised man persisting in practices which the only code he knows does not forbid: it falls on the other side of the line which divides the realm of the moral from the realm of the non-moral.

Prof. Orr, in his recent work *God's Image in Man*, also states his conviction that on such anthropological theories as the one which has here been provisionally adopted, "we can never have anything but defective and inadequate views of sin" (p. 11). "There is, in fact, on the basis of this theory, no proper doctrine of *sin* possible at all" (p. 19). When the theory for whose maintenance I am responsible is dissociated from the avowedly naturalistic views of Haeckel and others

Finally, if there be any desire to keep the term 'original sin' for our 'stock-tendencies,' though it be admitted that they are not in any sense the outcome of human volition, I accept such a doctrine and protest merely against the inaptness of its name.

6. It has been pointed out to me that "'morality' in the sense of a code of morals, and 'morality' in the sense of an attitude of will towards the moral code, are two different meanings of the word, both of which must be taken into account in our conception of sin"; and that my conclusion, that the earliest human sin or sins would be the least significant of all, seems to ignore the

simultaneously controverted in Prof. Orr's treatise, his objection that it explains sin away would seem ultimately to be based on the ground of the sure 'value-judgment' "that sin is actually sin" (p. 210). Inasmuch as the same ground is strenuously maintained in the present work, it is plain that Prof. Orr must diverge from myself at the definition of the concept of sin. If he will allow the certainty of the value-judgment just quoted, in its converted form: "not-sin is actually not sin," I hope that the foregoing discussion will serve to remove the force of Prof. Orr's objection.

The inclusion of acts done 'without law' under the category of sin must surely be the only ground also for Prof. Orr's statements (p. 300) that "in the condition in which evolutionary science starts man off, he had no alternative but to fall," and (p. 204) that sin "becomes a necessity of man's development—a stage it was inevitable man should pass through in the course of his moral ascent." Indeed it would seem to be to this divergence between my critics and myself, as to the proper definition of sin, that all the forms of the objection that I have unintentionally explained sin away, or that my theory is incompatible with essential and fundamental Christian doctrines, are ultimately to be traced.

second meaning of 'morality.' It is the attitude of the will towards the acknowledged moral code which determines the degree of guilt in the sin; and so the question which Mr Gayford puts[1]: "May not the sin of the savage against *his* code be very sinful?" is legitimately raised. I have endeavoured to supply[2] the omission of explicit reference, in the context to which he has drawn my attention, to this aspect of morality; for it had been but very briefly noticed on an earlier page. I need therefore here only express my thanks to Mr Gayford for thus enabling me to present my argument more adequately, and state that if the gradual development of subjective and objective morality has gone on together, from small beginnings unattended with abrupt and sudden inrushes, we shall not be able to look upon the earliest sins of primitive man against his rudimentary code as, even from his own point of view, 'very' sinful.

7. Lastly, a few words may be said in reply to criticism of the relation in which my arguments or conclusions stand to Holy Scripture.

It is maintained by Dr A. J. Mason and others who have reviewed my works on Sin that the Fall-story, though the broad results of criticism with regard to it be accepted, nevertheless still contains a basis for a doctrine of human nature. But if so, what is the test

[1] *Journal of Theol. Studies*, April, 1903.

[2] Below, pp. 93, 94.

of the validity of the doctrine derived from it? Is it the divine inspiration of the record? There would seem to be no other guarantee that the narrative of the Fall supplies us with historical or theological fact. But I would again submit that we must define inspiration, in this connexion, in the light of an inquiry as to whether that which the narrative asserts is positive fact, rather than assume its assertions to be facts because they occur within the pages of a book which we regard as inspired. It is with the conception of man's origin and nature, not with the more obvious elements of Semitic folk-lore, which the third chapter of Genesis presents, that modern knowledge conflicts; and to adhere to the traditional teaching based upon this chapter while admitting the legendary or allegorical nature of its contents, is, I believe, to adopt a position which is quite untenable.

Similarly, it has been represented that S. Paul's inspiration—the ground claimed for the truth of his doctrine of Original Sin—is not invalidated because it may have been proved that the apostle had recourse, for some of his teaching, to the Jewish pseudepigraphic writings. But perhaps the question rather is, is his inspiration, in the sense of an infallible guarantee for the truth of his borrowed teaching, proved thereby? Are we to regard as inspired, or, as I would prefer to say, beyond question, every element of doctrine which he derived from the literature of his time? Again,

inspiration must be defined in terms of ascertained facts, not facts ascertained by the assumption of perhaps much too full and definite a meaning for inspiration.

In the light of these general remarks it will be seen that the disputed question of the exegesis of Eph. ii. 3 ("children of wrath"), and that of whether or not there are other passages in the Old and New Testament than those which I claim only to have found, are not of essential importance to my argument as a whole. No more, therefore, need be said with reference to these questions.

F. R. TENNANT.

Hockwold Rectory,
February, 1906.

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LECTURE I.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN: ITS TREATMENT IN THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE.

EZEK. XVIII. 2.

The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge.

ROM. III. 10.

There is none righteous, no, not one.

I.

IT is the main purpose of the present course of lectures to endeavour to show the need of stating afresh, and then to reconstruct, in terms of the knowledge and the language of our particular age, the essential contents of Christian thought and feeling in regard to the nature and origin of man's sinfulness.

There is a side of the problem of human sin—one may call it the God-ward side—upon which a man is qualified to speak in proportion as his own life approximates to the pattern of the sinless One. There is,

doubtless, illumination as to the nature and the roots of sin only to be derived from the experience of the mystic or the saint. Such light, however, it is not mine to offer; and with this aspect of the subject self-knowledge will constrain me not to deal.

I have to ask you, therefore, to descend with me to a distinctly lower level of discussion: to the merely intellectual, as distinguished from the spiritual, point of view. And even thus lightened the lecturer finds his burden of responsibility to be heavy. Not that any utterance of his, however great its error, could imperil a truth which he himself had failed to grasp: but because the restatement of truths formulated in terms of the natural knowledge of long ago inevitably involves rejection of elements which had hitherto seemed to be essential to devout believers; and one well knows that pain is so caused to such minds as it grieves one most to hurt. Particularly is this liable to be the case when the subject touches the soul so closely as that with which we are about to deal. One can well understand that, to those who have been accustomed to think of sin exclusively from the point of view of the mature Christian experience, an examination of its growth from conditions scarcely lying within the realm of the moral, and of its nature before it acquired its exceeding sinfulness, may seem to involve trifling with the idea of sin, and to make less unconditional and severe the censure which the

Christian conscience must ever pass upon it. This difficulty of speaking at once without fear and without offence is inherent in the nature of my task: the translation, that is, from familiar and time-hallowed forms of thought into those which, to some, will have all the repugnance of novelty and strangeness, and all the precariousness of partly tentative suggestion. But if either the lecturer's presuppositions or his results should be unacceptable to the temperament of any whom he is privileged to address, he would fain claim to occupy so much common ground with them as this: the conviction that, in respect to method, the highest reverence for the deep things of God consists in striving for as clear ideas of them as possible, and in following what appears to be the truth, wherever it may lead; whilst, with regard to consequences, it is the part of theological thought, like that of religious faith, to work and wait.

With this avowal of the difficulties one is conscious of having to face, I may pass on to define with a little more of detail the course of argument which it is intended to pursue. In the first two lectures I shall attempt to show that the explanations of the origin, propagation and universality of sin in the human world offered respectively by ecclesiastical doctrine and speculative philosophy leave room for further endeavours. The one has furnished no solution of the problem acceptable to the Christian theologian, and

the other presupposes certain assumptions which it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend. In the first lecture of the Lent term I shall venture to submit to your criticism a restatement of the problem suggested by the application of the modern category of development and by the results of psychological study of the growth of moral personality. Finally, there will remain for the last lecture the discussion of various questions upon which the theory thus supported may be expected to throw some light, or from which it may be likely to encounter certain difficulties. The larger problem of theodicy, the doctrine of the immanence of God, the relation of the new theory to Holy Scripture, and other questions implicated in our inquiry, may thus be considered in their connexion with that of the origin and universality of sin.

In the present lecture we are to review the explanation of human sinfulness which has been elaborated by dogmatic theology, mainly under the directing influence of S. Augustine. The theory which, subject to various modifications, has expressed the almost unanimous mind of the Church from an early time, is that which refers the prevalence of sin to a fall from a pristine condition of innocence or integrity at the beginning of human history. One consequence of this moral catastrophe was the corruption of our nature in such wise that every individual finds himself, from birth onwards, in an abnormal moral state: a state

described as inconsistent with the concept of man, foreign to the Creator's intention: a state, therefore, displeasing to God, or sinful, and also guilty, or deserving of punishment. This corruption of human nature has generally been represented since Augustine as consisting in a diminution of the freedom of the will and in an acquired, ingrained bias or inclination to evil; and the universal appearance of sinfulness in the lives of men is ascribed to its hereditary transmission by means of natural generation. Such, in rough outline, subject to minor variations and embellishments in different Protestant branches of the Church and to more considerable divergences in the Church of Rome, is the doctrine of Original Sin[1].

And there are few truths of the Christian Faith that have received more general acknowledgement than this doctrine of human nature. It has been developed with great elaboration and definiteness in the formularies of all branches of Christendom. But more than this; unlike some doctrines it has not remained, so far as practical use is concerned, the exclusive property of the theologian or the preacher. Students of human nature from various points of view have felt themselves compelled to adopt it as the only and necessary explanation of the sad facts of observation. Pascal had said that though it is the most

[1] For the exact formulation of the doctrine in the symbolic confessions of various Churches, see Note A.

incomprehensible of all mysteries, we are, without it, an unintelligible enigma to ourselves[1]. Herder speaks of the story of the Fall as "one of the pillars of Hercules beyond which there is nothing; the point from which all succeeding history starts"; it is the very kernel and germ of that history, "without which mankind would be, what so many things are, a book without a title, without the first cover and introduction." There is perhaps no writer of our own time who has probed the heart of man more thoroughly than Robert Browning; and for what may be taken as an expression of his judgment we need but recall the familiar lines in which he states, as one among the "reasons and reasons" for holding by the Christian Faith,

> "'Tis the faith that launched point-blank her dart
> At the head of a lie—taught original sin,
> The corruption of man's heart[2]."

[1] *Thoughts on Religion and Philosophy*, I. Taylor's trans. pp. 76–77. "It is very astonishing, that the mystery most remote from our knowledge, that, I mean, of the transmission of original sin, should be a thing without which we can possess no real knowledge of ourselves....Certainly nothing shocks us more than this doctrine, and yet without this most incomprehensible of all mysteries, we are an unintelligible enigma to ourselves. This is the master-key to the intricacies and perplexities of human existence. So that, however inconceivable this mystery may be, man, without it, is still more inconceivable....For myself, I am free to declare, that as soon as I discovered in the Christian religion the doctrine that man is fallen and separated from God, I saw on every side indications of its truth."

[2] "Gold Hair: a story of Pornic."

The testimony of Byron may also be quoted:

It would be easy to multiply similar quotations from various kinds of literature; though, to be fair, one should notice too the absence of such testimony where one might expect to find it: as, for instance, in the works of Shakespeare. The doctrine of Original Sin is perhaps alluded to by him occasionally[1], but seems never to be used as an explanation of the mixed nature of human character. One must admit, however, at the outset, without serious qualification, the truth of the words in which a recent theologian has estimated the wide-prevailing hold of this doctrine on the general mind: "it collects, as it descends to this modern era of the world, the suffrages of modern thought."

But lest this considerable unanimity amongst poets and men of the world, which it is impossible to gainsay, be taken to imply an overwhelming weight of

> "Our life is a false nature—'tis not in
> The harmony of things,—this hard decree,
> This ineradicable taint of sin,..."

For a collection of similar passages see Mozley's *Lectures and other Theol. Papers*, pp. 157 ff.

As evidence of the extremely important place in Christian doctrine assigned to original sin by many modern theologians, the following passage may be quoted:

"What may be called the starting point of Christian theology, the doctrine of hereditary guilt and sin, through the fall of Adam, and of the consequent entire and helpless corruption of our nature, is entirely unknown to Rabbinical Judaism." Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, 1894, vol. I. p. 52; cf. p. 165, where the doctrine of the Fall is said to be presented in the New Testament "as the basis of the need of a Redeemer."

[1] *e.g. Henry V.* I. i. 29.

authoritative testimony, based on the directly observed facts of human character and conduct, such as would envelope with an air of presumption any suggestion as to the possibility of revision, let me at once point out that the evidence to which appeal has thus been made is really not relevant to the precise point to which it has generally been applied. That to which the insight of the poet and the experience of the man of affairs really testifies is the wonderfully mixed nature of the human heart as we find it in the morally developed person: the subtle interweaving of evil with good in act and motive which presents itself everywhere to empirical observation. The doctrine of Original Sin, on the other hand, is far more than the recognition of this all-pervading presence of moral evil in the life of man. This doctrine advances to the assertion of its whence and why, its hidden source and cause, its ultimate empirical explanation. And it therein obviously transcends the scope of observation however profound, and of insight however keen, into the springs of human conduct or the manifestations of human character. The law of sin in the members, discovered in himself by S. Paul, but not referred by him to Adam's transgression as its cause, is a matter of experience with all of us, though psychology would give it now a different name; its origin, however, is not disclosed by spiritual introspection. The corruptness of man's heart, to which all literature

bears its sorrowful witness, is one thing, then; the original sin with which it is confounded, or which is alleged to be its source, is quite another thing. The one is given in experience, the other is an explanation of what is so given; the one is fact, the other inference from fact: intangible, invisible, conjectural; indemonstrable, from the nature of the case, by the observation and evidence on which our prohibition to be sceptical was apparently so widely based[1].

[1] It is most important to distinguish these two ideas which many writers on human sinfulness have confused. That "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other": that man, in other words, is at perpetual strife with himself, is a fact of universal experience which has found expression in all literatures, heathen and Christian. But it is quite another question whether this state is to be regarded as a disease, a confusion, or even in any strict sense a 'discord,' produced once and for all in human nature. Internal conflict, or the effort required to govern our impulses in relation to a moral law, may at any rate be conceived as being due to a man's normal and natural constitution. To moralise the non-moral in us must inevitably produce the same sense of discord and strife within ourselves as to be the victim of a mutilated or deranged moral constitution. A "chaos not yet reduced to order" will present exactly the same appearance to observation as a "wreck and ruin of a once fair and perfect harmony." Which of the two explanations of man's sinful state is the true one is a question to be decided by argument, and one which forms the purpose of the present work. At this stage one would merely point out that there *are* two alternatives; not one possibility only, as is so commonly assumed.

The following instances of this assumption may be cited as examples:

"The fact which implies 'original sin' is manifest, 'writ large' on our daily experience of human perversity and depravity." Wace,

It was indeed natural, if not inevitable, to identify the universality of sin with its heredity, the observed fact with the sole apparent explanation, so long as thought was dominated by the idea that man's first estate was one of moral excellence or innocence, of natural or miraculous harmony of quiescent flesh and calmly ruling spirit. The evil of his heart could only then be supposed to come through the corruption of

Christianity and Morality, ed. 1, p. 82. On the same page Dr Wace speaks of original sin as "*observable* from the very moment of dawning reason" (italics ours).

"The witness of all our own experience; of all current language, all common expectations, about the ways of man:—the witness, conscious and unconscious, of prophetic minds in every age:—the witness of daily life, of our journals with their columns full of ceaseless news about the fruits, the provocations, the deceitfulness, the anticipations, the triumphs or the punishments of sin:—the witness, interpreting all else, of our own hearts, with their surprises of meanness and cruelty and profanity, their black storms of temper, their contemptible pettiness of vanity, their wretched way of always spoiling a fair thought or a pure motive with some vulgarising daub of selfishness:—all this whole weight and force of testimony, most manifold and yet unconscious, converges upon the truth of a world-wide disfigurement of human life: a pervading taint through all our history: a sense of something wrong in the ethical basis of our nature, thrust into every movement of the will." Paget, *Faculties and Difficulties for Belief and Disbelief*, p. 166.

"I do not see how its truth" (i.e. the doctrine of original sin) "can be altogether ignored by any man who goes about the world with his eyes open, and sees it writ large in history, past and present, or who looks with any truthful introspection into the workings of his own soul." Barry, *Bampton Lectures*, 1892, p. 58.

The identity of observed fact with theoretical explanation has been also assumed by Trench, R. I. Wilberforce, Bright, Newman, Mozley. Cf. also Guizot, *Meditations on Christianity*, E. T. p. 376.

his once pure and passionless being. But for us there has emerged an alternative view of man's original condition. What if he were flesh before spirit; lawless, impulse-governed organism, fulfilling as such the nature necessarily his and therefore the life God willed for him in his earliest age, until his moral consciousness was awakened to start him, heavily weighted with the inherited load, not, indeed, of abnormal and corrupted nature, but of non-moral and necessary animal instinct and self-assertive tendency, on that race-long struggle of flesh with spirit and spirit with flesh, which for us, alas! becomes but another name for the life of sin? On such a view, man's moral evil would be the consequence of no defection from his endowment, natural or miraculous, at the start; it would bespeak rather the present non-attainment of his final goal.

Here then, in the theory of development, is a new suggestion with regard to the origin of sin, offering a genetic explanation of the facts of observation and experience. And this suggestion theology must frankly meet. It will involve no irreverence to the venerable traditions of the past if we attempt to formulate our belief with regard to sin in terms of a more extended view of human history and human nature than was accessible to former generations, but which, in the providence of God, lies ready for our own. Still less need it savour of disloyalty to the Faith which we profess if we recognise as reopened, by

the mere progress of natural knowledge, a question long regarded in the Church, perhaps, as closed for ever; a question, moreover, belonging less to the realm of religious faith than to the lower province of the natural history of man.

On proceeding to look more closely at certain features of the theory of man's sinfulness which, with scarce an exception amongst Christian theologians, holds the field, let me emphasise the fact that it is with the consistency of its formulation and with the stability of its scientific foundations that our criticism is to be concerned; and if these should be impugned, the reverent humility and the profound sense of what is deepest in man, which speak from it to our hearts and consciences, are none the less acknowledged and esteemed. We may remark, indeed, that the value of a great generalisation is not always proportionate to its objective truth. At a certain stage in the progress of knowledge vast services to thought and to religious life may be rendered by a theory which, in a later time, may be found to embody the spirit of truth in faulty letter. And such, I am constrained to believe, is the case with the doctrine of hereditary or original sin. For, on the one hand, the history of this doctrine in the Church, especially from the Reformation onwards, reveals, at least as conspicuously as the tenacity with which the general mind has clung to it, the uneasiness with which it has never ceased to oppress the thought

of philosophic theologians. And the existence of this chronic state of intellectual tension excites a suspicion that the vital truth which the doctrine really enshrines has long been struggling for emancipation from elements which the conscience finds repulsive. On the other hand, the application of the idea of development without a catastrophic fall, and of the conception of human nature as offering conditions for a moral probation but not properly to be called corrupted, seems compatible with the essential truth of man's moral solidarity without enveloping it in suppositions which the Christian mind has striven in vain to assimilate with the rest of its theology.

When we recall the occasion in the history of the Church on which our problem first definitely emerged, we are reminded of the fact that the repudiation of the doctrine of the Fall was the necessary outcome of the Pelagian denial of man's need of grace. But if we reverse the order in which these negative positions actually appeared in history, and start from the rejection of the Fall, to which Pelagius was apparently driven with some reluctance, it will at once be obvious that we are not thereby compelled to deduce his premiss. The existence of sin is the sufficient basis of the doctrines of grace and redemption, quite apart from the further question of sin's origin and mode of propagation. And if we detach ourselves also from the impossible view of the nature of free-will with which

Pelagius gratuitously burdened himself, we may, I think, if we feel so convinced, affirm that, on the intellectual side, and in essential points, Pelagius was at least as near the truth as S. Augustine, without committing ourselves to any of the undesirable consequences inevitably associated with his unorthodox position. There can be no doubt that what is called the atomistic conception of sin to which Pelagius pledged himself, the view, that is, which regards the will as equally unfettered for the choice of good after any number of surrenders to the side of evil, as if each committed sin passed away and left no trace upon the character, was one which encouraged an altogether trifling estimate of sin, and contained a falsehood which would render it morally dangerous to anyone who seriously embraced it. It was this denial of the existence and the power of such a thing as sinful habit that was at once the least logically necessary and the most morally damaging feature of Pelagius' doctrine. His vigorous safeguarding of the inalienable rights and responsibilities of personality, which S. Augustine, it must be confessed, for all his superior profundity, unduly minimised, was a contribution to the Christian doctrine of Sin with which no age can dare to tamper with impunity. On the other hand, the infinitely greater spiritual fruitfulness of the Augustinian theory is due to its liberal recognition of two truths which also formed the essential kernel of the less

definite teaching of S. Paul, but were practically absent from the system of Pelagius: firstly, the existence of the power of sin as habit, and our inability, in spite of formal freedom, to do the things that we would; and, secondly, the social nature of man and the physical unity of the race. It is for its forcible representation of these two facts that the doctrine of Original Sin still commends itself with undiminished plausibility to the general sense of Christendom; and if its expression of them prove to be unhappy, they must certainly find an equally conspicuous place in the restatement by which the old formula is ever to be supplanted.

This brief summary of the essential points involved in the Pelagian controversy, in so far as it concerns our subject, will enable us to isolate the one great difficulty which has always beset the problem of human sin. It is that of reconciling the fact of its race-wide prevalence with the idea of guilt, which attaches with propriety only to the individual person. Experience shows that *all* are tainted with moral evil, as if with an inborn disease: conscience asserts that *each* is accountable for his own sin as if it were solely his creation. Pelagianism, ever taking on new forms, emphasises the side of individual responsibility; the doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin, on the other hand, insists as determinedly on the generic aspect of evil, and rejects the purely individualistic explanation as quite inadequate.

We have to inquire, then, in what manner the Augustinian theory predicates moral solidarity of the race.

In the first place we notice that the formularies of the various Reformed Churches agree in attaching *guilt* to birth-sin. The Tridentine decree on Original Sin does not clearly imply that original guilt attaches to fallen man, and asserts that his concupiscence is not strictly of the nature of sin. The idea of imputation, however, is adopted by some Roman Catholic theologians[1]. But the various Protestant Churches not only teach, for the most part, some form of imputation, but are unanimous in regarding the inherited corruption of nature to be offensive to God and deserving of His wrath and punishment. They hold, in fact, a doctrine of Sin which does not necessarily require the voluntary consent of a person to be an essential factor of his sinfulness. By S. Augustine himself, who was led by the exigencies of controversy to recognise but imperfectly the individual nature of responsibility, both the justice of God and the accountability of man were supposed to be sufficiently secured by allowing perfect freedom of choice between good and evil only to Adam. That he had some sense of the danger of such teaching, and of the tendency of his doctrine that

[1] See Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*, E. Trans. p. 106. Klee (*Dogm.*) rejects the federal and other theories of imputation and allows only a traducianist mode of transmission of original sin.

man is necessarily sinful through heredity, is shown by his anxiety to maintain that we were all potentially in Adam, and indeed were Adam, when he sinned. But he falls short of making each individual, as a separate personality, actually or consciously participate in its first parent's sin, and so fails to save himself from an overwhelming difficulty, even by the precarious and, for us, impossible device of regarding Adam's sin as potentially ours[1]. Augustine was an intuitive rather than an empirical thinker; and he stood almost on the threshold of the scholastic age. We are not surprised, therefore, at the inadequate forms of thought in which he expressed his doctrine, such as this conception of Adam's personality, and not merely his nature, being common to his descendants. But however natural to him, as the limitations of his science and philosophy, such notions are impossible for us; they are foreign to our habit of mind and contrary to our fundamental moral judgments. And yet it is only by replacing Augustine's theory of imputation, a curious anticipation of the realism of which we hear so much in later mediæval controversy, by suppositions equally fanciful, such as the federal theology which would see in Adam our valid representative, without our acquiescence, in

[1] *De Civitate Dei*, XIII. 14. Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum, quae de illo facta est ante peccatum. *Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed jam natura erat seminalis, ex qua propagaremur;...*

an arbitrary judicial compact with the Deity, that the theory of Original Sin has been even nominally reconciled with the sense of individual guilt, and saved from referring the responsibility for human sin mediately back to the Creator. The Pelagian principle, that 'God who remits a man's own sins does not impute to him another's,' can only be prevented from securing the capitulation of Augustinianism so long as the latter doctrine either is able to show that the 'other's' sin is the individual's own, or else renounces the connexion it had emphasised between original sin and personal guilt. But, as for the former of these alternatives, the scholastic and post-Reformation attempts to realise the fictitious identity of the race with its head have long been obsolete; and thus, in so far as it is a doctrine of Original Guilt, the Augustinian theory has already been tried by the Christian moral sense and found to be wanting[1].

Perhaps the most striking testimony to the deficiency of the theory of Original Guilt has been supplied by one of its ablest modern defenders. Reviewing the two forms in which the Church has expressed the connexion of guilt with original sin, the late Dr Mozley said of the one: "it is contradictory to common reason, according to which one man cannot be thus the same

[1] See Note C, on S. Augustine's 'Participation' theory.

The subjective mind of Abelard revolted against this side of the doctrine. See Neander's *Church History*, ed. Bohn, VIII. 197.

with another, and commit a sin before he is born"; and of the other: "it is contradictory to our sense of justice, according to which one man ought not to be punished for another's sin[1]." The only conclusion which it would seem possible to draw from such admissions Dr Mozley endeavoured to avert by resorting to the supposition that we are here "dealing with a mystery," so that what is "described in this doctrine as having taken place with respect to mankind, has taken place mysteriously, not after the manner of common fact[2]." And with this plea the writer meets the well-known objections of Jeremy Taylor and S. T. Coleridge. But such an expedient demands a strenuous protest; and one must not allow the deep respect which every scholar feels for the work of Dr Mozley to deter one from its expression. Of all attempts to succour a distressed doctrine this would seem to me to be the most disastrous. Even Mansel's famous betrayal of theology to agnosticism would be less damaging. For to affirm that a theory which deals in part with matters of history and physics and,

[1] *On Predestination*, 2nd ed. p. 32.

[2] Dr Mozley here followed Pascal (*op. cit.* p. 77), "But how could it be perceived by reason, since it is a thing above reason?" See also Mozley's Lecture on 'Mysterious Truths,' in his *Lectures and other Theological Papers*. The subject of 'truths above reason' is dealt with by Principal Caird in *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, ch. III. The particular case of the doctrine of Original Sin, for reasons given immediately below, is hardly one to which the words 'above reason' can be applied.

on its higher side, invites a judgment of the moral faculty, but which is found to conflict with reason or morality, if not with both, can nevertheless be true "in some mysterious way," is surely to paralyse the reason and the moral sense, and to reduce the distinction between truth and falsehood to delusion.

We may then the more confidently assume that the doctrine of Original Sin, in so far as it implies original guilt, stands self-condemned. Indeed the idea of original guilt involves a contradiction. Guilt is only predicable of the single person's volitional act.

The organic unity of mankind, therefore, does not account for this fact of guilt in the individual's moral experience; and if there be a race-sin or birth-sin it must be conceived as not involving in guilt the member who inherits it.

And so modern theology has been led to deny the necessity of always correlating the sinful and the guilty and making them exactly coextensive terms. It retains original sin; it repudiates original guilt. This of course involves using the words 'sin' and 'sinful' in a sense somewhat different from that which they usually bear. Consequently some have roundly asserted that what is called original sin is not sin. Without adopting that standpoint now, one may regret the elasticity which many of the leading words and concepts involved in the treatment of our problem have been allowed to acquire in theological discussion.

Certainly the indefiniteness of our technical vocabulary has been responsible for confusion of thought to an even greater extent than inadequate psychological analysis[1].

Bearing in mind then that we are now to pass from the strict sense of the term 'sinful,' applicable only to what is personal and volitional and correlative with guilty, we have next to ask how, this idea of guilt being dropped, man's state at birth is to be conceived as sinful. As far back as in the writings of S. Anselm, who nevertheless insisted on the actuality and guiltiness of inborn sin in the infant, we meet with expressions apparently implying dissatisfaction with the view that original sin is strictly sin in the sense we have just defined. It is regarded as deformity or misery. Zwingli, and also the Arminians, conceived of it as a malady and not as sin. The Roman Church, following Duns Scotus, asserts in the decree of Trent on original sin that concupiscence, the selfish desire which characterises human nature in its fallen state, is not truly and properly sin. An Anglican manual states that though original sin is a defect of nature or moral disorder, making us 'children of wrath,' it is rather, except in so far as we identify ourselves with it by actual sin, an appeal to God's compassion than a provocation of His anger. Finally, representatives of

[1] See Note B, on the ambiguous usage of the term sin and its derivatives in Theology.

each of the schools of Lutheran theology in Germany[1] are also found to speak of man's nature as 'sinful' only in the modified sense that, though no blame attaches to a man for the mere possession of it, it is nevertheless 'displeasing to God,' something which ought never to have been.

Here then we encounter the irreducible residue of the doctrine of the Fall and its effect upon the race: the doctrine that men are sinful not merely in that they have committed sinful acts, formed sinful habits, and established sinful characters, but also in the somewhat different sense that they inherit a nature which is rendered abnormal through privation, derangement or disturbance, and in which there is a bias towards evil prior to all voluntary sinful action. Before dwelling on the difficulties inherent in this view, at first sight promising so much toward the explanation of the universality of sinfulness, I would call attention to an assumption underlying it which has always seemed to imply strong reasons for its truth. It is the more in place at this point for its connexion with what has just been said in regard to the varying content in theology of the concept of sin.

The Pelagian, Arminian, and kindred expositions of

[1] Kaftan (Ritschlian) writes at considerable length on original sin from this point of view in his *Dogmatik*; so also Dorner, *System of Christian Doctrine*, III. 56 (E. T.) etc. Dorner, however, argues that there may be 'unintentional sin' (p. 52), and would apply ethical terms to what is not the outcome of volition.

the nature and source of sin are commonly held to be deficient by the orthodox mainly because they regard all the incitements to evil of which we are conscious as belonging to our natural constitution, all its strength of appetite and self-directed impulse, as not in themselves sinful till the appropriating act of will consents to them. That a sensual, a selfish, an uncharitable thought can so much as appear in our consciousness is generally regarded as evidence that our nature is abnormal and depraved. Or, again, that tendencies which, on the emergence of the moral sense, would be pronounced sinful if entertained or obeyed, are apparent within us before we arrive at moral accountability, is taken to be proof of the existence in us of an inherited fault of nature. The question thus raised will call for treatment at a later stage of our inquiry, which it is not expedient now to anticipate. At this point I would but state that the theory of Original Sin places such seductive impulses as arise spontaneously from within us, apart from all acquiescence in them, under the ethical category of sin: regarding them as marks of inward disorder and abnormity, things which pollute the man and betray the corruption of his heart and personality. And I would further observe that if reason can be assigned for declaring this designation a misuse of language, the argument based upon it falls to the ground[1].

[1] See Lecture III. and note B.

But assuming for the present the legitimacy of the application of ethical terms to these contents of our nature, and allowing the possibility of their origin through a derangement of man's original estate, let us look a little more closely at the implications of such a doctrine. There are difficulties connected with each of the constituent factors of the theory of the corruption of our nature by a fall; the conceptions, namely, of an original state of goodness, of the transition from it to the act of evil, of the derangement of the whole nature by an act, or even a course of sin, and of the hereditary transmission of a disturbance so acquired. The first three of these points have frequently been discussed, and therefore need not detain us long. The question of heredity, and the relation of the doctrine of transmitted sinfulness to the teachings of science, will exact a rather fuller notice.

(*a*) We have first to consider the conception of an original unfallen moral state which forms the basis upon which the whole structure of the ecclesiastical doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin are grounded. Perhaps the most convincing proof of the insecurity or invalidity of the doctrine of Original Righteousness, to a mind reluctant to embrace the theory of man's gradual but continuous evolution, would be a thorough historical investigation of its development from the time of the incorporation of its germ into early prophetic or pre-prophetic Hebrew literature down to the

treatise of Bishop Bull or the celebrated sermon of Bishop South[1]. Such an exposition, doubtless, would

[1] The account of Adam and Eve in Paradise states no more of their moral endowments than (i) capacity to obey or disobey a divine command with regard to the tree of knowledge, (ii) absence of shame at their state of nakedness. Of their natural life it implies that it was without the physical troubles involved in the curse of Gen. iii. 16–19. S. Paul connects, in some way which he does not define, the sinfulness of the race with the one man through whom sin entered into the world, but says nothing of the state of original righteousness.

With these statements we may contrast the following extract from Bishop Bull's work, which will illustrate the lengths to which speculation on man's first estate has been carried even by sober theologians:

"I might here insist upon that admirable philosophy lecture which Adam (appointed by God Himself to that office) read on all the other animals. For although his theme here was a part of natural philosophy, yet his performance herein, if we look to its circumstances, cannot but be judged by every considering man to be the effect of a more than human sagacity. That, in the infinite variety of creatures, never before seen by Adam, he should be able on a sudden, without study or premeditation, to give names to each of them, so adapted and fitted to their natures, as that God Himself should approve the nomenclature, how astonishing a thing is it! What single man, among all the philosophers since the Fall, what Plato, what Aristotle etc. among the ancients, what Descartes or Gassendi among the moderns, nay, what Royal Society durst have undertaken this?" (Bull's *Works*, II. 349.)

South similarly says: "An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, and Athens but the rudiments of Paradise."

These passages are concerned with the intellectual, not the moral, endowments of the first man; but they give a correct impression of the methods of exegesis used in the elaboration of the doctrine of the original state as a whole, at least in the later stages of its development.

be interesting; but at least a whole lecture would be required barely to do it justice[1].

It has already been hinted that the supposition of an original condition, such as the doctrine of the Fall requires, is one which it becomes ever harder to retain. The very conception involves difficulties; and, apart from exegesis, the method by which it has been reached is unphilosophical. It results, in some of the forms in which it is met with, from referring back to the beginning of the human race a condition which the Christian revelation first made possible, and in all cases involves the assumption of a special creation of man as a being endowed from the first with a moral nature enabling him to discriminate between good and evil: a view the untenability of which will appear later.

It would scarcely be necessary, perhaps, even if there were now time, to call up the heavy fire of several natural sciences against this fundamental basis

[1] It will be plain that if the nature of the Fall-story and of its inspiration be altogether different from that which it was assumed to be during the time in which the doctrines based upon it were elaborated, the claim that such doctrines are part of the content of divinely revealed truth, in the usual sense of that expression, or are necessary inferences therefrom, will be impugned. Their validity must then be determined by their power to bear examination in the light of our natural knowledge. It is presupposed throughout the present work that a historical fall of the human race in its first parents is not a revealed fact. For a justification of this position the writer must refer to his other treatise on *The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin*.

of the doctrine of the Fall. The increased light which has been thrown upon the early history of mankind, not to speak of the continuity of the human species with those lower in the scale of animal life, compels us to entertain the conviction that what was once necessarily received as a genuine tradition is rather, transfigured and spiritualised, the product of primitive speculation on a matter beyond the reach of human memory. Literary criticism and historical exegesis, comparative religion and race-psychology, geology and anthropology all contribute materially to the cumulative evidence on this head[1].

(*b*) Even if the supposition of a state of original righteousness could be maintained it would be difficult to imagine how the transition from implanted goodness to actual sin could take its rise. The introduction of an external tempter from another world, a suggestion of somewhat late Jewish thought, possible only when early Hebrew demonology had proceeded to a relatively advanced stage of development, of course but shifts the

[1] Without encroaching here upon subject-matter more appropriate to the historical treatment of the doctrine of the Fall, one may state that the view, according to which the early narratives of Genesis embody a record of a primitive revelation, preserved in purity by the Hebrews alone, has completely broken down in the light of the facts of the sciences enumerated above—e.g. man's extreme antiquity and rude primitive state, the gradual growth of his mental and moral nature, the existence of similar records amongst other races, whence the Hebrews partly borrowed theirs, and whose origin can be naturally accounted for.

difficulty further back, at the same time redoubling its intensity. And if we look for the cause of this transition, for the ultimate origin of sin, in fact, in the unfallen nature itself, we must ascribe to that nature something more than the mere possibility of evil, something more than the formal *liberum arbitrium*: something of solicitation from within. Whether the freedom ascribed to the will of unfallen Adam were that of perfect harmony with the will of God, or that of independence of all motives, or that of choice conditioned by motive and character, it is equally hard on the theory of an original balance or preestablished harmony of human nature to explain how sin could take its rise. It is the approach to evil, the indwelling propulsion to a wrong course which, on the theory that man was made at once an innocent and a moral being, precisely needs to be accounted for. If actual sin, in us, presupposes a sinful state, it is hard to see why the same inference should not equally apply to the case of the first man, whose *peccatum originans* has been held to be the cause of our *peccatum originatum*.

(*c*) Another difficulty is inherent in the premiss of the ancient doctrine of Original Sin. It is not easy to understand how one act of sin, however momentous, could serve to dislocate at once the whole nature of man and to destroy the balance of all his faculties. Human experience furnishes no analogy to such disturbing action. The decisive single deeds which, we

well know, can determine the after-course of a career and permanently blunt the sensibility of the moral faculty are not strictly parallel. For they are always but the final outcome and expression of gradually built-up character. Of such an act we have a classic example in Tito Melema's deliberate refusal to recognise his foster-father. But in this instance the transition from innocence to deep depravity was brought about in many stages, and therein lies the truthfulness of George Eliot's portraiture to life. Nor is this objection much "less cogent than it seems[1]." For it is essential to the Augustinian theory of the origin of sin, or, more correctly, of human sinfulness, that the *peccatum originans* was in the strict sense a first sin. Writers such as Duns Scotus, who regarded Adam as having committed lighter offences before the mortal sin which decided the fate of the race, rendering that great transgression possible: or Rupert of Deutz, who considered that Eve was already morally infected when she lent an ear to the serpent: or Jacob Böhme, who saw in Adam's 'deep sleep' the beginning of his fall: nay, even Irenaeus and the Antiochenes, who taught that Adam, before the Fall, was an *infans* or *νήπιος*, are generally regarded by those who came under the mighty influence of S. Augustine to have been guilty of a tendency towards Pelagianising. Adam's lapse was an initiative act; and though such acts, in the

[1] Caird, *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. I. p. 217.

early years of life, are sometimes critical, surely the experience of all who have aided in the training of youth will testify that such cases are the exception, not the rule.

Thus at each step the old theory which traces human sinfulness to an original acquired defect of nature encounters difficulties when examined closely. Apart from its precariousness, if we may not say its untenability, from the point of view of empirical science, it is a nest of psychological and ethical inconsistencies[1]. And to speak generally, these inconsistencies arise from the conception of man as a being created at once intelligent and elementarily moral, without the background of a past development, and as endowed with an implanted and unhindered aptitude for goodness. When we come to approach the whole problem from the standpoint which regards the very essence of man as a variable or flowing quantity, which finds it as impossible to define the concept of human nature[2] as the psychologist, for instance, finds himself incapable of

[1] For a fuller enumeration of these see Rüetschi, *Geschichte u. Kritik der kirchl. Lehre v. der urspr. Vollkommenheit u. vom Sündenfall*, S. 148 ff.

[2] The conception of human nature as an 'essence,' or as at bottom an essentially invariable type, or as a simple instead of a complex whole, inevitable before the idea of development altered our mode of conceiving things, is one which must share with the loose usage of the term 'sin' and its derivatives, already commented upon, the responsibility for the confusion which has enveloped the discussion of human sinfulness and its cause. See Note B, end.

defining those of the self and personality except in relation to some specific purpose in his usage of them: which deems it as true to say that God is making man as that He has made him, and which looks for the origination of sin, not after man became the being he now is, but rather in the process of his becoming, we may hope to find that all these several obstacles will disappear.

(*d*) There remains now the difficulty of understanding how the results of the Fall upon the nature of our first parents could be transmitted to their posterity by natural descent.

We encounter first, in this connexion, the traducianist theory, of which there are several slightly divergent forms. This doctrine asserts that the soul of the child is generated from the souls of its parents. It seems to have been introduced into the Christian Church from the later Stoic philosophy by Tertullian. He presented it, however, in terms of a materialism so thinly veiled that, convenient as it would certainly have been for his purpose, S. Augustine shrank from definitely adopting it. Whether his doctrine of inherited sinfulness does not logically require some such view, as certain upholders of traducianism maintain, is, however, a debatable question. If it does, both fall together. For philosophy will not allow such notions as those which traducianism, when least materialistic, necessarily involves. If we may legitimately think of

the soul as a 'substance,' not only in the logical but also in the metaphysical sense of that word, we certainly cannot regard it as having extension in space. We cannot conceive of it as a matter-like entity capable of self-division and reproduction such as we attribute to a unicellular plant. We cannot endow it with a being prior to its activities without committing ourselves to belief in the actuality of the emptiest of all abstractions. Nor can we describe the soul in terms borrowed from biological science without depriving them of all their meaning. Its origin is rather to be conceived as gradual, and its existence as a matter of degree. We may at once rule out of consideration all discussions of the merits of the rival theories of traducianism and creatianism to be met with in manuals which treat the problem as a matter of exegesis and patristic opinion, and must bow to the authority of the psychologist and metaphysician. And if there is one point upon which all philosophers are in agreement, it is perhaps the impossibility of a materialistic metaphysics of mind. "No previous mental activity, or conscious state, can really be connected with the following activities and states as their progenitor, so as to explain the genesis of the latter in the same way in which the existence and action of the parents explain the origin of the offspring; or even in the same way as that in which the earlier forms of bodily development explain the origin of the later forms.... To speak

of parents as transmitting their minds to their offspring, in part or in whole, is to use words that have no assignable meaning[1]." It is impossible to express what the traducianist theory states in terms of such conceptions of the mind's reality and identity, development, and relation to bodily organism, as may be derived from a scientific study of mental life. The only view of the origin of the soul which is consistent with the observed facts of experience and with the metaphysics which ethical theism can embrace is a form of creatianism refined of the crudities incidental to its popular statement, such as is taught by Lotze. The soul, according to this philosopher, is, as it were, a "uniformly maintained act of God," begotten from Himself when the organism with which it is destined to be associated has been prepared; He is the One which supplies underlying unity to the many, and they, despite that unity in Him, when once arisen, are independent things[2].

[1] Prof. Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 361 ff.

[2] "At the place where, and at the moment when, the germ of an organic being is formed amid the coherent system of the physical course of Nature, this fact furnishes the incitement or the moving reason which induces that all-comprehending One Being.....to beget from Himself, besides, as a consistent supplement to such physical fact, the soul belonging to this organism." *Outlines of Psychology*, § 81.

"The soul originates neither in the body nor in nothing; it goes forth from the substance of the Infinite with no less fulness of reality than all actual Nature brought forth from the same source. And neither do soul and body come together by chance, nor is it the work

It is therefore to be concluded that the organic unity of the race pertains directly only to the material side of our constitution. Heredity, in the strict sense of inheritance by birth or descent and not in that of appropriation of environment, cannot take place "in the region of the spiritual personality[1]."

of the body by its organisation to make itself a soul corresponding to the possible form of its vital activity; nor does the Infinite arbitrarily distribute ready-fashioned minds to infant germs. But as with free consistency it makes every bodily organism the necessary result of the parent organisms, so also in the creation of souls it doubtless follows a self-imposed law, that weaves their succeeding generations into the gradations of an inherent affinity. The soul of the parents cannot be split up by division into the souls of the children, but we are left to the dim conjecture that the creative hand of the Infinite reproduces in the latter the mental image of the parents, and brings inwardly also into near relationship those beings which it has linked together most closely for outward life." *Microcosmus*, E. T., vol. I. p. 391.

The obvious fact of experience that the character and the course of development of an individual mind are determined to some extent by environment and bodily organism, and that the 'nature,' as we call it, of a mind is in part determined by inheritance of cerebral peculiarities with which mental qualities are correlated, or by which certain mental qualities are necessitated, is here appealed to by Lotze as the expression of a law of nature or self-imposed universal mode of divine activity, and not an arbitrary 'special creation' of mental family likeness which might possibly seem to be implied in the concluding words of this passage.

[1] This phrase is quoted from a passage in which Dr Gore seeks to find a scientific basis for the doctrine of hereditary sin (*Epistle to the Romans*, II. Note E, p. 227). "No one who is not a materialist would deny the *possibility* of the character of the parent modifying at its very root that of the child, without even the smallest conceivable modification of the physical organism; because in the origination of

It is impossible, of course, to deny that mental qualities are inherited by offspring from ancestor. The works of Ribot and Galton, to name no others, have established beyond doubt the fact that talents, tastes, strength or weakness of emotions and passions, are transmissible. But their transmission takes place only in the form of modified physical structure, with which the physical quality is necessarily correlated; it is mediated solely through the body. "Psychological heredity," says Ribot, "has its cause in physiological heredity." Hence it is nowadays more common to find the doctrine of inherited sinfulness based on the ordinary laws of physical heredity with which science has of late been busy. It must be said, however, that it is exceedingly doubtful whether an appeal to science on this matter will advance the interests of

a spiritual personality, and in the link which binds it to the antecedent personalities to which it owes its being, there is that which lies outside the purview of biological science. There *may* be an inheritance of sinful tendencies derived from sinful acts in the region of the spiritual personality, even if no physical transmission is possible."

It is plain that what is called 'social heredity,' the appropriation by the mentally developing individual of the influences of society or mental environment, is not what is appealed to in the above passage as the medium for the transmission of sinful tendencies from parent to child. The position adopted must therefore be traducian, implying continuity of soul-substance or mind between parent and child. And though traducianism is not materialism in the sense of asserting mind to be a mode or property of matter, it has been shown above to involve materialistic and impossible metaphysics of mind.

the theological theory. Certainly the invocation of the 'principle of heredity' has generally been attended with misunderstandings or ignorance as to the scientific basis of the problem.

It is not enough to point, for instance, to the well-known facts of the transmissibility of disease, liability to certain vices, and various tendencies in which we see signs of depravity[1]. The question turns entirely upon the possibility of the transmission of acquired modifications as distinguished from congenital variations. And it is still less satisfactory to assume that possibility as if the underlying scientific problem were non-existent[2].

Yet further, it is not sufficient to rely upon the fact that the more speculative parts of Weismann's theory of heredity are highly precarious and but little received by his fellows in the same department of research. We may grant that Prof. Weismann's conjectures as to the mechanism by which heredity is effected are a leap

[1] e.g. Caird, *op. cit.* i. 213; Gibson, *Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 364 (ed. 2); Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, p. 167.

[2] Thus, Prof. Orr, in his *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 198, asserts that "man is a bundle of inherited tendencies, and will in turn transmit his nature, *with its new marks of good and evil*, to those who come after him" (italics ours). The writer adds that this conception is the scientific expression of a doctrine fundamental to the Scriptures, and underlying all its teaching about sin and salvation. Again, in *Progress of Dogma*, p. 148, he remarks: "It is easy in a *doctrinaire* way to criticise this theory of Augustine's, which yet has singular support in the modern doctrine of heredity."

in the dark: that the theory of continuity of germ-plasm, developed though by no means originated by him, states more than can be experimentally observed, though it would seem to be absolutely essential to any explanation of the facts, as all schools admit: and that the *a priori* proposition that acquired characters *cannot* be inherited is not wholly justified in the present state of knowledge. In other words, the burning question of the inheritance of such modifications is one upon which science cannot be said to have yet given its last word. Still the conviction very largely prevails amongst the authorities that unequivocal instances of such transmission have never yet been supplied. The mood of uncritical and unverified assumption characteristic of a quarter of a century ago has been exchanged for one of ever-increasing scepticism, especially amongst those whose investigations lie in the realm of experiment as contrasted with that of speculation. And finally it is almost impossible to conceive the nature of the mechanism whereby a specific effect produced upon any organism could so modify its reproductive organs as to cause a *corresponding* modification in the offspring. Now for a great acquired change in man's original nature or natural constitution to be transmitted universally there would be necessary a thorough disturbance of the physical constitution, presumably the brain, central nervous system and sense-organs, through the immoral act or course of conduct,

and then the transmission of that acquired physical derangement from generation to generation. Neither supposition, however, would seem to be a possibility; and certainly neither derives support from a study of the effects of ordinary sins or sinful habits, on ourselves or on posterity[1].

The main objections against the doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin which arise out of the implications of these doctrines themselves, rather than out of the premisses and the methods by means of which they have been developed, have now been briefly stated. If they have weight it will be obvious that theology has supplied no adequate and final solution of the problem how evil arose, and continues to arise, in every child of man[2]. Indeed the doctrine of an inherited corruption comes dangerously near to resolving original sin into physical evil[3]. It only remains for us, in conclusion, to mark the point at which the ecclesiastical theory begins to fail us. It rightly insists that the source of sin cannot be discovered in the will abstracted

[1] For fuller information on the scientific questions involved in this discussion, chiefly quoted from the writings of specialists, see Note D, on heredity of acquired characters.

[2] That these objections militate against modified orthodox doctrines of the Fall, e.g. those of Sanday and Headlam and of Aubrey Moore, will be seen by referring to Note E.

[3] It is fair to say that in so far as original sin is regarded as a disorder propagated by natural generation it is reduced to physical evil, and in so far as guilt is attached to such inherited disorder a purely legalistic and unethical theory of imputation is involved.

altogether from its environment, nor therefore in the individual, as Pelagius implied, independently of his organic connexion with the race. But the difficulties of the doctrine begin when it overlooks the fact that sin is resolvable into two factors, neither of which by itself is sin, and attributes ready-made evil, as such, to the nature common to us all, instead of seeing therein only the conditions, occasions or instruments out of which sin, not yet even latently existing, universally arises amid the stress of the moral probation thus assigned to us by our Maker: a probation in which the individual's will finds itself continually called to choose between the ends to which his organic nature blindly impels him, and the ends of altogether higher worth to which the small but imperative voice of such moral law as he knows urges him without condition. Such an alternative account of the source of sin, after glancing at the contributions to the problem offered by philosophy, we shall seek to establish in a later lecture.

LECTURE II.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN: ITS TREATMENT IN PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATION.

WISDOM IX. 16 ff.

Hardly do we divine the things that are on earth,
And the things that are close at hand we find with labour;
But the things that are in the heavens who ever yet traced out?

II.

IN the first lecture we examined from a modern point of view the now ancient endeavour of dogmatic theology to construct a theory of the origin and propagation of sin. It was an endeavour made under the influence of an estimate of the nature and inspiration of the Scriptural passages which formed its premisses somewhat different from that to which many theologians of our generation have been led. Of course when we

contrast the brevity and indefiniteness of the several Biblical statements on the matter with the astounding voluminousness of the literature which in post-Reformation times was devoted to the elucidation of any one of them, we realise at once that the development of the highly complicated doctrine of Original Sin was less the outcome of strict exegesis than due to the exercise of speculation; speculation working indeed on the lines laid down in Scripture, but applied to such material as current science and philosophy were able to afford[1]. We, therefore, can look upon the doctrine of hereditary sinfulness, without disrespect to it, as taking its place amongst other speculative theories. Of course such a judgment would by no means have been acquiesced in by those who shared in its elaboration. From their point of view the doctrine was rather a necessary deduction from the infallible premisses of revealed truth. And for this reason I have considered it apart, as distinctively the contribution of theology.

[1] The same observation is applicable, though of course in a much less degree, to patristic and early scholastic exegesis, of which that of the Reformation and post-Reformation divines was but a further development. Instances have already been given of the elaborateness with which the state of man before the Fall, and the consequences of that event, were defined by means of a speculatively expanded exegesis. From the 16th to the earlier part of the 18th century imagiuation on such matters scarcely knew any bounds. Adam's knowledge, his relations with Eve, the religion of Paradise and other such matters, were the subject of exhaustive research. See, e.g., the works of Suarez, Mersenne (*Quaestiones in Genesin*), Quenstedt, Luther (*Table Talk*), J. Deutschmann, Witsius, F. Burmann (*Synopsis Theologiae*, Lib. II.).

It is intended, in the present lecture, to review the chief efforts toward the solution of the same problem which have been offered from the standpoint of philosophy. The philosopher, as philosopher, and irrespectively of his personal attitude to the Christian Faith, approaches a question as if there were no truth which claimed to be revealed. For him the plan of the world may or may not have been divinely disclosed to man; it awaits discovery or interpretation through the exercise of reason. And so he approaches the particular question of the source of sin, which, in philosophical speculation, is generally entangled with the wider and more difficult problem of theodicy, the reconciliation, that is, of the existence of evil with the concept of God; a problem which in turn is but a department of the still more general and intractable one, the last perhaps ever to receive illumination, the relation of God to the world and to the finite soul.

Of the various philosophical systems of the modern period which have concerned themselves with the origin of sin it will only be possible to deal here with such as have exerted some influence on theological thought upon the subject. For certain others the briefest mention must suffice.

The Cartesian School with its theories of the passions and of the relation of the soul to the body, did not contribute any material help towards the solution of our problem. Some of its members, as

good Catholics, were already supplied with authoritative teaching on the subject which they were not concerned to scrutinise, and some would no doubt shrink from anything like definite opposition to a tenet of the Church. Descartes himself held that error and sin arise from the union of the soul with the body, inasmuch as the emotions, which he regarded as belonging to both body and soul, disturb clear knowledge, and therefore right volition. But it seems to be implied that this union and relation was not of the nature of a punishment or a defect, but essential to man's constitution as received from the Hand of the Creator[1].

Malebranche, who modified and developed much of the system of Descartes, was supplied by his Catholicism with the doctrine of the Fall; and this, though he was accused of semi-Pelagianist leanings, he found no reason to reject. On the contrary, he describes how the Fall affected the relations of the body and soul, how original sin is transmitted; and he incorporates the teaching of the Church on the subject into his philosophical theories of occasionalism and of "seeing all things in God[2]."

But in Spinoza there was a complete independence

[1] See *Principia*, Part I. 60, and elsewhere. In *Les Passions de l'Âme*, Art. 50, he maintains "Qu'il n'y a point d'âme si foible qu'elle ne puisse, étant bien conduite, acquérir un pouvoir absolu sur ses passions."

[2] See Note F, Malebranche (and Geulincx) on original sin.

of ecclesiastical theology. It is true that, with reference to the *nature* of sin, his teaching has much in common with that which had passed from pre-Aristotelian philosophy into the Christian Church, and had been dominant not only among the fathers of the East, but also among many of the West, in none so conspicuously as S. Augustine; from whom it was inherited by the scholastics, to survive, along with much else of the scholastic spirit, long after the beginnings of the Reformation. This is to say, that for Spinoza evil is privation and of purely negative character. "Reality and perfection," he says, "I use as synonymous terms[1]." But his thorough intellectualism reduces evil merely to defect of knowledge: the search for its cause is rendered unnecessary and impossible by his vigorously consistent treatment of it as non-being: and his teaching on the point is made the more inflexible for its logical coherence with his doctrine of thorough-going necessity.

It is an essential element of the philosophy of Spinoza that the very conceptions of good and evil would be impossible to us if only we possessed adequate ideas and saw things *sub specie aeternitatis*. His system, therefore, is one from which the Christian theologian, or even the ethical theist, can derive no help. We are compelled to see in it, from our point of view, an evasion rather than a solution of the

[1] *Ethics*, Part II. Def. 6.

problem which we have in hand. And inasmuch as it is our purpose to discuss the question of evil solely from Christian presuppositions, and in its empirical rather than its metaphysical aspect, we might well dismiss the speculations of Spinoza at this point. There is, however, one criticism capable of being passed upon his fundamental position which does not presuppose the definite standpoint to which we are committed beforehand, that may well be mentioned. "The knowledge of evil," says Spinoza, "is an inadequate knowledge"; for it is pain, which is in turn the transition to a lesser perfection, a passive state depending on inadequate ideas; and "it follows that, if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil[1]." Now, however evil be defined, it cannot be maintained that our knowledge of it is lack of knowledge. Evil is given in presentation, it has a positive ground in experience however much it may be of the nature of a defect; and unless our experience is not only illusion but also non-existent, and therefore all knowledge impossible, we possess knowledge of physical and moral evil which is "a positive increment of intelligence." We can accept, in one sense, that evil is of the nature of a defect; but only when the statement is correlated with the assertion that it is a positive affirmation, and

[1] *Ethics*, IV. LXIV. and Corollary. Cf. LXVIII.

that it is not merely an illusion due to relativity and inadequacy in our knowledge[1].

We pass on to the Theodicy of Leibniz. In this philosopher we meet again with professed sympathy for the Christian Faith. But unfortunately this leaning does not conduce to the clearness of his system as a whole. Leibniz finds it hard to serve two masters: he often vacillates and ends in compromise: and nowhere is this more plainly the case, perhaps, than in his treatment of the problem of sin.

Leibniz distinguishes moral evil, or sin, from physical evil, and also from what he calls metaphysical evil, the *imperfection* necessarily inherent in *finite* things as such. This latter kind of evil is the only one which is necessary; the other two forms are but rendered possible by it, and it is not due to the Creator but to the essential nature of the finite, which belongs to a *prius* of eternal verities independent of the divine will though 'in the understanding' of God[2].

[1] For Spinoza's treatment of evil, his correspondence with Blyenbergh should be consulted, especially Letter xxxii. (Elwes' ed.), in which occurs the passage: "For my own part, I cannot admit that sin and evil have any positive existence, far less that anything can exist or come to pass, contrary to the will of God.... I also maintain that only in speaking improperly, or humanly, can we say that we sin against God,...."

[2] See *Théodicée*, Partie i. 20, 21.

"Platon a dit dans le Timée que le monde avait son origine de l'entendement joint à la nécessité. D'autres ont joint Dieu et la nature. On y peut donner un bon sens. Dieu sera l'entendement,

The philosopher thus seeks to avoid committing himself to a doctrine of the necessity of moral evil, and stops short of asserting that metaphysical evil is the source of sin. This position, taken up in the Theodicy, is, however, difficult to reconcile with statements made elsewhere, and can scarcely be assimilated with his doctrine that evil is privation. He says, for instance, "For we must consider that there is *an original imperfection in the creature,* anterior to sin, because the creature is essentially limited; whence it comes

et la nécessité, c'est-à-dire la nature essentielle des choses, sera l'objet de l'entendement, en tant qu'il consiste dans les vérités éternelles. Mais cet objet est interne et se trouve dans l'entendement divin. Et c'est là-dedans que se trouve non seulement la forme primitive du bien, mais encore l'origine du mal: c'est la *région des vérités éternelles* qu'il faut mettre à la place de la matière, quand il s'agit de chercher la source des choses. Cette région est la *cause idéale* du mal, pour ainsi dire, aussi bien que du bien; mais, à proprement parler, le formel du mal n'en a point *d'efficiente*, car il consiste dans la privation, comme nous allons voir, c'est-à-dire dans ce que la cause efficiente ne fait point. C'est pourquoi les scolastiques ont coutume d'appeler la cause du mal *déficiente*.

"On peut prendre le mal métaphysiquement, physiquement et moralement. Le *mal métaphysique* consiste dans la simple imperfection, le *mal physique* dans la souffrance, et le *mal moral* dans le péché. Or, quoique le mal physique et le mal moral ne soient point nécessaires, il suffit qu'en vertu des vérités éternelles ils soient possibles. Et comme cette région immense des vérités contient toutes les possibilités, il faut qu'il y a une infinité de mondes possibles, que le mal entre dans plusieurs d'entre eux, et que même le meilleur de tous en renferme; c'est ce qui a déterminé Dieu à permettre le mal."

For a criticism of the supposition of 'premundane truths' (*vérités éternelles* of Leibniz) see Lotze, *Metaphysic*, secs. 33, 85, etc.

that the creature cannot know everything, and can be mistaken and commit other faults[1]." And this is the normal implication of Leibniz's doctrine when he writes as the pure philosopher. As Mr Russell has lately pointed out, Leibniz, if he were self-consistent, should teach that sin is due to ignorance: that moral evil has its source in imperfection, the confusedness of the finite monad's perceptions of the good, whence it is deluded into following the worse instead of the better. He should, in fact, be a Spinozist, and deny the positiveness or reality of evil. If moral evil has its ground and source in metaphysical evil, and such imperfection is merely privation, the reality of evil is given up.

S. Augustine also taught that evil has no *causa efficiens* but only a *causa deficiens*. With him, however, the *privatio* with which moral evil was identified was more than mere non-existence. It was also *corruptio, perversio*. It was the depraved activity of the will, loss of the good which ought to belong to every person. And so his theory of the nature of evil furnishes a philosophic basis for his theological explanation of its origin. In the system of Leibniz, on the other hand there is no place, save at the cost of consistency, for a Fall and a corruption of man's nature as the source

[1] Quoted from *Die philosoph. Schriften*, ed. Gerhardt, VII. 306, by Mr Russell in his *Philosophy of Leibniz*, where (pp. 196 ff.) a discussion of Leibniz's inconsistent position will be found.

of universal sinfulness. Nevertheless he meets the orthodox doctrine at least half way when he regards souls as existing in the germ in Adam, from whom they are transmitted with sin attaching to them, to undergo a kind of 'transcreation' when made rational[1]. But such a view is perhaps more objectionable than that to which it is a concession; it is evidently an afterthought, an unconscious compromise. Original sin, for Leibniz, is rather the original imperfection of our nature as it was created; and the source of evil, therefore, is as much outside the human will as that of God.

So far in our survey of the views of early modern philosophers with regard to the origin and propagation of sin we have found nothing that has exerted

[1] "Ainsi, je croirais que les âmes, qui seront un jour âmes humaines comme celles des autres espèces, ont été dans les semences et dans les ancêtres jusqu'à Adam, et ont existé par conséquent depuis le commencement des choses, toujours dans une manière de corps organisé:...Mais il me paraît encore convenable pour plusieurs raisons, qu'elles n'existaient alors qu'en âmes sensitives ou animales douées de perceptions et de sentiment, et destituées de raison; et qu'elles sont demeurées dans cet état jusqu'au temps de la génération de l'homme à qui elles devaient appartenir, mais qu'alors elles ont reçu la raison,...par une espèce de transcréation.... Cette explication paraît lever les embarras qui se présentent ici en philosophie ou en théologie,...puisqu'il est bien plus convenable à la justice divine de donner à l'âme, déjà corrompue physiquement ou animalement par le péché d'Adam, une nouvelle perfection qui est la raison, que de mettre une âme raisonnable par création ou autrement, dans un corps où elle doive être corrompue moralement." *Op. cit.* 91.

important influence on ourspeculative theology: nothing, certainly, capable of offering to the Christian theologian an alternative theory to the doctrines of the Fall and of hereditary sin. But the case is different when we reach the religious philosophy of Kant; and to a part of this we must now turn our attention.

A considerable portion of Kant's work on 'Religion within the limits of mere reason' is occupied with the discussion of the origin of moral evil; and he here comes to terms with S. Augustine. He does not, indeed, accept the doctrine of Original Sin; nay, of all theories on the subject he considers this to be the least satisfactory. He repudiates also the view which would identify evil with sense, or the hindrance which sense puts in the way of the spirit, closely as some expressions in his earlier works approach to such a theory, and much as the sense-nature is everywhere depreciated in his Ethics. The ground of evil, he teaches, does not lie in any object or instinct; it is not to be regarded as a natural characteristic of our species. We, and not our nature, are responsible for its existence, simply because we are conscious that it ought not to be. But Kant feels profoundly what we have already seen to be the great *crux* of the problem of sin: the apparent antinomy, furnished by our experience, between the direct deliverance of conscience, on the one hand, behind which it is not possible to go, that we are chargeable for the guilt of sin, and

the fact that, on the other hand, the bias to evil in us seems to be prior to any conscious act, and therefore born with us. Here is the old question of which Augustinianism and Pelagianism each only grappled with a side. But it is the merit of Kant to have first fairly estimated the difficulty involved, and to have given to the world the first clear statement of the problem. We have now to see how he set out from his general philosophic principles to investigate its solubility.

Kant, of course, only allows the application of such terms as we call ethical to the will. "Nothing," he says, "can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will[1]." Consequently evil, in his view, exists in nothing except the will. It is the perversion of the right relation between reason and sense, the false subordination of the rational to the sensuous. Such is the nature of evil; what then is its origin or cause?

Kant shows, in his Critique of Pure Reason, that we can only have knowledge of what is the object of possible experience, of the sensible, phenomenal world. But that treatise leaves open the possibility of a supersensible or noumenal world; and in the Critique of Practical Reason this possibility is exchanged for necessity. A supersensible sphere and a supersensible

[1] *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, § 1.

nature for man, independent of relations of time, are demanded, he maintains, by the facts of our moral experience. For in the sensible world our actions are but parts of the causal nexus of the course of Nature, and are consequently wholly determined. That freedom of will, therefore, which our consciousness of the moral law involves and demands, in that 'I ought' necessarily implies 'I can,' belongs to us as supersensible beings. It is from this dualism between the phenomenal and noumenal man that Kant attacks the problem of the origin of evil.

Evil is brought about when a man adopts the impulses of his sense-nature, rather than the dictates of his reason, into his 'maxims' or the subjective ruling principles which his will appoints to itself for the exercise of its freedom. The subjective ground or condition for the possibility of adopting evil maxims, is however the thing to be accounted for. This cannot be due to any determining act in time; for then evil would belong to the empirical realm governed by necessity, and so would be no longer moral evil. It is therefore an innate bias or propensity, in the sense that it is in force before any use of freedom is experienced; it is in man at his birth[1]. And inasmuch as this bias is rightly to be designated evil—Kant calls it "radical badness"—its origin must be in our freedom, must belong to the supersensible sphere, and must be of

[1] See Note G, Kant on the propensity to evil in man.

the nature of a supersensible or timeless act. We cannot trace it further, however, in the noumenal realm without entering upon an infinite regress. Beyond this, then, no light can possibly be thrown upon the source of evil. In the last resort, Kant teaches, it is quite inscrutable.

The 'intelligible act' with which Kant identifies the evil propensity is a difficult conception. We shall presently see that later philosophy found Kant's position to be one of unstable equilibrium. The 'act' is banished from our temporal or phenomenal life, but is of course not referred to a previous existence. It is strictly timeless[1]. It is the *rational*, not the temporal, origin of our evil. And it is equally the origin of all our empirical actions as of the first. "Every bad action, when we inquire into its rational origin, must be viewed as if the man had fallen into it directly from the state of innocence." Perhaps we shall get near to Kant's meaning if we regard the intelligible or supersensible act, with Dr Caird[2], as the summing up of our empirical evil acts as seen by God, from a timeless point of view, or *sub specie aeternitatis*. At any rate Kant's radical evil will be seen to be a very different thing from the theologian's original sin.

This exposition of the doctrine of Kant has, I fear, been somewhat tedious. Its importance in the history

[1] See the last passage quoted in Note G.

[2] *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, vol. II. p. 596.

of our problem must be my apology. It will have perhaps faintly suggested the myth to which Plato resorted in the *Phaedrus* to describe the history of the soul and its fall from the celestial sphere previous to its earthly life: the myth which appears again in the eclectic medley of Philo and the syncretic system of Plotinus: which takes its place in Christian thought in Origen's doctrine of pre-natal sin, and finds a distant echo in the speculations of Erigena. But what in all these thinkers was but an unsubstantial dream is in Kant a serious deduction from his theory of knowledge and of morals. Not only did his idea receive further development from philosophers who came after him, but it was also adopted, in modified form, by a series of Christian theologians. Of these the most notable was Dr Julius Müller, whose work on the doctrine of Sin is still the most philosophical and exhaustive standard treatise on the subject. And for us the result of Müller's elaborate examination of the doctrine of Original Sin is fraught with interest. He is inevitably, and perhaps reluctantly, led on by the compulsion of his clear and vigorous reasoning, to find the Augustinian theory inadequate to solve the great antinomy which Kant's work had served to emphasise: the antinomy between the inalienable sense of responsibility which the individual feels for his own evil and the fact that sinfulness seems at the same time inborn and prior to any action. And so he is constrained to abandon it as an

account of the origin of human sinfulness, or rather to supplement it by postulating a personal fall for every man, previous to that of the race in Adam, in a state of existence which Müller calls extra-temporal, but which is nevertheless prior to birth. This is a modification of Kant's idea, approaching to Origen's fancy of a pre-natal fall, though it is as anxiously distinguished from the Greek father's doctrine as it is dissociated from the Kantian theory of supersensible freedom. It is a view, however, in which Müller's work does not give the impression that he found himself at home. It would seem to be accepted not for its intrinsic cogency and naturalness, but rather as an only alternative: a last resource, the sole remaining chance of rational satisfaction in which his mind can find a refuge. That this acute and learned theologian, starting from presuppositions, and using a method, in many respects at variance with those adopted in the present investigation, should arrive at the conclusion that the Augustinian theory is not at bottom satisfactory, was a great encouragement to me to venture to express my own misgivings in the previous lecture. We shall afterwards have to see whether the application of another method of inquiry, impossible alike to him and to Kant, does not disclose a third way out of the difficulty, which, had Dr Müller lived in a later generation, might have afforded him a retreat from the difficulties of hereditary sin other than that of a

pre-natal fall. For he declared himself willing to be a ready listener to any explanation "which should view man simply as existing within the bounds of time, and enable us to understand his guilt," provided it were an explanation which did not "surrender the truths to be explained[1]."

Meanwhile we have to observe that the basis of the Kantian theory of radical evil has not been exempt from disastrous criticism. The distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal man to which its author resorts, and the unreal separation between sense and reason which makes his system of morality so formal and so far aloof from actual human life[2], are generally felt by philosophers to be among the greater deficiencies of Kant's teaching. It is hard to conceive how the supersensible essence of man which gives him from itself the categorical imperative, should also give him the evil maxim; how it could cause the impulses of his sense-nature, the objects of which have for it no worth if any reality, to preponderate as motives over the moral law. It is hard to acquiesce in the ruin of the phenomenal by the noumenal man, or to reconcile such a thing with Kant's theories either of freedom or causation. To some, moreover, it seems arbitrary and

[1] *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Urwick's Translation, II. p. 397.

[2] Whether there be a transcendental self or no, the self concerned with moral practice is the empirical self of time-processes, specific desires and duties.

unnecessary to derive the evil act from the adoption of a general maxim or universal rule, without which determination to action cannot be supposed, rather than simply from the non-suppression of the impulse in the single case. Experience does not furnish this notion of a general determination to evil; why then should not the yielding to the sensuous impulse, and the non-activity of the reason which allows it, be an imputable act, without any universal subjection of the rational to the sensuous?

But I must not trouble you with the enumeration of more of the many weaknesses of which Kant's critics have been able to convict his doctrine; especially as we shall have to notice later how his theory of noumenal freedom, apart from which Kant's betaking himself to a timeless origin for evil would be a superfluous escape, failed to satisfy the sifting test of subsequent development in the schools which carried on its evolution, in that it inevitably yielded a system of determinism.

It is more germane to our purpose to observe that the aspect of the problem which is suggested by the social nature of human life and the organic unity of the race is wholly left aside by the Kantian theory of radical evil. Kant of course abundantly recognises the universality of sin; but it is for him merely an empirical truth, an induction from observation, to which there is no reason to assert an exception. His explanation of it is even more entirely individualistic than the ancient

doctrine of Pelagius. Personal guilt attaches solely to an individual choice, and the Scriptural account of the first transgression is consistently rationalised into a symbolic picture of the timeless act by which each man makes the choice of evil. In all this Kant was the expression of the individualism of his age. The deism of its theology, the subjectivity of its religion, the atomism of its science, are manifestations of the spirit of his time. Add to them its deficiency of historic sense, and Kant's own contempt for psychology, and we can realise how impossible it was in his day, even for a Kant, to do justice to the social side of man and his connexion with the race, or to conceive of human nature as a growth or flux rather than as a constant and unchanging quantity from the first.

And finally we may observe that Kant's treatment of our problem does not profess to furnish an ultimate explanation of the 'rational' origin of sin. It expressly concludes that the source of our radical evil is inscrutable. But we may still venture on the hope that, if the problem is insoluble on Kant's presuppositions, it is because Kant himself has made the difficulty; and that the negative result at which he arrived may rather serve to show that there is no such thing as radical evil than that the origin of human sin is utterly unaccountable.

We have already seen that Kant's speculations on the problem of evil were fruitful in developments, and

many will be familiar with the form in which they were made widely known in England by S. T. Coleridge. For this writer's 'Reflections' on original sin were mainly influenced by the Kantian theory of radical evil.

Rejecting all notions of hereditarily transmitted sin, or of Adam's being the cause of the sinfulness of his posterity, Coleridge regarded the universal prevalence of evil as an expression of the timeless act of the whole race, the evil not of any one man's will but of all human will collectively. He saw, like Kant, the necessity of grounding every man's sin in his will, but he avoided the Pelagian and Kantian individualism by predicating sin of the race instead of the individual; and he admitted, like his master, that the origin of sin ultimately disappears in mystery. The universal 'act' lies, in fact, 'beyond reason[1].'

In the idealist philosophy which followed upon the criticism of Kant the notion of radical evil underwent further development. Schelling sought to remove from Kant's noumenal freedom all suspicion of mere arbitrariness and chance which attaches to absolute indeterminateness, and regarded its acts, manifested in the empirical life, as expressions of the essence or individual

[1] *Aids to Reflection*, Aphorism CIX.

If Kant's 'timeless act' of the individual is difficult to attach a meaning to, Coleridge's 'timeless act' of 'all human will collectively,' is quite meaningless; for 'human will collectively' can mean nothing but the sum of human wills.

character of the soul which it brought into the world at birth; and this essential and fixed character he derived in turn from the soul's own eternal choice. The timeless act of Kant became, instead of the supersensible aspect or source of a man's empirical evil, the *cause* of that evil—a change for which Kant's own occasionally vacillating language had prepared the way. Thus man's sinfulness in this life came to be regarded as self-predetermined. Schelling further conceived of this act as a fall from absolute to self-dependent existence, and as taking place at the beginning of all things, in eternity. He represents unborn man as an original timeless will, "which freely causes itself to be somewhat." There can be no consciousness of this self-causation, but our moral experience is in conformity with it. In so far as these speculations are intelligible they will seem perhaps to be a somewhat mythological caricature of the difficult and indefinite conception of Kant[1], and partly to reduce

[1] Schelling was of course largely influenced by the mystic, Jacob Böhme (1575–1624), who adopted Eckhart's idea of God as going through a process of development and used it to explain the necessity of evil. This doctrine, as stated below, was developed by Schelling, and by other philosophers akin to him. If one might coin the word anthroposophy to describe Schelling's teaching as to man and the origin of his evil, this too probably had its source in the gnostic and fantastic speculations of Böhme and his predecessor Weigel. Baader, a contemporary of Schleiermacher, who also dealt with the problem of evil, again reproduces much of the same pseudo-philosophy; and the theological student will have met with it in the *Christian Dogmatics* of Martensen. For some account of Böhme's works see

his distinction between noumenal and phenomenal to the difference between before and after birth. I refer to them merely to show how soon Kant's own intended meaning was already reversed—for Kant denied that man is self-made[1]—and the direction in which his theory of freedom logically pointed. It only needed the further advance of Schopenhauer to reduce Kant's supersensible world, where evil has its origin, to an "all-pervading, blind, groundless will," and to make his supersensible freedom the basis of a system of determinism.

Schelling's general doctrine of evil, as it does not directly concern our special subject, may be passed by without further notice. His theory of the necessity of evil, not only to finite man, but also to the very life of God, is one which many theologians have indeed attempted to assimilate to Christian doctrine, but perhaps without a full realisation of the consequences to which it leads, and with too venturesome an acceptance of the precariously speculative premisses on which it rests[2].

Windelband, *Geschichte der Neu. Philosophie*, Bd. I. S. 100 ff., or other histories of Philosophy.

[1] *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*, S. 85; Abbott's Trans. p. 70.

[2] Most of the little theology produced of late in England which aims at supplying a Christian philosophy has borne on its surface the marks of Schelling's or Hegel's influence. As one who regards the alliance with such schools to have been dangerous or disastrous, and who considers the philosophic basis of Ritschlianism to be its

Still greater use has been made in theological thought on the problem of sin of the teaching of Hegel. From him we certainly obtain a standpoint very different from that of Kant. The idea of evolution, which we largely miss in Kant, is predominant in Hegel's system, in which it was almost for the first time brought into prominence. Not indeed in the sense in which that word is used in science, denoting growth or development towards which the environment contributes as much as the organism itself, but rather in the etymological sense of the self-unfolding of what is already immanently present[1]. Still Hegel's application of his dialectic to the problem of sin, and his

least respect-worthy equipment, I would earnestly second the appeal recently made in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (vol. III. No. 10, Jan. 1902, p. 186) by Dr Rashdall for "a serious study of the one original modern thinker of the very highest rank (*Lotze*), whose thought is profoundly and *without qualification* Christian," reserving agreement, however, with the words which I have italicised,

[1] The difference between these two senses of the word 'evolution,' which are sometimes confused, will be made obvious by a comparison of the definition given in *Encycl. Brit.*, Art. *Evolution* (in Philosophy), according to which "what evolves does not necessarily contain in it what is evolved," and evolution is almost identical with 'progress,' though without any reference to 'value,' with the footnote on p. 173 of Mr Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, in which it is stated that evolution implies something identical throughout, a subject of evolution. The word has no meaning unless what is there at the beginning is there at the end. Evolution must bring out nothing but what was in, and bring it out, not from external compulsion, but because it is in. The word is then shown to imply a paradox; but only because the writer is applying logic, which only deals with the discrete, to a process in time, to which logic has no application.

treatment of the Fall and original sin sometimes afford a close approximation to certain results of science such as will constitute our future starting-point. The individualism of Kant has also disappeared in Hegel; but along with it, unfortunately for the theologian, all personal responsibility for sin. Sin, in fact, for Hegel, is as much 'appearance' as we found it to be for Spinoza. *Sub specie aeternitatis* there is no such thing as sin. Indeed how could there be if Hegel's God or Absolute is merely the sum of reality, the Spirit whose differentiations are finite persons[1]? Sin can only belong to us in the same way that it belongs to the Absolute. It is not absolutely evil but relatively good. Indeed it is a necessary element in, or step to, virtue; there is no virtue that is not based on sin. And sin is less evil than innocence or ignorance of vice. "Man must be culpable," Hegel says; "in so far as he is good, he must not be good as any natural thing is good, but his guilt, his will, must come into play, it must be possible to impute moral acts to him[2]." Sin is, in fact, the antithesis of a triad, composed of innocence, sin, and virtue; and, when thus understood to arise

[1] Rather than venture to expound myself any part of Hegel's system I would aim at not misrepresenting the exposition recently given to us by Dr McTaggart, to which I appeal in preference to any other. I therefore refer the reader to extracts from the *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, included in Note H, for authority for the statements made above in the text.

[2] *Philosophy of Religion* (Spiers' and Sanderson's Trans.), vol. III. 48.

out of innocence and to produce virtue, it is to be considered as itself resolvable into the triad, sin (proper), retribution, and amendment[1].

Thus sin is, for Hegel, a necessary factor in the development of a man. In this connexion he often refers to the Scriptural account of the Fall, which he regards as a myth eternally realised in man and expressive of the mode in which he comes to be a person. He sees a deep truth in the Christian doctrine of Original Sin; but, needless to say, its import is very different from that which the Church has intended to convey. Man, Hegel teaches, is by nature good, or at harmony within himself, according to his essence, his Notion; but in his actual, temporal existence he has "in his nature a contingent and particular element as well as a rational and universal element," and in respect of this he is bad by nature[2]. The state of nature in which every individual finds himself at first is indeed innocent or non-moral. If willed, however, if persisted in, this natural condition becomes evil. It is a position from which man ought to free himself and, in this sense, is 'what ought not to be.' For the spirit not to go out of that state is negation of spirit, and therefore evil. From this point of view evil would seem to be persistent innocence, animality as contrasted with

[1] Cf. McTaggart, *op. cit.* p. 151.

[2] For the passages in Hegel's writings dealing with original sin see Note H.

personality; such, at least, is original sin. As in the teaching of Schelling individuality is the result of a fall from God, similarly, according to Hegel, man cannot be a person without experience of evil. The emergence from the state of nature, pictured in Genesis by the eating of the forbidden fruit of knowledge, is a necessary step in man's development; his fall is a rise, a sinless act. Apprehension of evil by experience, then, is man's second stage. But he is not to rest here. He must overcome the evil, "setting it aside as null and void."

This philosophic doctrine of the Fall will remind you of the ground-thought of the romance of the Marble Faun, or Transformation, in which the fancy of Nathanael Hawthorne has played with inimitable grace of touch around the deep problem of the springs of sin in mankind and in the single soul. You will recall, possibly, the words in which Miriam speaks of Donatello, when penance had restored to him somewhat of the faun-like simplicity which he possessed before the crime that called forth his half-latent intelligence and moral sense: "He has travelled in a circle, as all things heavenly and earthly do, and now comes back to his original self, with an inestimable improvement won from an experience of pain." That sentence states, almost in the form of the Hegelian dialectic process, the results of its application to the question of the nature and the source of evil.

Such a theory suits well a system "which resolves will into thought and virtually supplies us with a new determinism"; but it is ill-adapted for incorporation into one which lays the foundation of its ethical doctrine in the finite will's reality and independence. If, as Hegelianism represents, evil is an absolute necessity in the development of spirit, it is not the correlative of guilt, and for us it therefore ceases to be evil. In the course of its explanation evil has already been explained away. Hegel has indeed only led us back to the point at which Spinoza left us. God is wholly immanent: the finite is absolutely swallowed up in the infinite, and all ethical relation between man and God is dissolved: evil is an element in the divine life and ceases to be *real* evil. "There is, in plain words, no difference left between goodness and badness[1]."

The line of founders of the greater systems of philosophy comes to an end with Lotze, and he does not occupy himself much with the problem of how evil actually arose. Had he done so he would probably have given us a view which kept nearer to the facts of

[1] These words are quoted from Mr Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, 1897, p. 435. Cf. Mr Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*.

Both Dr E. and Dr J. Caird, in *Evolution of Religion* and *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, respectively, have tried to absorb the Hegelian doctrine of evil, or something like it, into the Christian system. For a brief criticism of the endeavour see Prof. J. Seth's *Ethical Principles*, 5th ed. p. 440 f.

experience than any which we have hitherto reviewed. The 'why' of the existence of evil is for him, as for other philosophers, an insoluble difficulty which he does not profess to be able to remove. His theory of the relation of God to the world, however, suggests a metaphysical basis such as alone seems capable of maintaining a doctrine of sin which does justice at once to the reality of evil and the holiness of a Personal God. His monism embraces a pluralism, and his Absolute is transcendent as well as immanent. God, for Lotze, is the sole reality, and finite souls are the differentiations of that reality. But He is more than the unity of His differentiations; there is in Him what there is not in them, and their individuality separates them from Him whilst He is their underlying ground. Real self-hood is delegated to the finite creature[1]. Hence Lotze is neither compelled to reduce evil to unreality or illusion, like Spinoza, and so deny it without explaining it, nor, like Schelling or Hegel or their followers, to make it an essential moment in the progressive or eternally realised life of God, and so to deny it while explaining it. It is from Lotze, if from anyone, that the Christian theologian can seek a metaphysical basis for a doctrine of sin, or for a satisfactory theodicy. But these are matters with which we are not for the present concerned, and we must return to the question of the actual origin of sin.

[1] The foregoing statements describe the position at which Lotze *aimed*. I do not consider that he succeeded in consistently establishing it. This has been better done by recent British writers whom Lotze influenced, and who have corrected the exaggeration of the monistic tendency in his teaching. See below, p. 129, n. 1.

There still remain to be mentioned the speculations of two thinkers whose influence has been exerted not so much upon philosophy as on theology, but whose contributions to the solution of our problem may be considered here.

In the latter of these fields none since the Reformation has ruled the thought of Germany, perhaps, in a greater degree than Schleiermacher. And the impress of his influence is very evident on the now dominant school of Ritschl.

In some features of his theological system there are signs of a return, in Schleiermacher, from Kant to Spinoza, and nowhere, perhaps, more conspicuously than in his treatment of the idea of sin. He follows Spinoza, for instance, in making God the sole and absolute cause in the universe. The relation of the creature to Creator is one of absolute dependence, so that there is no independent human will or efficient causation. There is for him no intermediate position between this doctrine and Manichaean dualism[1]. It would seem to follow that God is the author of man's sin, unless sin has no reality. And indeed it is Schleiermacher's peculiar doctrine that sin has no objective reality, but is only sin from our subjective point of view. It is real, but only in our consciousness. Sin, in fact, *is* consciousness of sin.

[1] "Denn neigt man zu sehr dahin, die Sünde aus dem Umkreis der schlechtinigen Abhängigkeit von Gott auszuschliessen, so streift man unvermeidlich an das manichäische." *Der Christl. Glaube*, 65 (2).

The sense of sin is aroused in us when the God-consciousness meets with opposition, or is inadequate to overrule the promptings of the lower nature. This hindrance offered by our sense-nature or flesh to the functions of our reason or 'spirit,' we interpret as sin. But we are not responsible for this hindrance of sense, or for the inadequacy of the God-consciousness. The sense-nature developes in us first, and this is the 'seed of sin.' Moreover the spirit, when it awakes, developes more slowly and fitfully, and is essentially unequal to the encounter with the manifold activities of the flesh, which it finds already in full sway. Thus the inadequacy of the God-consciousness is a necessary outcome of the conditions of our natural development. Its cause is God, but in His sight it does not constitute sin to which guilt attaches.

Schleiermacher thus enables himself to elude the implication that sin is a necessity for us and that there is no need of redemption. And he expressly asserts that man might, like Christ, have developed without sin. His account of sin and its origin in us will be seen, however, to be beset with a constant confusion of the objective and subjective point of view, and with the employment of language with regard to the one which is properly applicable only with regard to the other.

The internal strife of which we are conscious in consequence of the inadequacy of our God-consciousness, or, ultimately, of the nature of our spiritual

development, is, as has been said, the objective fact which we interpret as sin. From God's point of view, this is not sin, and therefore He is not the cause of our sin. But God has ordained, so Schleiermacher teaches, that we should attribute guilt to this state of consciousness, as if it were a positive act of opposition to the God-consciousness; and this has been ordained in order that there might be occasion for redemption.

In other words sin, considered objectively, is mere negation demanding no divine causality; and this negation or deficiency becomes sin *for us* because God has caused us to reckon it as sin; and in this sense, but in this sense only, God is the cause of our sin. Sin, in fact, in so far as it is real, is identical with the consciousness of sin. If Schleiermacher has fallen short of the position summarily assumed by Spinoza and again reached in the school of Hegel, that sin is appearance not reality, he has certainly not indicated a logical resting-place at which he meant to stop.

With regard to the doctrine of Original Sin Schleiermacher's attitude must again be considered wholly unsatisfactory. He dwells on the impossibility of accounting for the first sin of our first parents without presupposing the same tendencies to exist in them as in us. It is only necessary, he declares, to assume that they sinned before they begat and educated the next generation, so that the sinfulness of the children could be grounded on that of the parents. There was no

change produced in Adam's nature; such inborn sinfulness as we possess belonged to him as well. Further, it was compatible with his 'original perfection.'

Thus the orthodox doctrine of inherited corruption is rejected; the orthodox expression, however, is still reserved to denote something quite different from that to which it had previously been applied. *Erbsünde*, in fact, is resolved into the influence of the actual sin of surrounding society; it points to a connexion of the individual with the race such as we now speak of as social, as opposed to physical, heredity. Its guilt is only the individual's in as far as *Erbsünde* is the collective deed and the common guilt of the race. Further, it is only to be regarded in connexion with the actual sins which grow out of it; and, as they develope a habit of sin, it increases also. The individual thus makes it his own. Finally, Schleiermacher teaches, sinfulness is really a 'common' thing; it is "in each the work of all, and in all the work of each."

It will be obvious that Schleiermacher only attaches guilt to the individual subject of inherited sinfulness by blurring the line between congenital disposition and acquired habit. This, as Ritschl has said, can only be called "sophistical and valueless." Such a method represents a great retrogression from the moral philosophy of Kant. And it was the more unnecessary and irrelevant for Schleiermacher since he elsewhere allows sin to be predicable only of society. It is true

that his treatment of the idea of *Erbsünde* or hereditary sin gives to the doctrine of the propagation of sinfulness an entirely new development since the time of Pelagius. But the moral solidarity which is thus asserted is of so different a kind from that embodied in the Augustinian theory that for him to speak of hereditary sin at all is only an inconsistent concession to traditional expressions. What Schleiermacher calls hereditary or original sin is by no means a corruption of our nature caused by Adam and physically transmitted to his posterity: it is not of the nature of a punishment: it does not presuppose a fall in the head of the race[1]. It is *inbred* sinfulness derived by us from our surroundings, our mutual interaction and cooperation: it is the accumulated influences stored up in the social environment, not those physically inherited by an organism from its parent. Insistence upon this factor in the propagation of sin was both new and timely; but it should have been called simply common or collective evil, and should not have been confounded with original sin[2].

So, among others, Ritschl has remarked, who adopts the idea from Schleiermacher under its more appropriate title, and definitely repudiates the old doctrine of original or hereditary sin to which Schleiermacher,

[1] Schleiermacher teaches at once that original sin is the source of all actual sin (see Note J) and is yet derived from the actual sin of society.

[2] For a few passages from Schleiermacher asserting the positions criticised above see Note J.

at the cost of clearness and consistency, sought to approximate it. This latter doctrine Ritschl is led to reject, not through the exigencies of his epistemological presuppositions, nor on account of the scientific and philosophical difficulties expounded in our previous lecture; but partly on account of less real and valid objections, some of which would seem to rest upon a misconception of the contents of the doctrine[1], and partly because he regards the fact of the social heredity of evil influences sufficient to account for the universal presence of sin in individuals.

The appeal of Schleiermacher and Ritschl to the relation of the individual to his environment for an explanation of his sinfulness certainly reclaims an important and much forgotten truth. Pelagius had long ago insisted on the influence of example, but that power does not express the sum of the complex interactions of society, "the web of sinful action and reaction" as Ritschl calls it, which serves to pollute the atmosphere in which the individual is educated. When Ritschl, however, following Schleiermacher, goes on to maintain that the race, as contrasted with the individual, is the proper subject of sin, it is difficult

[1] The second and third objections urged on p. 337 of *Justification and Reconciliation* (E. T. of vol. III. 1900) are of this nature. Original sin is perfectly compatible with responsible formation of habits, and certainly its supposition does not make education useless. Nor would its truth involve the *equal* sinfulness of all descendants of Adam.

to follow him. We gain, of course, "a more complete estimate of the anti-moral aspect of sin than is expressed in the conception of the *concupiscentia* of each individual by comparing it with the common good which, according to Christian standards, ought to be realised through the cooperation of all," and it is true that "sin cannot be completely represented either within the framework of the individual life, or in that of humanity as a natural species[1]."

Still, the ethical unit must ever be the individual will. When we speak, as we sometimes do, of the race as an organism, and attribute to it a life, a will or a sinfulness, of its own, we use the mode of rhetoric, not that of exact science. Apart from being merely the sum of its individuals the race is but an abstraction; and to make it the subject of sin, in any sense that is inapplicable to the individual, is to depart from the only safe region of the concrete.

And social interaction, after all, is insufficient to explain the genesis of evil in every member of the race apart from predisposing conditions belonging to the nature which we share in common. Ritschl indeed hints at these conditions: "evil," he says, "springs out of the merely natural impulses of the human will[2]." Its possibility is grounded in the fact that the will is

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 334–5.

The last words of this quotation refer to the Augustinian theory of the pre-existence of individuals in Adam.

[2] *Unterrichtung*, S. 25.

an ever-growing quantity, with whose activity the perfect knowledge of the good is not from the first connected[1]. Consequently, as he often insists, ignorance is an important factor in the origin and growth of sin.

So far as these observations go they recognise that the individual nature itself contains the raw material whence sin, as the activity of the individual will, is produced. But a theory which would replace and dispense with that of original and hereditary sinfulness must go further than this. If it would do more than possibly anticipate the truth by happy guess-work it must be an induction from a multitude of well-grounded facts supplied by empirical psychology. The laying of this essential foundation, however, was not undertaken by Ritschl; and he left the traditional theory only half-dismantled and only partially rebuilt. One is not surprised, therefore, that several leading representatives of his school, such as Prof. Kaftan, have reverted to the old view which Schleiermacher and Ritschl had too prematurely abandoned[2].

[1] S. 26. The question of the *origin* of evil did not interest Ritschl; and his definition of sin in terms of the concept of a common good really precluded such inquiry.

[2] There is a lengthy discussion of the whole question of the Fall and Original Sin in Prof. Kaftan's *Dogmatik*, from a point of view intermediate between those of Ritschl and the orthodox Lutheran teaching. It fails, however, to appreciate the scientific bearings of the problem and practically falls back upon what may be called 'occult principles' in the last resort.

It now remains to sum up the results of this hasty glance at the treatment which our problem has received at the hands of philosophical speculation.

The discussion in which we have been involved in the present lecture has frequently carried us away from the empirical question with which we are directly concerned to the metaphysical problems which underlie it; and these will meet us again when, at a later stage, we touch upon the theodicy to which an evolutionary theory leads. Various views as to the origin and nature of sin have been considered which dispense with the assumption of an inherited bias to evil in human nature resulting from a moral fall of the race. We have seen that evil has been regarded as non-existent, as mere finite limitation, as inevitably springing from the natural predominance of the sensuous over the rational nature, and as a necessary stage in the development of personality. It may be conceded that each of these views contains a fragment of truth which the theologian may accept; but that any one of them forms a satisfactory substitute for the doctrine to which he has hitherto been pledged, he must stoutly deny. They evade, not solve, the problem set for him by the facts of his moral experience. Indeed it is just because these several theories do not keep close to the facts of experience, but deal with sin, for the most part, in a manner predetermined by the requirements of a system, that philosophy has

contributed so little that is satisfactory to the elucidation of the meaning and source of moral evil as the Christian has been taught to understand it. One system, however, we found, which took the question in all seriousness—the religious philosophy of Kant; and that, in declaring the problem to be insoluble, seemed to imply that the *à priori* road to its solution was blind, rather than that no other could possibly be discovered. Our remaining hope, then, is of guidance from an empirical study of the psychological genesis of evil. And this conclusion is confirmed by the result of Müller's thorough examination of the various attempts to grapple with the problem. In despair of all of them, we saw him reluctantly compelled to revert to the idea of a fall of every individual soul in a previous life[1]. This may imply strong testimony to the inadequacy of the traditional and other views; but we can hardly remain satisfied with an alternative so hypothetical. To appeal to a pre-natal moral history of which experience can supply no hint, and for which imagination can picture no conditions, in order to explain the appearance of what finds, in the only world we know, so many predispositions, is indeed to explain an obscurity by what is even more obscure.

"Hardly do we divine the things that are on earth,...
But the things that are in the heavens, who ever yet traced out?"

[1] On Müller's theory see Note K.

LECTURE III.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN: ITS TREATMENT IN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND EMPIRICAL SCIENCE.

ROM. VII. 7, 8.

I had not known sin but by the law.....for without the law sin was dead.

OUR previous study of the history of the problem of human sin, its origin and propagation, would perhaps at least serve to show that the problem had not yielded to the attempts at its solution made either from the side of theology or from that of philosophy. Two main reasons may be assigned for this intractability.

In the first place it must largely be attributed to the tendency in the past to regard sin, in its essence and in its initial stages, too much as what it really comes to be only in the extremest forms of its development, viz. the conscious rebellion of the creature

against God. This point of view, which the growth of the historical sense has rendered more and more unsatisfying, has been responsible for the far-fetched causes of catastrophic nature to which universal sinfulness has so generally been attributed in theology, and sometimes in philosophy.

In the second place, it is still more largely due to the difficulty of reconciling the two propositions that, on the one hand, evil is so universal as to suggest a common origin for the sinfulness of the whole race, independently of the self-determination of its individual members; whilst, on the other hand, our sense of guilt demands that each one is "the Adam of his own soul." It is with this latter source of difficulty that we have especially been concerned. The old antinomy which the Pelagian controversy first brought to light still stands, and mainly because it has hitherto been approached from the standpoint to which allusion has just been made. We have seen that the problem of the origin and universality of sin, even on its empirical side, and apart from deeper metaphysical questions to which it leads, has been acknowledged by theologians and philosophers alike to present an incomprehensible enigma. Dr Julius Müller, who devoted to this subject the most thorough attention it has ever, perhaps, received, and who was resolute to do equal justice to both sides of the antinomy, was compelled, we saw, to postulate behind the fall of Adam an individual "turning

away from the divine light to the darkness of self-absorbed selfishness in a life beyond the bounds of time."

We can scarcely hope, then, for a reconciliation of universal sin with individual guilt, in terms of knowledge pertaining to our present life alone, so long as the antinomy which has been repeatedly affirmed to be the *crux* of the problem is maintained in the form in which it has hitherto been stated. Now the Augustinian doctrine practically attempted to dispense with the one of the opposed propositions supplied by moral experience: that, namely, which makes guilt entirely a matter of personal responsibility. In so far as it did so, however, it failed to satisfy the developed Christian consciousness. It is the other side of the antinomy, then, which must be either abandoned or restated if the problem is to be attacked afresh. And what logic thus suggests, science has begun to demand. There are insuperable difficulties involved, as we have shown, in such conceptions as those of original righteousness, corrupted nature, hereditary transmission of acquired depravity. The influences of social environment, on which Schleiermacher and Ritschl have rightly insisted as an important factor in the explanation of the propagation of sin, are insufficient in themselves to account for its ubiquitous diffusion. They presuppose a real, physical, organic race-solidarity in respect of the non-moral conditions and material which our nature

furnishes, to form a basis for the individual's receptivity and response. It remains, therefore, to inquire whether that side of the old antinomy which has hitherto been expressed in the form of an assertion of inborn sinfulness, or an inherited disturbance of our nature, cannot be modified and reinterpreted so as to be free from such notions as we have found good reason to reject; and further, whether this can be done without at the same time renouncing either the truth of our physical and organic unity, or that of our responsibility for sin. Instead of resorting to a hypothetical previous existence or extra-temporal self-decision, can we find the ground of the possibility and occasion for sin in our natural constitution regarded as the perfectly normal result of a process of development through which the race has passed previously to the acquisition of full moral personality; and can we assign the rise of evil itself simply to the difficulty of the task which has to be encountered by every individual person alike, the task of enforcing his inherited organic nature to obey a moral law which he has only gradually been enabled to discern?

This is the view which I would now endeavour to support. The effort is somewhat tentative, inasmuch as the construction of such a theory from first principles has not yet been undertaken by theology, where alone the adverse influence of tradition raises prejudice against it. Some of its outlines, however,

have been already drawn by a living German theologian: one of its fundamental ideas has been pregnantly expressed by a recent Hulsean Lecturer: and there are signs that popular thought has begun to feel after a reconstruction upon some such lines.

Canon Wilson, in an address to the Church Congress of 1896, spoke very concisely of the relation of evolutionary theory to various Christian doctrines, and, amongst them, to the doctrine of sin. His reference was so brief that I may quote it in full:

"What is the bearing of the theory of evolution on the Christian doctrine of Sin? Here we approach less familiar ground.....I think the popular view of sin as connected with a definite fall of the head of the race is considerably affected.

"Man fell, according to science, when he first became conscious of the conflict of freedom and conscience. To the evolutionist sin is not an innovation, but is the survival or misuse of habits and tendencies that were incidental to an earlier stage in development, whether of the individual or the race, and were not originally sinful, but were actually useful. Their sinfulness lies in their anachronism: in their resistance to the evolutionary and Divine force that makes for moral development and righteousness. Sin is the violation of a man's higher nature which he finds within, parallel to a lower nature. Under the law of evolution God has given men conscience which condemns certain actions, and

under this law such actions pass through the stages, first of disapproval by the finer souls, then of condemnation by the ordinary conscience, and at last of punishment by the action of society. .....

"Now, this conflict of freedom and conscience is precisely what is related as 'The Fall' *sub specie historiae.* It tells of the fall of a creature from unconscious innocence to conscious guilt, expressing itself in hiding from the presence of God. But this fall from innocence was in another sense a rise to a higher grade of being. It is in this sense that the theory of evolution teaches us to interpret the story of the fall. It gives a deeper meaning to the truth that sin is lawlessness[1]."

Such, in few words, is the suggestion offered by the evolution theory as to the historical beginnings of sin in the human race.

A short sketch of the lines upon which a corresponding account of the origin of sin in the individual awaits to be developed, will be found in Professor Otto Pfleiderer's *Philosophy of Religion.* This writer seeks the determining cause of evil not in the inaccessible region of a beyond of thought, but in the course of development, traceable by psychology, of the finite will, from its enchainment in nature to its freedom. "The psychological genesis of evil," he says, "is not difficult to understand, if we set out from the fact that

[1] *The Guardian*, Oct. 7, 1896.

the tendency towards the satisfaction of his natural impulses is as necessary to man as it is to every other living being." This tendency is not evil because the moral law with its 'Thou shalt not' is as yet unknown. And when some knowledge of such law has begun to be acquired, the natural and necessary self-will of the individual by no means dies away before its increasing authority and sternness.

It is with difficulty that our natural, non-moral, tendencies are moralised or brought under the dominion of the higher nature; and every failure in the attempt, or every conscious desistance from the struggle, is sin. Our natural self-willing cannot strictly be called evil; that which *is* evil, again, cannot be called natural, because it belongs to the stage of acquired morality. And the transition from animal innocence to rational evil is gradual; it is not a sudden and inexplicable change, either here or in a previous life[1].

Here we have an indication of the main lines on which an evolutionary account of the historical or empirical origin of sin in the individual must be constructed, as contrasted with the theories which trace the source of universal sinfulness to a definite fall and its inherited consequences. It corresponds to the briefer sketch, from a similar point of view, of the beginning of sin in the race as a whole, given

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, E. Trans. of 2nd ed., vol. iv. pp. 34 ff. For the passage from Pfleiderer see Note L.

by Canon J. M. Wilson. So far as my knowledge of the literature of the subject goes, Dr Pfleiderer is the only theologian who has appealed to the elementary facts of the empirical psychology underlying the science of ethics for light on the ancient paradox of original sin. His is therefore the only support, from within the sphere of Christian theology, that I find myself able to quote in favour of the view to which my own studies have led[1].

Before proceeding to develope this view more fully, it will be well, perhaps, to remind my hearers once again that in discussing the initial stages of sin one must necessarily use language which would seem terribly inadequate to describe sin as it is present to the mind of the Christian penitent. Our present investigation, both in the case of the race and that of the individual, deals with transgressions of sanctions which only become identified with the will of an all-Holy God in the process of their gradual formation.

I.

Bearing this thought in mind, we may first consider the beginning of sin in the race, in the light of the conception of development. It must be acknowledged at the outset that for the present we have to move largely in the sphere of theory and speculation. I cannot indeed accept the assertion, sometimes made[2],

[1] For a notice of other attempts in a similar direction which have since become known to me see Note M.

[2] e.g. by Dr Newman Smyth in *Christian Ethics*, p. 146.

that there is no positive science of prehistoric man; still less the implied belief that there never will be such a science. But that the beginnings of human life, of mind, of morals, and consequently of evil, are matters of inference from somewhat scanty facts rather than of full and direct knowledge, must be allowed.

I shall venture to assume as overwhelmingly probable that there is continuity between the physical constitution of man and that of the lower animals. Continuity of mental development is an infinitely more difficult question to dogmatise upon in the present state of our knowledge of animal psychology. It would be unsafe, for instance, to define how far the germs of 'conduct,' or such sentiments as we call moral in ourselves, exist in the animal world lower than man. It would be unwise to commit oneself to more than the statement that there is sufficient evidence of continuity here and there to generate a strong presumption in favour of evolution all along the line. At present, however, this is far from actual demonstration. The question whether the moral has been developed out of the non-moral would seem to be largely a matter of words, and to depend on the definition we assign to the term 'moral[1].' If we draw the line of separation

[1] To admit the difference between a natural or descriptive and a normative science, such as ethics, the difference between *is* and *ought*, fact and worth, is not to admit that the moral and the factual judgment are different in such a sense that an absoluteness, an

between the moral and the non-moral at the emergence of such complex ideas as those of responsibility and obligation, it is more difficult to maintain that there is no bridge from the non-moral to the moral than if we make the sentiments of approval and disapproval in general the starting-point for the truly ethical. The break in the chain of continuity from the lowest to the highest forms of physical life will then have to be put back at the point where memory and anticipation appear, faculties which cannot as yet be traced in the crudest forms of animal mind.

These, however, are considerations of little moment to our inquiry. Sufficient of evolution is undoubted fact, whatever may become of the theory's wider claims, to show that Kant's self-imposed moral law, for instance, or the intuitionist's conscience, has a long, long history.

immediacy, and an origin are to be attributed to the moral which are denied to the factual.

That the question indicated above is one of words and definitions may be seen by contrasting its treatment by Prof. J. Seth, e.g., with that by Mr A. E. Taylor. The former writer (*Eth. Principles*, 5th ed. pp. 318 ff.) argues that "morality cannot arise out of the non-moral"; the latter implies that if there is continuity of mental development from absence to presence of memory and anticipation, the moral must have originated from what is generally called the non-moral. Of course the last-named writer repudiates the view that unless such 'primary' concepts as those of 'obligation' and 'free personality' are postulated as ultimate reality, there is no science of ethics at all. This procedure he justifies at length; see *The Problem of Conduct*. pp. 119 ff.

Morality at any rate is a social creation, not a ready-made endowment of the individual. As in the case of other things even more fundamental and elementary in our mental furniture, our conceptions of space and time and the external world, its synthesis was only possible through the prolonged intercourse of individuals. And though anthropology cannot furnish anything like a complete account of man's moral growth, it can yet prove that there has been development from extremely rudimentary beginnings; and that this development has taken place along certain general lines is nowadays common knowledge.

It is generally recognised that in the earliest human society the tribe was all-important and the individual relatively insignificant. Of such society we have, of course, no *direct* knowledge; there is no such thing as prehistoric history. But if little is thus known of man's state before he reached the stage at which we begin to have historical evidence of his life and thought, there seems to be no reason to attribute to him, in his earlier condition, a course different from that of gradual development such as he certainly followed afterwards; and numerous sciences point to the overwhelming probability of such continuous evolution. We are justified then in using the method which the physicist calls 'extrapolation' in arriving at an estimate of man's prehistoric mental life: the method which consists in producing backwards the curve of progress which

history, when it once emerges, positively presents to us. And further, the critical study of savage life, as it now exists, is a useful auxiliary source of knowledge. For though the savage man, as we know him, is by no means identical with the primitive man, whom we do not know but desire to reproduce, we are nevertheless enabled largely to eliminate from savagery those characteristics which have been acquired in course of time, and so to form at least a probable conjecture as to the essential marks of the primitive state. Now "among savages moral consciousness is largely still in germ[1]." Action is to a great extent impulsive, and 'conduct,' or the crude, unreflective morality which they exhibit, is moulded in the main by tribal opinion expressed in tribal custom. The further back we trace man, the less we find him the person, or even the individual; the greater his dependence on the tribe and family, and the more complete the solidarity of his moral consciousness. It appears that man did not at first think of himself so much as an independent individual as part of a system. The 'tribal self' preceded the 'personal self.' The importance of this fact alone is great in its bearing on our investigation, for it enables us to see that the idea of moral personality, in terms of which theology has been wont exclusively to formulate its doctrine of the origin of sin, emerged extremely late

[1] Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 4th ed. p. 107.

in human thought[1]. May we not almost say indeed that it appeared with Christianity, to be lost again, to a large extent, for centuries; and that its rediscovery from the partial oblivion into which it had fallen during the middle ages was one of the mainsprings of the Reformation movements?

"The ethical sentiments and the judgments which express them" are, then, "in their most primitive form ...impersonal[2]." And morality, as the words ἦθος, *mores*, *Sitten* all testify, arises out of *custom*.

Custom inevitably hardens into formulated law. And inasmuch as rules sometimes conflict with one another, and in any case are found too rigid for the guidance of conduct in all circumstances, the application of inelastic laws leads to reflection and discovery of their underlying principles[3]. Out of what was purely arbitrary or merely ceremonial in external sanctions there emerged moral obligation carrying its own sanction, much in the same way that the disciple becomes able, in time, to dispute the pronouncements of his master. Thus appeared introspective

[1] It is not only on its moral side that the primitive human consciousness evinces this solidarity; it holds with regard to savage psychology in general. The curious custom of the couvade, to mention but one example, testifies to the fact that the uncivilised mind possesses a very imperfect notion of separate individuality such as common sense regards as natural to all mankind. See Tylor, *Early History of Mankind*, 3rd ed. pp. 295 ff.

[2] Taylor, *op. cit.* p. 124.

[3] I here almost quote Mackenzie, *op. cit.* p. 109.

morality, and the formation of the general convictions as to one's obligations which we collectively call conscience[1]. So much, at least, is matter of fact to be read on the surface of Israel's history[2] and in the literature of other ancient civilisations.

There is thus every reason to believe that the awakening of man's moral sense or sentiment, his discovery of a law by which he came to know sin, was an advance accomplished by a long series of stages. It would indeed be difficult, even if we knew precisely the order of the gradual steps by which man advanced from the purely animal condition of his ancestors into a rudimentarily moral society, to define at what point the externally imposed authoritative restraint upon the individual's natural conduct should be regarded as a 'moral' code, or when the individual's attitude towards such a code became what we call ethical. In all processes of very gradual change it is scarcely possible to estimate where the transition occurs between two given states which language easily isolates by definition and logic easily distinguishes. It is so in things physical; in fixing, for instance, the limit of audibility

[1] For a full account of the origin of the higher moral concepts, obligation, conscience, responsibility, merit, etc., see the extremely able chapter on the Roots of Ethics in *The Problem of Conduct*, to which reference has several times been made. The discussion there of moral personality is most important.

[2] The student will recall portions of Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*.

of a sound, or the point of transition, through many shades, from one colour to another. So too, if man's passage from the non-moral condition to the level of morality was a gradual development, it is scarcely possible to isolate in imagination an individual act of some individual member of the race from the closely similar acts of his similarly-minded fellows, and call it the 'first sin.' Logic, which can only deal with the discrete, can indeed define such a first act of sin. But actual change is 'flowing'; and to draw a line, so to speak, through the life of an individual or a society, in the period of the dawn of moral consciousness, such that all performances of a certain act on one side of it manifestly evince their innocence, while all performances of the same act on the other side of it may clearly be seen to have been deliberately wrought with some sense of violation of a somewhat moral prohibition: this would surely have been found a hard task by the first generation of morally enlightened men, even had they been gifted with our present powers of thought, analysis and observation.

Thus the origin of sin, or of evil as we should at this stage rather call it, like other so-called origins, was a gradual process, not an abrupt and inexplicable plunge. The appearance of moral evil, from the evolutionary point of view, would not consist in the performance of a deed such as man had never done before, of whose wickedness he could previously have been

fully aware, and for which shame and guilt, as feelings differing in kind from any known before, would overwhelm him; it would rather be the continuance of a primitive society or group of individuals in certain practices or in the satisfying of certain natural impulses, after that these things had come to be regarded as conflicting with a recognised 'sanction' of ethical rank as low as that of tribal custom. The sinfulness of such acts would gradually increase from zero, which was its value in the time of man's non-moral innocence, as the moral code grew more exacting and more full of content, and the individual's sense of its binding nature deepened. From the point of view of our ethical standards, i.e., objectively considered, the first sins of humanity would be as the sins of early childhood; not the most heinous and momentous in the race's history, but rather the least guilty of all. And what of their guiltiness in the subjective sense: from the point of view, that is to say, of the barely moral beings who committed them? Degree of guilt, in this sense, is determined not by the actual moral value of the code transgressed, but by the degree in which the transgressor recognised himself to be bound thereby, the awe which he felt towards it, and the intensity of the sense of wrong-doing and shame which he was capable of feeling after its transgression. Could not, it may rightly be asked, the sin of primitive man against *his* code, such as it was, be very sinful? Surely not, if,

as we have already seen reason to believe, ethical sentiments were, in their most primitive form impersonal; if introspective morality was not the first stage of ethical development but arose out of an earlier one. Analogy with the state of the savage, and with that of the child also, corroborates this negative; while, finally, it is difficult to imagine how progress in inward morality or moral consciousness, regarded from the natural point of view, was effected, unless it took place *pari passu* with the elevation of the external moral standard, each constantly acting and reacting on the other.

The foregoing remarks may be looked upon as an extension, in terms of modern forms of thought, of the truth which S. Paul emphasised, that man did not know sin without the law. When the apostle goes on to speak of sin being 'dead' without the law, it is probable that he had in mind the idea of sin as an objective and immanent power lying dormant in the soul from birth. Such language, implying a notion common in the Jewish schools of his time, is of course figurative: it involves a rhetorical concretion of an abstraction; and it would be absurd for us to translate it into technical terms and harden it into dogma. The evolutionary account of the origin of sin would substitute for it the assertion that sin does not, and cannot, exist at all without the law, and that the motions in man which the first recognised sanction condemned were natural and non-moral; not sinful, even in the

sense of being abnormal or displeasing to God. For if man's physical nature is necessarily endowed with instincts, appetites and impulses[1], with self-assertive tendencies inevitably accompanying the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, it contains abundance of raw material for the production of sin, as soon as these native propensities are brought into relation with any restraining or condemning influence. When we reflect that many of these propensities are inevitably strong because they are, or once were, useful or necessary to life, and were therefore through countless ages intensified by natural selection, there is no reason left for referring their clamorous importunity to an evil bias or a corrupted nature. They belong to man as God made him, and are to be controlled in proportion as the moral law becomes the more exacting because the more elaborately developed, and the more expressly associated with religion embracing the whole of life. There is indeed no need to marvel at the universality of sin throughout mankind when many of its most general forms, at least, are thus attributed to the self-assertion of powerful tendencies, with all their priority in time and fixity in instinct or habit, after the acquisition and superposition of a 'higher nature' which

[1] I use these terms, of course, in the loose, vague mode of popular speech, which is here quite sufficient, and not as they are precisely defined in the psychological treatise. They are defined, however, further on.

demands their subordination to less immediate and tangible ends.

"To the evolutionist sin is not an innovation, but is the survival or misuse of habits and tendencies that were incidental to an earlier stage of development" and whose sinfulness "lies in their anachronism[1]."

II.

Such being the nature of the fall of the race to which science and its theoretical generalisations point us, we have now to endeavour to trace the genesis of sin in the individual, which has hitherto been explained by the idea of the inheritance of a perverted nature.

The foundation from which we start is the fact already asserted of the race and now to be repeated of the individual, that we are natural before we are moral beings, and that the impulses of our nature are in full sway before the moral consciousness begins to dawn. And on passing from the race, as to the earliest state of which we have to rely much on inference and theory for guidance, to the case of the individual, we set foot upon more solid and certain ground. For here we enter the realm of empirical fact. And it is found that just as the embryo recapitulates within the womb the age-long history of the development of its species, so too, to some extent, does the infant's mind recapitu-

[1] The word 'anachronism,' I observe, has been found capable of misinterpretation. Though in itself only implying time, the context should make it plain that it here refers to an interval between the non-moral and the moral stages of man's development.

late the moral history of the race. The psychology of infancy is a branch of science which has recently been receiving much attention, and its investigations have led to the refutation of many *à priori* views. It is interesting to compare the estimates of child-nature attained from the starting-point of various kinds of prepossession with one another and with the results of actual experimental study. Some such estimates are collected in the works on childhood of Prof. Sully and M. Compayré[1]. Thus, Rousseau looked upon children as coming perfect from the Creator's hand. Wordsworth, too, attributed to infancy certain positive excellences, glimpses of a higher morality than ours, divine intuitions brought from a previous existence[2]. Others again, of whom the kindly Dupanloup, the children's bishop and catechist, may be taken as a type, have been led by the requirements of the doctrine of Original Sin to paint the child's nature in the blackest colours. And perhaps most people see in children's impatience of restraint, their wilfulness and passionate temper, their unconscious cruelty, their greed and envy and self-pleasing, so many confirmations of the doctrine that every child of man inherits a sadly vitiated nature.

Real knowledge of the mental and moral develop-

[1] Sully, *Studies of Childhood*; Compayré, *L'Évolution intellectuelle et morale de l'enfant*.

[2] See the Ode 'Intimations of Immortality from recollections of Early Childhood.'

ment of children, however, pronounces a judgment different from all of these, and one in which the investigators whose works I have been able to consult are unanimously agreed[1]. They find that the human infant is simply a non-moral animal, and that its impulses and propensities are essential to its nature. The faculties, as we may still conveniently call them, of will and 'moral sense,' are made, not born. Even their germs are not apparent at the first. Experience commences in blank sensations, feelings of pleasure and pain; passes into the stage of apprehension of objects and response to suggestion and imitation; thence to imagination and volition, and finally becomes reflective, social and ethical[2]. The instincts which the human being brings with him into the world are extremely few[3], and even these mostly terminate with the rise of volition. No animal species, indeed, is so

[1] See, e.g., the works of Prof. Baldwin and Prof. Sully referred to in this lecture; Perez, *The first three years of childhood*; Mezes, *Ethics* (where Royce is quoted as in agreement), and various papers in the American *Journal of Psychology*. M. Compayré (*op. cit.*) adduces also the authority of Renouvier, from whom he quotes the following words: "Nous savons par l'observation de l'enfance, par l'expérience des effets de l'éducation, que l'hérédité ne fournit à l'homme naissant aucune détermination fixe des actes bons et mauvais."

[2] See Baldwin, *Mental Development in Child and Race*, p. 17.

[3] The word 'instinct' is often loosely used to include cases of imitation or rapid learning; in the restricted sense (see p. 101, note) of the term the human instincts are few, in wider senses they are many.

slenderly furnished at birth with ready-made endowments; but none shows so great receptivity and capacity for adaptation. Apart from the external educating environment, however, the child would remain on a level little superior in any respect to that of the brutes. Social, rather than physical, heredity[1] moulds the child. Hence the tendency to imitation, which seems to be one of the hereditary equipments of the infant, is of great importance for its mental and moral growth. Before the imitative period opens, however, the child is utterly organic. For some seven months the sway of the inborn tendencies, whose power is proportional to their fewness, is absolute. It need scarcely be repeated that nothing is found in these to lend colour to the view that their intensity results from a defection from original, ideal human nature. They are necessary, in their full power, to life or health or growth, or for the later realisation of the distinctively human mental attributes. And the same must be said of habits which soon begin to be formed under the stimulus of pleasant or painful feeling, the direction

[1] The term 'social heredity,' which has already been frequently used, is due, I believe, to Prof. Baldwin. It serves to express the "indebtedness of the individual to his social environment" or the truth "of social transmission by tradition," emphasised by writers such as Leslie Stephen, Lloyd Morgan, J. A. Thomson, Alexander, R. MacIntosh. Though widely different from physical heredity, Baldwin contends that it is a true 'heredity' because the outcome of 'a personal reaction' upon tradition. See this writer's *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development.*

of the emerging and growing will, and the only known sanction of success. Of course such a pure little animal as the young child presents sometimes an appalling spectacle of self-centredness in the satisfaction of its impulses and appetites, and of passionate resentment to restraint on their indulgence. But if the upholder of the doctrine of a fallen nature sees in such an exhibition that false delight in freedom which is said to be one of the marks of inborn depravity, the naturalist reads there only a sign of future sanity and vigour. The young child is for him a sentient automaton admirably suited by nature for self-preservation and development under the conditions of its early nurture: an organism adapted for "parasitic assimilation of its environment" as it unconsciously follows the line of least effort. The apparent 'faults' of infantile age are in fact organic necessities. There *must* be what looks to older eyes so much like unmitigated selfishness. There *must* be unmixed dislike of restraint until expanding intelligence discerns its reasonableness. Even the curious 'contrariness' which often appears at a certain age, seeming like deliberate persistence in resisting every expressed wish or command, appears to be but an out-of-place example of an involuntary process of inhibition of response to suggestion which is essential to the learning of many complicated useful actions.

It has been proved, then, that the tendencies which

casual observation or doctrinal preoccupation might plausibly construe as expressions, in the child, of divergence from the original or ideal type of human nature are necessarily incidental to the human organism. Man, as a sentient being endowed with instincts and impulses[1], inevitably possesses propensities which belong to him not at all as a fallen and corrupted being, but as man, and which must of necessity involve him, from the time that his moral life begins, in a lasting series of struggles and efforts if he is to order himself as a rational being in accordance with the requirements of an ideal or a moral law. Fear and anger, envy and jealousy, self-centredness and self-pleasing are qualities which form part of the birthright of the human being in virtue of his animal ancestry. Whatever may be the degree of strength in which the elements of the 'ape and tiger' in our nature are inherited—they are of course liable to 'variation'—they are natural and normal and necessary. It cannot be said of them, when we speak with reference to man in his yet unmoralised condition, that in any sense 'they ought not to be.' They are non-moral[2].

[1] Instincts are defined by Prof. Baldwin (*Psychology*, p. 329) as "original tendencies of consciousness to express itself in motor terms in response to definite but generally complex stimulations of sense." Impulses are internally stimulated tendencies; instincts are stimulated by the environment. Of course the definition given above regards instinct on its psychological side; psychologically, an instinct is an innate tendency to a certain form of action when the appropriate external stimulus is presented.

[2] Hence it cannot be said that man inherits a 'bias to evil.' If

And besides being non-moral, it must be added that these animal propensities are *neutral* in character. That is to say, they are not exclusively prophetic of evil in respect of the moral value of what may be shaped out of them. They are indifferent material waiting to be moralised. They may be turned to bad or they may be turned to good. Fear is the necessary basis both of cowardice and the highest courage. Anger is the source of righteous wrath as well as of vindictive passion. Our virtues and vices, in fact, have common roots. The crude material of natural dispositiou, of inherited propensities of emotion or of appetite, is neither good nor evil but the common ground of both[1]. We do not inherit separate collections of ready-made tendencies, some wholly good and some wholly bad, to war with one another. Our lowest appetites are the necessary basis of our finest moral sentiments means of self-realisation in the highest sensc, at the same

an honest merchant takes over an unsuccessful business and, in his attempts to place it on a sound financial footing and to make it a prosperous ooncern, long needs to exercise the utmost diligence, and even to borrow money, in order to escape bankruptcy, it would be improper to speak of his evincing a bias to indebtedness. He might be the most independent person in the world. It is no less improper to speak of the individual member of the race who inherits the tendencies of the stock, and consequently, from an early age, has to enter upon a laborious career of 'self-conquest,' as possessing a bias to evil. Bias can only be predicted of the will, which emerges after the 'nature' is inherited.

[1] Cf. Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, on the origin of the good and bad self.

time that they are the fateful rocks on which so many human lives make shipwreck. It is simply because the mastery of appetite and emotion by the moralised man has always proved so difficult that human thought has generally considered the animal side of our nature to be positively evil. S. Paul was no Hellenic dualist; he knew well that the propensities of our lower nature are servants to be controlled, not evils to be rooted out. Yet he allows himself to speak of the "sinful passions"; and in his description of the "sinful flesh," which of course has a practical rather than a scientific purpose, he accommodates himself to popular modes of speech. So also does the philosopher, at times, when off his guard. Even Prof. Pfleiderer, in the passage in which he states the outlines of a theory similar to that which I am endeavouring to elaborate, lapses into speaking of evil as "cleaving to all men from their very birth," and as present in us "as a power, the origin of which must accordingly be beyond the conscious exercise of our freedom[1]." Manichaean dualism is perhaps the most perennial and ineradicable of all popular heresies; and it seems as if we must inevitably be committed to it if we allow ourselves to apply the ethical attributes of good and bad to anything except the activities of the will

[1] If these words represent more than an unintentional lapse they repudiate the position for which the Professor would seem to be contending.

which knows a moral law. It is true we speak of motives as good and bad; not, however, because they are so in themselves, "but because they are the elements out of which is built up the good or bad character, which is identical with good or bad actions." It is true also that we speak of dispositions as good and bad: the various blendings of innate or nearly innate tendencies or qualities in their various degrees of intensity; but again, "disposition only comes up for strictly ethical judgment according to the volitions in which it issues[1]." In fact the occasion or the material of sin can only be termed sinful in a loose, rhetorical or metonymical sense[2]. The most clamorous passion which invites to sensual indulgence is just as little to be described as evil in itself as the sublime work of art which may goad a man to extravagance and debt. It is equally non-moral and indifferent. No natural impulse, then, is itself sinful, unless present through our volition, and therefore through our fault. It is the deliberate refusal to reject the impulse, the wilful surrender of the government of conduct to the non-moralised sensibility, in which evil takes its rise. Neither in the sense that they are foreign to human nature as it ought to be, nor in the sense that they are ethically classifiable under the categories of good and bad, can we call any of

[1] Alexander, *Moral Order and Progress.*

[2] See Note B.

our inborn tendencies or earliest acquired habits 'sinful.' Neither deductive reasoning nor empirical observation will allow us to speak of a bias to evil or of moral contamination before the individual inheritor of our common nature has attained to moral consciousness and accountability. Indeed when the individual is passing through the natural or animal stage of his development, that which knows as yet no 'law,' his appetites are blind, more of the nature of mere wants than conscious desires; action is impulsive rather than purposive. And it is not until reason appears that these appetites are transmuted into desires directed towards an end. In the meantime life is a series "of simple reactions to ideational stimulation."

It is not necessary to present here what is known or supposed as to the origin and development of will. But it is the basal proposition of the theory of sin which is now being elaborated that until the will has emerged, and the life begins to be self-conducted, no germ of evil can be said to exist in the individual. The young child, in following the impulses and instincts which it is as yet unable to direct or control, is entirely fulfilling its life's purpose. With the dawn of will and reason morality first becomes a possibility. And until moral sentiment appears, the existence of sin is of course excluded.

The account of the actual genesis of sin in the

individual which our theory has to offer will thus involve a description of the birth and growth of conscience which first makes sin a possibility: the 'law' without which sin is 'dead' or non-existent. It is comparatively lately that psychology has supplied us with information on the subject that is of scientific value; and of a little of this information I must presently make use.

We have already seen that the infant, as shaped by heredity alone, is a non-volitional creature of impulse, only differing from the animal beneath him in the capacity of becoming, under certain conditions, what the other never could become. The status of a human person can only be realised through education. But, with all deference to etymology, this education would seem to consist less in drawing out than putting in. The child's development is by no means the self-unfolding of what is immanently existent in him; it is much more the appropriation from without of what never could be his were it not for the human environment, with its long past history, in which he finds himself. Soon the moulding power of influences acquired by physical inheritance reaches, in most respects, the limit of its range. Then comes the turn of social heredity, in whose growing power practically all man's future progress, as a race, consists[1]. And the race's most important gift to the

[1] We are told that evolution has exhausted its possibilities in

individual is the morality which itself has toilsomely and gradually won.

It is said that after three years or so from birth the child shows signs of the dawn of moral sentiment around the acts and attitudes of its will. The full story of the rise and growth of moral sensibility, however, need scarcely be repeated here. Only such broad outlines as are unquestionable can be safely given. It has long been recognised that obedience acquired by punishment plays a considerable part in evoking moral sentiment. But this, we are told by Prof. Baldwin, to whom I am chiefly indebted for information on the matter[1], is by no means the only, or the most important, moral educator. The conflict of direction from without with desire that wells up from within is an experience which the child has already known. He has learned that he is now an assertive self that makes according to habit for what is pleasant, and now an accommodating self that yields and learns. But obedience calls forth yet a further self which denies its own impulses in conforming to another's will; which obeys, in fact, unwillingly. Hence comes

perfecting man's body. Moreover man, when civilised, is not exposed to natural selection in the sense in which he once was. He is now a domesticated animal; his progress consists in the enrichment of his environment and in securing the transmission to the individual of its stored-up acquisitions.

[1] See especially *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, chap. x. § 3; *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chap. i. § 3.

the idea of law. But the law to which he has learned to bow from various motives, the child can neither anticipate nor understand. In his attempts to do so he often blunders. He finds, however, that his parents and teachers also obey it: he sees them hesitating, doing what cannot be pleasant to them. He is thereby puzzled. But some of the law's content is learned through 'suggestion' and imitation, through instruction and reflection. And so there grows up for him a moral ideal which is taken over into himself, an idea of goodness or right conduct which is perfectly concrete, embodied at first in a person, and afterwards in God. And it is continually revised and expanded throughout life[1]. Thus in temptations the child begins to get accustomed to the presence in him of something which represents his father or some other law-giving personality. Much experience is necessary to separate the abstract idea of good and bad from that of the will of his parents[2]. Good is, at first, what is permitted, and evil what is forbidden. But long before this separation of abstract from concrete has been effected,

[1] The content of the moral law is mainly learned by imitation till mature manhood. Without the 'tone' and somewhat arbitrary sanctions of the public school, and without hero-worship in later youth, most of us would have suffered in the building-up of character. The unique power of Christianity, and the highest significance of the appearance of Jesus Christ, is connected with His embodiment of the ethical ideal and His appeal to the moral faculty in man.

[2] For striking examples see Perez, *op. cit.* E. T. p. 238.

the new self that has thus arisen calls the child to account if he yields to his 'self of habit.' Here is conscience; and as it is being acquired one ceases to be innocent with the innocence of ignorance of good and evil.

The impulse toward the satisfaction of all desires, natural and inevitable from the first, and already strengthened by some years of use, now meets with the check of an internal law. And as the ethical ideal expands, and the widening world brings ever new occasions for failure in the steady realisation of the higher self, the experience of evil grows. Moreover the iron chains of habit have already begun to be forged before the expulsive power of new affection and reverence can be felt. The new-born moral agent, therefore, has much to unlearn and much to subdue, as he enters on the task of moralising his organic nature. He is indeed beset from the very first with those manifold temptations, "which death alone can cure," in that they belong of necessity to human nature as God ordained it to be constituted.

Thus "the way from nature to character is laborious and full of effort." Morality consists in the formation of the non-moral material of nature into character, in subjecting "the seething and tumultuous life of natural tendency, of appetite and passion, affection and desire," to the moulding influence of reflective purpose[1]. Here,

[1] J. Seth, *Principles of Ethics*.

and not in any universal and hereditarily transmitted disturbance of man's nature, is to be found the occasion or source of universal sinfulness. It is simply the general failure to effect on all occasions the moralisation of inevitable impulses and to choose the end of higher worth rather than that which, of lower value, appeals with the more clamorous intensity. And if goodness consists essentially in this steady moralisation of the raw material[1] of morality, its opposite, sin, cannot consist in the material awaiting moralisation, but in the will's failure completely to moralise it.

And in the growth of evil we have of course to emphasise the power of habit. Both physiology and psychology teach us that every action leaves behind it a tendency to repetition. Ends tend by repetition to coalesce with one another, as a psychologist expresses it. Selective effort gives way more and more

[1] In the account given here of the development of sin in the individual the 'raw material of morality' has been spoken of as if it consisted merely of what is supplied by sensibility. This, however, has been only for simplicity and convenience' sake. Of course human instincts and impulses do not remain blind when rational life has become developed. Thought transmutes them and makes them but centres of "a complex of associated ramifications due to our richer life." "Hunger and love" may be the two root elements of human nature, the rockbed of morals. But reason gives greater scope for selfishness than mere instinct, and enormously extends the field which morality has to conquer. It too, no less than sensibility, has to be moralised, and yields the stuff from which sin is made.

to routine, and the voluntary life becomes more and more limited. Character is a habit of will and determines future action. Both virtue and vice become easier. "But the ascent reveals ever new heights of virtue yet unattained; and the effort of virtue is measured by the heights of the moral ideal, as well as by the heights of moral attainment. Thus, what at a lower level was character, becomes, at the higher, again mere nature, to be in turn transcended and overcome. 'We rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things.' There is no resting in the life of virtue,—it is a constant growth; to stereotype it, or to arrest it at any stage, however advanced, would be to kill it. There is always an 'old' man and a 'new': the very new becomes old, and has to die, and be surmounted[1]." The gate is ever strait, and the way ever narrow, in the life of virtue[2].

If the account of the genesis of sin which has now been given be substantially true, the universality of sinfulness will scarcely need another word of explanation. If we bear in mind the facts which science and experience supply as to the origin, development, and organic constitution of man, the mode of appearance

[1] J. Seth, *op. cit.* pp. 52, 53.

[2] For a somewhat fuller and more complete account of the child's 'nature,' of the development of will and conscience, and of the beginnings of sin, the author would refer to his essay on The Child and Sin, in *The Child and Religion* (Crown Theol. Library, 1905, edited by T. Stephens).

of his conscience, the nature of his social and physical environment, it will seem to savour of unreality to continue to demand some event of universal or of catastrophic nature to account once and for all for our present state. God forbid that one should seem to excuse sin at any stage of human development! But the absence of a solitary case of sinless life would seem, according to this doctrine of evil, to be no marvel that needs to be violently accounted for. Like the gospel in which lies man's only hope of salvation from its power, sin requires no ascent on our part into the heavens, nor descent into the deep, to bring its actuality into the sphere of human life: its source is very nigh. But I would have it observed that in thus naturally accounting for the origin and universality of sin, we neither excuse evil nor explain it away. Let us once more remind ourselves that we have been considering sin only in its initial stages, not at all in its perfect development in relation to the law of Christ. If conscience is not immediately given in the infant mind of race or individual, but only came to be what it is—and who shall say what it shall be?—through many stages, its intuitions have for us, on that account, none the less validity[1]. If sin can be traced back, in race

[1] "Those who dispute the validity of moral or other intuitions on the ground of their derivation must be required to show, not merely that they are the effects of certain causes, but that these causes are of a kind that tend to produce invalid beliefs." H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 5th ed. p. 213. This error was made by Prof. T. H. Green,

and single person, to its beginning in the transgression of a sanction not then recognised as that of God, it loses nothing of its exceeding sinfulness for us to whom it is none the less a deliberate grieving of the Holy Spirit. And further, if this account of sin sees in it something empirically inevitable for every man,—which of course accords with all experience,—it by no means implies that sin is theoretically, or on *à priori* grounds, an absolute necessity. If, finally, it avows fully and frankly that our nature, and the surroundings in which we are placed, are such as make the realisation of our better self a stupendously difficult task—as indeed the theory does—it thereby only emphasises, like the old doctrine of inherited depravity before it, man's crying need of grace and his capacity for a Gospel of Redemption. That the nature of redemption would need to be defined in terms somewhat different from those to which we have long been used, is of course true; but that would not be a wholly new demand, nor perhaps an altogether idle one. But with regard to consequences, we have, as said before, to work and wait. Their possible gravity should make the student weigh his words, not seal his lips.

And, in conclusion, what has our theory done with

Prolegomena, p. 9. A similar confusion was made, curiously enough, by Chas. Darwin, with regard to man's rational faculties in general (*Life and Letters*, I. p. 313).

the idea of human solidarity in evil which, as we have often seen, is a necessary and a permanent element in the problem of sin? It has re-emphasised as strongly as, and perhaps more pertinently than, the doctrine of Schleiermacher and Ritschl, the factor of social heredity which alone gives the moral law and makes sin possible, and the influences of social environment on moral life and the diffusion of sin in polluting the atmosphere in which the individual is reared.

But what of physical or organic solidarity? In relation to this question we have, of course, moved far away from the position of S. Augustine and the various Confessions of three or four hundred years ago. Yet not so far as to lose all contact with the great father's fundamental conception. The community which we have asserted with regard to the inborn contents of our present nature is not indeed a community in ready-made evil—a self-contradictory notion—nor in disorder, abnormality, deprivation, or corruption caused by the head of our race; but in instincts and propensities which are both neutral in value and non-moral in character, necessary and essential also to human nature as God purposed it to be. The Fall is exchanged for an animal origin and a subsequent superposition or acquisition of moral rationality. Taint of sin is replaced by normal self-directed tendencies, once very naturally, but nowadays very wrongly, called sinful. That man's performance lags behind his aspiration is

attributed, not to a defection from a sinless yet moral state, but to the fact that he is rising in moral culture, which makes great demands upon his organic nature, whilst his inherited psychical and physical constitution is making no corresponding or adaptative change, no evolutionary progress[1]. The theory thus preserves the truth of solidarity of race, both in nature and in environment, along with that of individual responsibility and guilt. It transcends, in fact, the old antinomy which previously made our problem so intractable. But it yet remains for us to ascertain whether it satisfies further legitimate demands, both of reason and of Christian sentiment.

[1] Cf. Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, p. 349, where it is added: "We, men of the present centuries, are like animals suddenly transplanted among new conditions of climate and food: our instincts fail us under the altered circumstances." In short, our nature and our nurture are necessarily at cross-purposes, and sin arises, though not of necessity, from their necessary conflict.

LECTURE IV.

THEODICY: PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE NEW THEORY.

JOB V. 6—8.

Although affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither doth trouble spring out of the ground:

Yet man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward.

I would seek unto God, and unto God would I commit my cause.

IT now remains for us to consider some of the bearings, implications, and presuppositions of that view of the origin and propagation of sin which the last lecture was intended to describe.

I may perhaps be allowed, however, before proceeding to this discussion, briefly to recapitulate for the sake of clearness the main points of the theory at which we arrived.

The basis of the view was the supposition that the theory of evolution applies to man. We scarcely relied upon this theory, however, except between the limits within which it is but a statement of historical or

scientific fact. We saw that it was then to be welcomed as a means of escape from a certain difficulty with which theology had become burdened in the past. According to evolutionary doctrine, man's constitution is at first simply animal. He inherits the tendencies of the stock, the original material of impulse and emotion out of which sin is soon easily made; but that, as a matter of science, is the normal and inevitable constituent of the common nature in which we all have kinship or solidarity, and, as a matter of ethics, is neutral, indifferent and non-moral. It is the product of the ordinary course of Nature, and ought not properly to be called original sin. We cannot say of our inborn propensities that they ought not to be, but only that they ought not to remain unmoralised or to be treated otherwise than as means toward the realisation of the whole man. They are simply the conditions which render virtue and vice equally a possibility when will and conscience have been acquired.

We accepted as proved, also, that the moral status both of race and of individual was gradually attained. Moral sensibility emerges in the course of mental education, and the content of the ethical ideal is the later gift of social heredity, for which physical heredity only supplies the empty and bare capacity. Conduct that before was neither good nor bad but innocent now becomes necessarily and increasingly either good or bad.

Evil is not the result of a transition from the good, but good and bad are alike the results of volitional reaction upon what is ethically neutral. Sin only emerges when the moral faculty has begun to pass upon our thoughts and action a moral condemnation. The individual thus discovers himself to be sinful. He does not rightly find himself to *have been* sinful in the past in which he knew no law, or to have been "subject from birth to an indwelling power of sin." If his consciousness tells him that he has thus been from the first the subject of sin, it is because it goes beyond immediate experience to a faulty inference therefrom, which it expresses in rhetorical language and in terms of an uncritically accepted theory. What introspection really discovers is an internal conflict between nature and nurture, natural desire and moral end[1]; and this is the inevitable condition of human life and the expression of God's purpose. We feel ourselves to be constantly solicited towards conduct which must be reckoned sinful when the moral faculty has entered upon its infinite possibilities of develop-

[1] The reader will be reminded here of the Romanes Lecture of the late Prof. Huxley on Evolution and Ethics, where the antagonism between the process of evolution and our moral principles is emphasised. He will bear in mind, however, that the mechanical necessity which characterises the lower stages of man's evolution is at the same time the indispensable prerequisite for intelligence and moral freedom, and therefore for ethical life in man when fully developed. "First that which is natural, then that which is spiritual." The natural is less the reverse of, than the preparation for, the spiritual.

ment. An impulse of greater intensity but lower worth conflicts with another of higher worth but lower intensity. This is temptation. It divides the man against himself: his natural animal basis against his acquired human conscience. Without both these elements, temptation and law, he could not be a finite moral being. And if man is thus the product of development, and sin is thus resolvable into factors (the flesh and the law of S. Paul), it is no longer possible to put the old question which has so long troubled the theologian: 'How does such a discord as sin arise in human life wherein everything indicates unity and harmony as its normal condition?' The question rests upon an entirely erroneous prepossession. Empirical science asserts that the discord in us is not sin until we make it so, and unity and harmony, in the sense of freedom from effort to avoid evil, never has had actual existence. Calm's not man's birth-gift any more than it is "life's crown," "though calm is well." "A spark has *disturbed* our clod." Man was born to trouble: to the arduous task of subjugating and annexing his organic to his rational and moral 'nature.'

Certainly from the presupposition of such original harmony, which modern knowledge asserts to be false, the question I have quoted has never yet been answered.

Through taking up a wider range of facts than was accessible till fairly recent times the problem, however,

if modified, would seem to have become more tractable. And the solution which has been suggested does not secure consistency at the price of surrendering any of the truths to be explained. The possibility of sin, the instruments of sin, and the temptations to sin are derived partly from our common nature: that is the essential truth which Augustinianism, supplied with deficient science and philosophy, misrepresented. The actuality of sin is derived solely from the individual will influenced by its social environment: that is the truth which Pelagius abstracted from its proper relation to the solidarity of mankind in the non-moral material of sin[1]. Solidarity and guilt each finds its recognition in the theory of Sin involved in the account of human nature which science has now supplied to theology as a basis for its doctrine of Man. And the denial of inborn sin by this newer theory, in the sense in which those words are properly taken, is accompanied with a strong insistence on man's need of grace.

In this attempt to ascertain the true nature of sin, to describe its actual origin, and to account for its universality, we have aimed at following the facts of experience and have been concerned with a purely empirical problem. Our basis has been the history of the growth of personality and of moral experience as traced by the genetic psychology of moral action: we have set out from the conviction that metaphysical

[1] On the moral solidarity of the race see Note N.

and *à priori* doctrines of Sin begin at the wrong end, and that for a sound and valid knowledge of what *ought to be* it is essential in the first place to study what *is*. The concept of man and the concept of sin can only be adequate when they take note of what man has been and how sin has 'become.' And if we are to pass on to the metaphysical aspect of our problem it must be with the determination to hold fast by, and not to part company with, the solid facts of experience which we have acquired in the field of the empirical.

And this transition to the philosophical treatment of the problem of evil is indeed required of us. For if the theory which was offered in the last lecture to explain the nature, origin and propagation of sin may have thus far commended itself, it ought yet to satisfy the further condition of affording a basis for a rational theodicy, and of being included easily and naturally in an attempt to describe the relation of the Infinite Creator to the finite independent soul.

We enter here upon the most intricate and difficult of theological and philosophical questions; and yet it is impossible now to do more than sketch the outlines of such a theodicy as naturally follows from the theory of sin already adopted. If, in offering such a sketch, I am compelled to pass by with exceedingly scant notice other theories advanced from various points of view, it will be understood that it is not because I would leave the impression that the whole problem

were less complex than it is, but simply because no other course is open than briefly to state the consequences, in this connexion, which follow from premisses already grounded.

It has previously been shown in detail how both the possibility of sin and the opportunity for its realisation exist, in the first instance, independently of the individual's choice. The opportunity is supplied by his inherited organic nature and by his social environment, for neither of which he is in any wise responsible. The former of these factors contains no moral element whatever; the latter is the expression of the ethical life of previous human generations. The former belongs to the ordinary course of Nature, whose only Cause is an immanent God. So also does the fact that man has become a free and moral being,—the fact which is the ground of the possibility of sin; though the contents of his moral life and the quality of his character are of course the results of his own determination according to his opportunities: the product of his volitional reaction upon his disposition and environment. It follows, then, that responsibility for the *possibility* of moral evil and for the opportunities for its realisation lies with God: that responsibility for the actuality of moral evil lies with man. This distinction is a very simple one, though it has sometimes been confused or overlooked. So far as it goes it states the problem without doing violence either to the Holiness of God

or to the reality of evil, the two elements which the Christian, or the ethical theist, must preserve from dissolution. It asserts exactly so much as is required for a Christian view of evil and no more. And it thereby accomplishes what many theories, professedly Christian, have failed to do[1].

But this distinction scarcely brings us to the begin-

[1] The philosophical problem of evil can only be approached after the adoption of a definite ontology and doctrine of God. The ontology of the self which is here presupposed will be briefly described on a later page. God is, of course, for us a personal, moral Being; but the reader must not expect to find here any attempt philosophically to justify this theological position. We set out with its assumption, and with the conviction that only on its adoption can the problem of evil receive even the most partial illumination. We have been learning of late to distinguish the God of religion, the *Ground* of all finite spirits and their experience, from the Absolute of philosophy, the *whole* of reality. The differentiation of these two conceptions, says Dr James Ward, at the end of the second edition of his *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, "will be *the* problem of the twentieth century." It will therefore be no longer necessary to attempt to controvert the following passage cited from Mr Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* (2nd ed. p. 197):

"Evil is a problem which of course presents serious difficulties, but the worst have been imported into it and rest on pure mistake. It is here, as it is also with what is called 'Free Will.' The trouble has come from the idea that the Absolute is a moral person. If you start from that basis, then the relation of evil to the Absolute presents at once an irreducible dilemma. The problem then becomes insoluble, but not because it is obscure or in any way mysterious. To anyone who has sense and courage to see things as they are, and is resolved not to mystify others or himself, there is really no question to discuss. The dilemma is plainly insoluble because it is based on a clear self-contradiction, and the discussion of it here would be quite uninstructive."

ning of the problem of theodicy. For if we thus avoid referring evil to the causal will of God, it still remains to explain such independence of the human will from the divine which called it into being as is necessary to ground the origin of sin in man alone; and then, further, to justify the permission of evil in the universe of a Holy God, and His delegation of the power to make it actual.

Both of these points we must consider in due course.

Throughout the previous lecture the reality of the human will as an efficient cause was assumed, and there is of course no incompatibility between this supposition and the fact that the will is to be regarded as having a past history rather than as a ready-made 'faculty.' But I do not wish any of my hearers to think that I thus start from a position which philosophers unanimously grant. On the contrary, it is around the will, its reality, nature, origin and freedom, that psychological and metaphysical discussion is most keen. But I shall not be assuming as true in theology what is for me false in philosophy if I adopt such a view of the human will as is essential to belief in the reality of evil, and alone renders profitable any inquiry into its origin and its compatibility with the Holiness of God.

By this position one is inevitably pledged to a definite attitude towards the perennial problem of the One and the many, the Infinite and the finite: the rock

on which so many imposing waves of philosophical thought have spent themselves in vain. In asserting the freedom of other agents than God we make ourselves responsible for an ontology. And the attitude which our premisses alone permit is one which emphasises, with rather more stress than has recently been usual in Christian theology, the independence or separateness of the finite will from that of God, in respect of its causal activity. Spinoza in philosophy, and, to a great degree, Schleiermacher and the Hegelian school in theology, have so allowed the finite to be swallowed up in the Infinite that no reality remains to it. And this is pantheism. Christian philosophy, with its idea of God as both immanent and transcendent, needs to be very careful to avoid the same danger as well as that which is its opposite. Of these two tendencies, the one which verges towards the pantheistic is the more predominant in the religious thought of to-day. The doctrine of the divine immanence, in the form in which it was impressed upon us by the theory of biological evolution, proved, for a time, a fruitful source of theological inspiration. In so far as it supplies a conception of the self-revelation of God in human history I shall presently have recourse to it, in order to show the relation of the evolutionary view of sin to Holy Scripture. But, like all recovered truths when at the height of their

dominance and popularity, it may easily be pressed further in some directions than a comprehensive survey of the whole theological field will allow. The problem of evil certainly has grave perils for any but the most cautious statements of the indwelling of God in man and man's being in God; and an exhaustive presentation of the doctrine, defining the meaning and limits of immanence, its relation to the teleological and the incidental or contingent, respectively, in Nature, and to the reason and the moral evil of man, grappling also with the very real philosophical difficulties that beset these questions, is as yet a conspicuous want in Christian theology. As against the pantheistic trend of much recent thought, I would venture to submit that in the interests of Christian theodicy it is necessary to insist upon two essential points. One of these is the independence of the finite human will or, in other words, the adoption of a monism which includes a pluralism; and the other is the postulate that much which belongs to the divine world-plan belongs to it only incidentally, as a necessary accompaniment or by-product, without being in itself a divine end at all. If we are granted these two principles, it seems possible to explain the evil of this world less violently than by assigning it, as many would do, an absolute purpose in the universe, or by regarding it, with an influential school of writers, as an essential moment in the life of

God, to whom it is necessary to attribute development or 'becoming.'

In asserting the real independence of the human will we remove the responsibility for actual evil from God; we give the finite spirit a real power to thwart and oppose, within limits, the divine end in His world. The bond between the soul and God in whom it lives and moves may indeed be hard to define. On the one hand it must be a bond which admits of God being the universal ground of the life of all finite existences, and also the "Strength and Stay upholding all creation," rendering possible the moral and intellectual relations of man with man, his converse with God, and his receptivity of those aesthetic influences which the world of inanimate Nature can so powerfully impress upon his soul. But on the other hand it must be a bond sufficiently loose to allow of a man's will being his own, and to find room for an utter discord and opposition in the world of time between part and whole, the many and the all-embracing One. The self-hood and independence delegated by the One Spirit to the many souls derived from Him, and always somehow indissolubly linked to Him, must be sufficiently complete to permit the initiation of new streams of causation: so that the creature may grieve the Love which called it into being and delay the far-off divine event to which we believe the whole creation moves, or may work together with Him for its accomplishment

Without this postulate all Christian philosophy would seem to me to be superfluous. For Jesus Christ and for the Christian experience sin means something infinitely deeper and more real than what it can have meant for Spinoza or the follower of Hegel. And it is because one cannot consent to the resolution of evil, of human personality and volition, into illusion or appearance, that one takes one's stand, in attacking the higher problem of evil as it exists for Christian experience, upon an ontology that finds room for a partially pluralistic conception of reality. Any other philosophy would seem to be converted, by contact with the problem of evil, into pantheism.

But the view of the nature of the finite spirit and its relation to God which is thus implied is not merely a necessary postulate for such a theory of evil as is alone consistent with what is deepest in human experience; it has its own intrinsic merits as one amongst a number of ontological systems. It is the metaphysic of Hermann Lotze, intermediate between Herbartian realism and absolute idealism, between Leibnizian pluralism and the various kinds of pantheistic monism. And for those who, like Lotze, do not "cherish an assurance that speculation possesses secret means of going back to the beginning of all reality, of looking on at its genesis and growth, and of determining beforehand the necessary direction of its movement," and who regard philosophy as the endeavour of the

human mind to work its way back in thought and bring the facts of outer and inner experience into connexion, as far as our present position in the world allows, there will be weighty reasons for being attracted to this teaching of Lotze: to his conception of the being of things as consisting in their relatedness, his identification of the spiritual subjects' reality and 'separateness from God' with existence-for-self and knowledge by the self of its states as its own, and to his doctrine of the substantial connexion of the finite multiplicity of things and souls in the unity of the Infinite One.

We hold, then, for other reasons than merely to ensure the absolute reality of evil, that the Eternal has created, by an act of self-differentiation, an infinite variety of spiritual energies to which our souls belong[1].

The Infinite is immanent in each of us: the phenomena of our sensitive life are due to His agency;

[1] The view of the relation of God to the finite soul here adopted has much in common with that of Lotze. But Lotze, in not distinguishing between the Absolute (the whole of reality) and God (the personal World-ground), and in reducing all interaction between finite selves to the immanent activity of that World-ground, pushes his monism to the verge of pantheism or acosmism. He is not, indeed, logically justified in proceeding to regard man as a free agent. I am therefore more in sympathy with Martineau and with three recent writers who, influenced by Lotze, have likewise recoiled from that philosopher's exaggeration of the immanence of God in finite minds: Prof. Upton (*Hibbert Lectures*, 1893), Dr Rashdall (in *Contentio Veritatis* and *Personal Idealism*), and Mr Galloway (*Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*). My view is, however, far removed from that of the absolute pluralism of, e.g. Prof. Howison (*The Limits of Evolution*), which takes the finite self to be, like God, uncaused (*causa sui*) and eternal, and dispenses with the idea of creation or causal relation between God and human spirits.

but our wills are to be rescued from pantheistic absorption. God is indeed their central guiding Light dwelling in the world; but "here it is that God, immanent through the universe besides, and operating by determinate methods alone, passes into transcendent existence still unpledged, and establishes moral relations with beings whom He has endowed with a certain scope of similar volitional causality[1]." Our wills are ours to make them His.

> "God, whose pleasure brought
> Man into being, stands away,
> As it were, a hair-breadth off, to give
> Room for the newly-made to live,
> And look at Him from a place apart,
> And use his gifts of brain and heart."

In other words, man's higher self can never be his without his independent labour. There is a sense, indeed, in which it is essentially from God. As Prof. Royce has said, "It comes *into* the man like Aristotle's Creative Nous (*θύραθεν*), and is precisely so much of a man as is not his own, but God's[2]." But this statement is one-sided. God worketh in us, truly, both to will and to do of His good pleasure; but not in such a way that He does the whole work alone. He reveals the ideal, supplies the inspiration, prepares the heart:

[1] Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, 2nd ed., II. 183.
For further quotations from Martineau on this point see Note O.

[2] *The World and the Individual*, II. p. 251.

but the activity which responds, and accepts, which does the real warring against the flesh, is ours. The higher self is not the product of His immanent causation in an impersonal medium; it is revealed by means of God's transcendent relation to the soul, but the finite will grasps and apprehends it and, with full freedom to reject it, takes it for its own.

Such is the view of the finite self to which our doctrine of Sin has led us. From its intermediate position between mutually exclusive theories it will doubtless encounter various charges, some of which it may be desirable to anticipate. It is partially realistic in that it implies a relative independence of being from the Infinite into which it declines to allow the finite soul to be entirely absorbed. But the independence is not absolute; the sundering of the self from its Creator and from its fellow finite selves is not complete. It is compatible with solidarity in sin and penalty, and does not necessitate that the ills of the creature are events wholly external to the life of their Creator—though indeed their sins are—so that "the Creator has fashioned suffering in which He Himself has no share, and of which He is independent[1]."

[1] This is the main charge which Prof. Royce (*op. cit.* II. 405) brings against "any realistic conception of the moral agents." It would seem that the theory sketched above entirely escapes the criticism which, as a thorough idealist, he makes upon realism; indeed he seems to us to be here fighting a mere shadow. We would

And what we have said of the realism involved in our view applies equally to its relative pluralism. It is a pluralism whose very basis is a belief in One God. And if it be urged that such a doctrine "lets contingency into the very heart of things," then, like Prof. Ward whose words I use, I not only admit it, but contend that any other world would be meaningless. It is only on such a supposition that the world can be a moral order.

There can be no doubt that the metaphysical doctrine of Evil to which we have thus become committed recognises very real limits to the action of Omnipotence. But it sees in these Self-Limitation, and therefore marks of the highest power as well as love. It does not detract from God's Infinitude. For, as Dr Martineau has said, "What is thus relinquished is potentially retained. The self-abnegation of infinity is but a form of self-assertion, and the only form in which it can reveal itself." Our freedom is *conceded* to us by the Author of our being: "it is included in what He *has caused*, though excepted from what He *is causing*." Neither by 'planting out' other minds with initiative power, nor by instituting a universe

only postulate individual separateness of existence so far as is necessary to secure a man's will to himself as his own. Whether our position would then be identical with that of an idealist such as Prof. Royce we find it hard to ascertain on account of the ambiguity and paradox which is contained in some of his statements as to the relation between the finite and the divine will.

under law, does the God cease to be Infinite Cause, though He foregoes in both cases somewhat of His absolute freedom and omnipotence.

And the same self-imposed limitation in the life of God, so essential to any satisfactory theodicy, is implied in the other supposition upon which at the outset we pledged ourselves to rely, and which again will be familiar to readers of Dr Martineau. It is that of the incidental nature of much that happens in God's world, and from which teleological import is excluded. It would seem to me that there lies to hand in this idea a means of carrying the solution of the problem of evil a stage further than the point at which Lotze, with characteristic modesty, confessed that if any way out of the difficulty were to be found, he "knew it not."

Whereas all systems which incline towards a pantheistic monism endeavour to find a purpose of God in every detail of the world's structure and history, the theodicy which has naturally developed out of our doctrine of Sin excludes such a notion. It can of course consent to see in the pain and moral evil of the world, when it is there, an instrument for the further realisation of good; it can believe that all things do "work together for good," ultimately, "to them that love God," because the "rebuff which turns earth's smoothness rough" may be converted into a means of self-development, bidding man "nor sit nor stand but go." But it

declines to see the absolute necessity or the essential appropriateness of a divine end being fulfilled by the entrance of sin at all. Man's condition denotes, on our theory of Sin, a fall from the divine intention, a parody of God's purpose in human history, though not a fall from an actual state of original righteousness.

What we can recognise as a legitimate inference from the knowledge of the divine purpose for the world that may be derived from acquaintance with our small corner of it, is that the evolving course of Nature was destined eventually to produce moral beings bearing the image of God, and a cosmos suited to be the theatre of their moral life. And, in referring this result to the immanent divine agency, we recognise that God has committed Himself to a determinate method of procedure. Now, as Dr Martineau has argued, the choice of one such method shuts the door upon the perhaps infinite number of other possible methods. God has thereby "defined His cosmical equation, and only those results can be worked out which are compatible with the values of its roots." A cosmos in which intelligent beings find a reign of law, and in which spirit, greeting Spirit, perceives a moral order, implies that God has abnegated His unconditional Infinitude and, instead of "conducting all things by a miscellany of incalculable miracles," which would put human intelligence to confusion, has made it impossible for all imaginable things to be now possible. This is

of course to replace the absolutely contingent by the relatively necessary. Not indeed that the world, once created, is maintained by its own self-sufficiency instead of by the governing will of God. Not that the laws of Nature are an eternal *prius* existing independently of God Himself like the ὕλη of the ancient Greeks: rather are they the expression of the free but self-determined will of God acting in relation to the creatures to whom He has delegated intelligent and moral life. Such self-limitation is to be regarded as itself the outcome of the divine will and not an inner necessity of His own Being and Life. And the corollary of the fact that our knowledge of the cosmos reveals God as pledged to a definite plan or process of realising His end is that many of the details accompanying the execution of the plan are no essential parts of it but only necessarily incidental.

Such, it may well be, are the terrible physical catastrophes of the earthquake and pestilence, the apparent promiscuousness of distribution of the ills and temptations of life, which often seem, so far as we can judge, to bear no relation whatever to individual circumstances. These are but the inevitable by-products of the selfsame course of Nature which on the whole ministers to life and health. Such, too, it may well be, is the moral evil of the world, and all the misery which comes from sin. It would be maddening to some minds to be compelled to believe

that many of the more awful kinds of human agony are direct expressions of the will of God. The heaviest burden which distresses human thought is not the existence of evil, of pains and temptations, but their goading intensity and their chaotic distribution. If we could trace the utility or purpose of particular afflictions, if we could discern adaptation in quality or in quantity to the individual's strength of character and opportunities, philosophy might agree with simple-hearted belief when it assigns a special purpose to every individual event. But would not this belief, logically carried out, reduce the cosmos to a medley of unrelated miracles? Or do we evade the difficulty thus raised by falling back upon the divine Omnipotence? We are far too apt to assume without reflection that, as Martineau expresses it, there is nothing we may not ask from the Omnipotence of God, and that no petition can be unreasonable addressed to such a Being. "But it is absurd to treat the limits to such demands as a denial of the divine Almightiness; it is not a question about the power of doing, but of the compatibility of being and the consistency of thought." Omnipotence, in fact, "is not the power to realise a contradiction"; or, as we would prefer to put it, there cannot at once be and not be unity and coherence in the processes of the divine activity.

One hopes that such a view, though doubtless at variance with unreflective religious sentiment, may

escape the charge of impoverishing faith without enriching knowledge. But at least it seems less disastrous to thoughtful piety to assign the ills of our bitter-sweet life to the inevitable concomitance, in the working out of a world-plan, of incidental results over and above those directly intended to be secured, than to attribute their existence to the direct and immediate purpose of God as if they were ends for Him in themselves. Similarly the existence of moral evil would seem to be the most easily justified to reverent speculation if it be looked upon as a contingent product of a moral world, and not as having an absolute purpose in the universe or in the self-manifestation of God. For if, with Leibniz, we make evil teleologically necessary to the best of possible worlds, we transmute it into relative good; and if with the neo-Hegelian we make it an essential moment in the life of God, we deny that it is unconditionally evil. Such forms of optimism, too, regard the finite person as a mere means, or else explain away individuality into mere 'appearance.' "It may be doubted," however, as another has said, "whether we do not fall into more difficulties than we avoid by this low estimate of the conscious individual[1]." And, certainly, to treat evil as unreal is to break with experience as the ultimate basis of all knowledge. The problem of evil exists equally, of course, for all systems of idealism. For

[1] McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 178.

theism it takes the form of the old dilemma which demands the sacrifice of either the goodness or the omnipotence of God. So insuperable has this difficulty appeared to some that they have sought refuge in a dualism. But dualism, when absolute, is the least philosophically justifiable of all theories, and when only relative, as in Zoroastrianism and Judaism, is ultimately included in a monism. We have seen, however, that much of the force of this well-known dilemma is derived from misuse of the word 'omnipotence,' as if it implied, when referred to God, the power of self-contradiction. We have concluded that divine self-limitation is indeed involved in the constitution of a moral order or a realm of spirits, but that such self-limitation is at the same time the expression of Infinite power. It remains to show that such a moral order and such voluntary abnegation of sole causality in the universe is also consistent with, and a manifestation of, the highest love.

This is an easier task than that which has hitherto been occupying our thought. If evil really be a contingent product of a moral world, as has just been argued, and originates in other wills than that of God, the second question to which theodicy must undertake to give an answer is that which asks why the actualisation of evil was permitted and not prevented by a Being at once Almighty and all-Holy. This is identical with the question whether the Holiness and Love of

a Self-revealing God are better manifested in an entirely non-moral world or in one in which good be possible though mixed with evil, and in which good may yet be the final goal of ill.

We have seen that the world is, as a matter of fact, on account of its causal connexions, its unity and coherence of process, the suitable theatre, and the only conceivable kind of theatre, for the life of rational and moral finite beings. It contains the requisites for the formation, exercise and discipline of character, in that there is left in it a certain range of contingency, surrendered to the free will of its finite denizens. In other words, the cosmos offers scope for the highest personal relations between finite persons and a personal God. Had evolution stopped short at the stage of lower animal life and not proceeded until human experience appeared, there would have been, indeed, no sin; but there would also have been no possibility of moral good, no room for a revelation of the Love and Holiness of God. And unless we are prepared to maintain that non-existence of persons, a world of mere things or of conscious automatons, is the highest ideal of a universe which man can conceive, we have no right to deny that the present world, with all its sin and misery, is compatible with the love of a righteous God. If the notion of a moral being incapable of evil be a contradiction which omnipotence cannot realise, then the establishment of the possibility of sin, so far

from being inconsistent with the Love and Holiness of God, is unquestionably its most adequate and indispensable expression. And, further, it is perfectly compatible with what we mean by optimism. For to assert the self-limitation of divine freedom and initiation essential to the attainment of the final purpose of God's universe, is not to abandon belief in the ultimate divine government and preservation of the world, and in reservation of infinite possibilities for preventing the moral order from passing into moral chaos. It is very necessary to remember too, in dealing with the problem of theodicy, that we are trying to comprehend the whole from a knowledge of the part, the eternal goal from experience of the temporal order. An end of infinite worth can justify the means to its attainment provided the means are not absolutely evil and are absolutely necessary. The means in this case consists in the divine establishment of the *possibility*, not the *actuality*, of evil; for its actuality we have removed from the contents of God's will. And this means, as we have striven to show, is both good and necessary from the point of view of the Eternal. The fulfilment of the whole of the divine purpose may involve the temporary defeat of a part; that evil will be ultimately transcended and overcome is essential to the idea of a moral order: and it is one of the characteristics of the Christian hope.

The system of theodicy which we set out to sketch

has now been given. It is not fancied, of course, that the problem of evil has thereby been carried the smallest step nearer than before to its solution; sufficient, indeed, if its confusions have not been worse confounded. It is only fair that an empirical theory of the origin and nature of sin should be accompanied with some description of the philosophical implications which it suggests and the ontological premisses on which it rests. And this demand we have crudely endeavoured to meet. The theory which has been furnished emphasises, as has often been pointed out, the metaphysical separateness of the human will from the divine, and the self-limitation of the omnipotence of God by His entering into relations with a finite world in which much that happens is rather to be regarded as incidental than teleological. It is the natural outcome, though not exclusively the logical development, of the doctrine of Sin which has previously been maintained. That it is its further vindication I can only hope.

* * * *

It now remains, thus late in the course, to attempt to justify certain general assumptions adopted without explanation in the previous discussion. I have felt that, just as the preface to a book is often more profitably read after rather than before the contents have been studied, it would be more expedient to avow these presuppositions at the end instead of at the beginning.

I am aware that the explanation of human sinfulness which has now been stated must encounter opposition unless it commend itself to the sentiments as well as to the reason. And here I allude, in the first place, to the opinion, still sometimes expressed, that the estimate of man's primitive estate involved in evolutionary views is inconsistent with the implications of Christian belief. Man's original brutishness, implying a nature governed only by animal impulses, is a condition which many find it hard to believe to have ever been normal to the human race. The mind clings tenaciously to an original state, if not of anything like perfection, yet of unsullied goodness or conscious moral innocence; and it does so because it vaguely feels it derogatory to the Holiness of God to attribute any other kind of human nature to His direct causation. But it is surely a mistaken feeling, due in part to the confusion of the end with the beginning, and in part to an unworthy conception of the divine Nature. As the late Dr Bruce has said[1], divine Holiness has been no barrier to intimate relations between God and man throughout our sinful history; why then should we postulate either sinlessness or moral completeness to begin with? Rather may we say in Darwin's words, "there is grandeur in this view of life." In the light of the Incarnation it is surely more true to her mission for Christian theology to lay emphasis on God's condescension and benevolence,

[1] See his *Providential Order*, pp. 165–7.

than to find offence in the methods by which, out of humble origins, He would seem to have shaped the development of the creature who can now hold converse with Himself. It is the case, however, as Dr Pusey remarked, that men have a greater quarrel with God's condescension than with all His other attributes.

A further connexion in which other than purely intellectual considerations are involved, is the relation of our theory of sin to Holy Scripture; particularly to the narrative of the Fall in Genesis and the argument of S. Paul in which he associates the sin of the race with that of Adam. The questions which thus come up are difficult and delicate; and the lecturer may well wish that at this point he might devolve his responsibility for utterance upon those possessing the qualifications for a wise and balanced judgment. However, he must do his best, lest suspicion should fall upon the view which he has laboured to commend.

In dealing with the earliest Old Testament history there is indeed precedent to follow; and one's opinion as to its nature can be freely expressed in such a place as this without fear of startling cherished convictions or of insinuating yeast which can produce other than healthsome fermentation.

If, now, the early history of mankind was at all such as several sciences infer it to have been, it will follow that any revelation from God to man implying

that order of mental and moral advancement exhibited in the story of the Fall could not have been bestowed without an immensely long previous preparation. Man at the first was incapable of receiving it. Indeed we have been led to conceive of the pre-Christian self-manifestation of God, the main process of which is enshrined in our Scriptures, as not so much communicated to man by a purely transcendent God from without in a primitive revelation, as infused by the Supreme Reason immanent in that of man, into the natural processes of human thought and speculation. Revelation, like the nature of the being to whom it has been addressed, is a gradual development. "In every age God took man as he was that He might make him what he was not." And it matters little, when we are scientifically describing the process, whether we speak of it as God's revealing of Himself to man or as man's becoming sensible of God's influence and truth. For in the latter mode of speech we assume the movement of God in man in man's feeling after God; and if our language resembles that of naturalism, our mind is that of theism and teleology[1].

[1] The process of God's revelation of Himself and His onward guidance of man's moral and spiritual ideals have been described in these lectures solely in their human or 'natural' aspect, as if they were the outcome of unaided human thought. In other words, I have used the language of description rather than that of explanation. In describing the *how* of things it is often expedient, for purposes of method, to ignore the *why*.

When we assert, then, that some of the early chapters of Genesis give us a glimpse of Hebrew thought as it had just emancipated itself from elements of Nature-religion and had scarcely passed into ethical monotheism, we are but interpreting them in terms of a view of God's Self-revelation which is alone compatible with the doctrine we have been led to adopt of man's gradual growth in mental, moral and religious nature. We have learned that it was in descriptions of Nature in terms of the knowledge which primitive man had acquired of himself, his needs, his instincts, his passions, his relations with his fellows, that we are most probably to trace the beginnings of science, philosophy and religion. Such was mankind's *inevitable* mode of thought at a certain stage of his development. And revelation—I mean of the immanent kind—*must* therefore have addressed itself to, and expressed itself in terms of, such modes of thought. We need evince no surprise, therefore, nor offer any apology, if our most ancient records of that revelation present us with the proof that such was actually the case. The opening chapters of the Bible, when studied in the light of comparative religion, show how God stooped to men while they had hardly emerged from this primitive state of mind to guide them from Nature-poetry to ethical religion, from deities which had once been natural phenomena to the purer conception of Himself. Yes, the *record* of His Self-revelation to the

world begins thus far back. And if we adopt towards the third chapter of Genesis some such attitude as this, recognising in it the echoes of remotely prehistoric thought, elements borrowed from the ancient lore of other nations, human speculation on matters beyond the reach of human memory, and all purified and readapted to the spiritual and ethical standpoint of a writer or collector of oral traditions, somewhere near the threshold of the prophetic age, we shall not look in its narrative for truth of final and permanent value on the historical, psychological or scientific questions which seem to be involved[1]. To hold such convictions as those just described in regard to the nature of the story, and yet to persist in extracting from it the elements of a revealed doctrine of a Fall such as was evolved only after centuries of Jewish and Christian speculation, would indeed seem to be taking back with one hand what has been surrendered with the other: a tendency against which the apologist ever needs deliberately to set his face.

But there is the further question of the use made by a Christian apostle of the idea of a Fall of the first parents of the race. In the fifth chapter of his

[1] If the validity of the deduction of the doctrine of a historical fall from an actual state of original righteousness from Scripture be repudiated, and the doctrine be still retained, it will remain for theology to show that the idea of such a fall is a necessary presupposition or implication of Christianity as the religion of a redemptive Incarnation. On this point see p. 152.

Epistle to the Romans, in which S. Paul illustrates the justifying work of the second Adam by contrast with the effects of the transgression of the first Adam of the race, he speaks of sin entering into the world through the one man and its consequence, death, passing to all because all sinned. I am not concerned with the extremely vexed question of the exegesis of these verses, except so far as to assert that the apostle himself does not define in them the precise manner in which he conceived the transgression of Adam to have been connected with the sinfulness of his posterity. His exact meaning can only be reached by inference. And if it is ever to be extracted with any degree of certainty, it will not be through approaching his teaching from the standpoint of Augustine, or even of Irenaeus or Tertullian, but from that of current doctrine in the contemporary Jewish schools from which we know the apostle frequently drew. This task, however, is not fully possible until we have a complete higher criticism of Talmudic and Apocalyptic literature. But whatever uncertainty may surround the question whether S. Paul taught a doctrine of hereditary sin, it is clear that he in some way connected the race's sinfulness with Adam when he so strongly insisted on our moral solidarity with the 'one man.'

I do not wish to confuse the plain issue that S. Paul, like his contemporaries, seems to have believed in a historical Adam from whom the human race derives its

woes, whereas if we are committed to the evolutionary view of man's history and of the origin of his sinfulness, or even to the estimate of the Old Testament narrative which I have just described, it is no longer possible for us to share in that belief.

But it does not seem to me that this is a matter of much moment. We have outgrown such mechanical modes of interpreting the sacred Scriptures as to extract from a writer's illustrations, or his usage of the Old Testament, authoritative doctrines on matters such as man comes to know through scientific study. We cannot always take Scripture statements, so another has remarked, as equivalent to the observed facts of the natural sciences, and make theology merely by induction or deduction from them. This was necessarily the method of theology in the past; but the limits between which it can be considered valid have, of course, been very considerably narrowed by the results of modern study. We have learned that these statements are often expressions of the ideas current in the writer's time, to be superseded in the course of growth of natural knowledge. Similarly we do not make metaphysics out of St Paul's conception of sin as a hypostatised power or agent within us. We take it as a useful mode of speech for practical exhortation without troubling ourselves about its incompatibility with the results of accurate psychological or ethical analysis. And so it would seem to display unnecessary anxiety

on our part if we seek to ascertain what elements in the Pauline conception of the first man are consistent, as matters of actual fact, with the doctrines of modern anthropology.

We simply decline to look for such knowledge in such a place. We take the responsibility upon ourselves of endeavouring to discriminate between the thought and knowledge which an apostle derived from the common intellectual surroundings of his time and the essential contents of the Christian revelation of God and morality which he sought to express in terms of it. The one element abides and grows. The other is transitory and incomplete; it invites continual translation and restatement, which is always to be undertaken, however, in the same spirit as characterised the truth's first formulation.

And thus, to pass on to vindicate another presupposition hitherto tacitly implied in our whole investigation, much of the theologian's work is inevitably only temporary. It is in part the work of reconstruction and repair. It is none the less necessary or useful, however, on that account. Such labour, too, like the work of the architect to which it closely corresponds, must be no mere slavish imitation of that of former generations. To be sincere it must, like true art, be expressive of the conditions and requirements of the present age, with which it must have thorough sympathy.

And thus the edifice of Christian truth, like a

great cathedral, will bear the evidence of many styles characteristic of their various periods. I may perhaps allow my metaphor to carry me yet further. For there is another sphere of labour essential to the keeping of an edifice, whether of stone or of historic truth. I mean work near the foundations: work below ground in the half-light of inquiring faith: work to which some must needs be called in every generation. We must not be so exclusively concerned with the completion of our constructive plans, of speculation or deduction or even discovery of empirical fact, as to forget the need of frequently examining the stability of our foundations. And if we find decayed and crumbling stones deep down and near to the basements of our theological edifice, let us not shrink from the needful readjustment of ancient and apparently secure masonry resting on them in the upper portions of the building. The criticism of our premisses in the ever intenser light of facts from external sources is as necessary as the drawing of further inferences. An investigation of the nature of the presuppositions and processes by which we have arrived at doctrines, and the keeping of them free from error, is as essential to theology as the enlargement of our stock of knowledge. Lest we be using principles of which we cannot altogether tell the origin, theories of which we have not thoroughly estimated the validity, assumptions which we can only partially know to be assumptions, we must

ever have recourse to the 'critical regress' which, from the time of Kant, we have known to be the one prerequisite of all true knowledge and rational faith[1]. It is largely our tradition that the solid basis of Christian theology lies in historical facts grounded and interpreted in accordance with historical method; and the ideal is one which all must reverence. It would be utterly wrong, of course, to imply that the Christian is to ground his deepest convictions upon the precarious basis of abstract thought instead of upon historical and objective fact, sifted and criticised. And yet even the historical method cannot dissociate itself here and there from postulates the validity of which it is the business of philosophical criticism to investigate. Theology may indeed take warning from the naturalism which exploited the facts of science for an explanation of the universe before it had constructed for itself a theory of knowledge.

And so I would urge upon younger and abler brother students who have been giving me their patient attention, especially upon such as may be equipping themselves with knowledge of the natural and mental sciences, acquiring the temper and habit of mind, the extended intellectual horizon, the manifold sympathies, which such studies must bestow, and who

[1] The history of knowledge shows "that the rate of intellectual progress may be measured by the periodicity of the wave of scientific scepticism." *London Quart. Review*, 95, p. 345.

may be learning thereby something of the God-given unrest which urges with imperative solicitation to the fearless search for the ultimate foundations of religious faith, that there is a work in the fields which I have indicated, a work for Him who is The Way and The Truth, which calls for their self-devotion and the labour of their life. I well know it is a work which has its peculiar trials and its dangers. But if the heart knows the unconditional nature of its own vocation the difficulties incidental to that work will not be matters of rash personal choice but of God's ordaining. The responsibility, brethren, then lies with Him. "I have made, and I will bear; even I will carry and will deliver you."

And now to return in order to conclude. It is in no spirit of ruthless iconoclasm that one has ventured to state what have been taken for weighty reasons for reconstructing a time-honoured doctrine in terms of knowledge to which we have been guided by the Spirit of Truth. Nor can I see that in doing so the essential contents of the Christian Faith have been at all involved. The supposition that this doctrine of man is the basis of Christianity is, to say the least, gratuitous. The universality of actual sin and sinful habit is the sufficient basis of a gospel of Redemption, and how exactly sinfulness arises or arose is a matter of no moment to it. In all our Lord's recorded relations with sinners no word or act necessarily implies the presence in men of aught but actual sin and self-made

character. The worthiest view of the meaning of the Incarnation—that which finds in it an absolute and eternal purpose of God—utterly transcends all question of a Fall, and even the relation of Christ to human sin. It is most doubtful whether the idea of inherited sin occurs in Holy Scripture[1]; and that S. Paul made use of the conception of the imputation of Adam's sin, or of the solidarity of the race, in some undefined way, in the Fall of our first parent, is, as we have seen, no reason why the Church of to-day should take his somewhat incidental utterances on the subject as the basis of its doctrine of human nature. The fictitious importance assigned by theology, in its most scholastic and artificial periods, to the doctrines of the Fall and of Original Sin is an accident of history, not the outcome of the necessary development of the Faith.

"Our thoughts of man are widened with the process of the suns"; but the essential contents of our revelation, like Jesus Christ Himself, are "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever."

[1] On this question see Note P.

NOTE A.

THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN IN CHRISTIAN CONFESSIONS.

THE doctrine of the Anglican Church on the consequences of the Fall upon human nature is contained in Article IX.:

"Original Sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault and corruption of the nature (*vitium et depravatio naturae*) of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit, and therefore, in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated; whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no

condemnation for them that believe and are baptized; yet the Apostle doth confess, that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin."

This article is reticent in comparison with most other confessions on the subject. But it definitely lays down that man is displeasing to God because of his possessing a hereditary bias to evil, or a corruption of nature, which is identified with the animal propensities or 'concupiscence'; and this concupiscence is definitely asserted to be 'of the nature of sin' in the strict sense of 'deserving God's wrath.' No mention is made of a loss of supernatural endowments, of deprivation of grace or of the presence of the Spirit.

This negative result of the Fall, which is strongly emphasised in the doctrine of the Church of Rome, has been taught, however, by representative Anglican divines; see, e.g., H. Browne, *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles*, 4th ed. p. 236, note 1.

The Roman Church has a more complicated doctrine of the Fall and its consequences. Original sin is, or results from, the loss of original righteousness, which did not belong to man's *nature* but was a supernatural addition to it, a *donum superadditum*.

Man's proper nature, his *pura naturalia*, was only affected indirectly by the loss of the supernatural embellishments which at first accompanied it. His nature was not wholly depraved by the Fall, but weakened; and this weakening is regarded as an effect,

not a constituent, of the loss of original righteousness. It is spoken of as *vulnera naturae*. Concupiscence is acknowledged to belong to man's nature, though thus a consequence of the Fall; but it is expressly declared *not* to be strictly of the nature of sin. It arises not by positive corruption, but naturally on the withdrawal of the *donum superadditum*. In this respect, and in restricting the term 'sin' to what is volitional, the Roman theology is more philosophical than that of the symbols of Protestant Christendom. But it is quite as much pledged to the anthropology and modes of exegesis which modern research has rendered obsolete, and is as incapable of adjustment to evolutionary views of the origin of human nature. Though original sin is regarded as a defect, it is nevertheless transmitted by physical generation. How guilt is associated with such hereditary sin the formularies do not clearly explain, but Bellarmine has recourse to a doctrine of imputation[1].

We append the decree of the Council of Trent on original sin[2]:

1. Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem Adam, cum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset transgressus, statim sanctitatem, et justitiam, in qua constitutus fuerat amisisse, incurrisseque per offensam praevarica-

[1] See Winer, *Confessions of Christendom*, E. T. 1873, p. 106.

[2] Copied from Gallemart, *Sacros. Concilii Trident. Canones et Decreta*, 1621.

tionis hujusmodi iram, et indignationem Dei, atque ideo mortem, quam antea illi comminatus fuerat Deus, et cum morte captivitatem sub ejus potestate, qui mortis deinde habuit imperium, hoc est, diaboli, totumque Adam, per illam praevaricationis offensam, secundum corpus, et animam in deterius commutatum fuisse; anathema sit.

2. Si quis Adae praevaricationem sibi soli, et non ejus propagini, asseret nocuisse; et acceptam a Deo sanctitatem, et justitiam, quam perdidit, sibi soli, et non nobis etiam eum perdidisse; aut inquinatum illum per inobedientiae peccatum, mortem et poenas corporis tantum in omne genus humanum transfudisse, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est animae; anathema sit: cum contradicat Apostolo dicenti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors: et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt.

3. Si quis hoc Adae peccatum, quod origine unum est et propagatione, non imitatione transfusum omnibus, inest unicuique proprium, vel per humanae naturae vires, vel per aliud remedium asserit tolli, quam per meritum unius mediatoris Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui nos Deo reconciliavit in sanguine suo, factus nobis justitia, sanctificatio, et redemptio; aut negat ipsum Christi Jesu meritum per Baptismi sacramentum in forma Ecclesiae rite collatum, tam adultis, quam parvulis applicari; anathema sit: quia non est aliud

nomen sub caelo datum hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri. Unde illa vox: Ecce agnus Dei: Ecce qui tollit peccata mundi. Et illa: Quicunque baptizati estis, Christum induistis.

4. Si quis parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, etiam si fuerint a baptizatis parentibus orti; aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad vitam aeternam consequendam; unde sit consequens, ut in eis forma Baptismatis, in remissionem peccatorum, non vera, sed falsa intelligatur; anathema sit: quoniam non aliter intelligendum est id quod dixit Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt: nisi quemadmodum Ecclesia Catholica ubique diffusa semper intellexit; propter hanc enim regulam fidei ex traditione Apostolorum etiam parvuli, qui nihil peccatorum in semetipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo in remissionem peccatorum veraciter baptizantur, ut in eis regeneratione mundetur, quod generatione contraxerunt. Nisi enim quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei.

5. Si quis per Jesu Christi Domini nostri gratiam, quae in Baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat; aut etiam asserit non tolli totum id,

quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet; sed illud dicit tantum radi, aut non imputari; anathema sit. In renatis enim nihil odit Deus: quia nihil est damnationis iis, qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christo per Baptisma in mortem: qui non secundum carnem ambulant, sed veterem hominem exuentes, et novum, qui secundum Deum creatus est, induentes; innocentes, immaculati, puri, innoxii, ac Deo dilecti effecti sunt, haeredes quidem Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi, ita ut nihil prorsus eos ab ingressu caeli remoretur. Manere autem in baptizatis concupiscentiam, vel fomitem, haec sancta Synodus fatetur et sentit: quae cum ad agonem relicta sit, nocere non consentientibus, sed utiliter per Christi Jesu gratiam repugnantibus non valet: quinimo, qui legitime certaverit, coronabitur. Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquando Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat Ecclesiam Catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere, et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit; anathema sit. Declarat tamen haec ipsa sancta Synodus, non esse suae intentionis, comprehendere in hoc decreto, ubi de peccato originali agitur, beatam et immaculatam Virginem Mariam, Dei genetricem; sed observandas esse constitutiones felicis recordationis Xysti Papae IV. sub poenis in eis constitutionibus contentis, quas innovat.

For Bellarmine's much more elaborate definition of

the Roman teaching, the reader is referred to numerous passages selected by Winer, *op. cit.*

From quotations in Winer's work from the Orthodox Confession, it would appear that on several points the teaching of the Greek Church with regard to the Fall and original sin is in agreement with that of Rome, though developed with much less elaborateness and precision.

The following fragments from various symbols will serve to illustrate the teaching of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches[1]:

Formula Concordiae (Lutheran).

* * * Praeterea, quod peccatum originale in humana natura non tantummodo sit ejusmodi totalis carentia seu defectus omnium bonorum in rebus spiritualibus ad Deum pertinentibus, sed quod sit etiam loco imaginis dei amissae in homine intima, pessima, profundissima, (instar cujusdam abyssi) inscrutabilis et ineffabilis corruptio totius naturae et omnium virium, imprimis vero superiorum et principalium animae facultatum, in mente, intellectu, corde et voluntate. Itaque jam post lapsum homo haereditario a parentibus accipit congenitam pravam vim, internam immunditiem cordis, pravas concupiscentias et pravas inclinationes: ita, ut omnes natura talia corda, tales

[1] These are taken from Winer's *Confessions of Christendom.*

sensus et cogitationes ab Adamo haereditaria et naturali propagatione consequamur, quae secundum summas suas vires et juxta lumen rationis naturaliter e diametro cum Deo et summis ipsius mandatis pugnent atque inimicitia sint adversus Deum, praesertim quantum ad res divinas et spirituales attinet. In aliis enim externis et hujus mundi rebus, quae rationi subjectae sunt, relictum est homini adhuc aliquid intellectus, virium et facultatum: etsi hae etiam miserae reliquiae valde sunt debiles: et quidem haec ipsa quantulacunque per morbum illum haereditarium veneno infecta sunt atque contaminata, ut coram Deo nullius momenti sint.

Confessio Basiliensis (independent of Calvin).

Through Adam's fall the entire human race is corrupted and subject to condemnation; our nature has been weakened, and affected with such a bias to sin that, unless the Spirit of God restores it, man of himself can do nothing good.

Confessio Helvetica II (Calvinist).

Qualis (homo, Adam) factus est a lapsu, tales sunt omnes, qui ex ipso prognati sunt, peccato inquam, morti variisque obnoxii calamitatibus. Peccatum autem intelligimus esse nativam illam hominis corruptionem ex primis illis nostris parentibus in nos omnes derivatam vel propagatam, qua concupiscentiis pravis

immersi et a bono aversi, ad omne vero malum propensi, pleni omni nequitia, diffidentia, contemtu et odio Dei, nihil boni ex nobis ipsis facere, imo ne cogitare quidem possumus.

Westminster Confession (Presbyterian).

By this sin they fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.

The Socinians repudiate the doctrine of Original Sin altogether, and with it, of course, all theories of imputation. The Arminians hold a similar position.

NOTE B.

THE AMBIGUOUS USE OF THE TERM 'SIN' AND ITS DERIVATIVES IN THEOLOGY.

THE starting-point for all definition with regard to the concept of sinfulness is, of course, the isolated single act of sin: *a sin*. This is an activity of the will, expressed in thought, word or deed, contrary to the individual's conscience, to his notion of what is good or right, his knowledge of the moral law or the will of God. The 'seat of sin' is the will alone. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will[1]." This foundation-stone of the

[1] Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, I.

Cf. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, E.T. II. 720:

"Actions are not good simply as events that occur, nor their results as facts that have been established—it is only the will from which the actions proceed that is good. And the will itself is regarded as good not as a mere impulse to execution, but as the outflow of a frame of mind which is not simply knowledge of a command but also agreement with it, and this agreement is not—like the obedience of any natural force to the law which it follows—a mere factual agreement, but is a case of compliance where non-compliance was possible. And it must be not simply a possibility of disobedience which is perceived, but the disobedience, by its own worth, which it opposes to the worth of the command, must withstand the tendency of the will to compliance. But worth can exist only for a sensitive subject; whatever may proceed from an intelligence that feels neither pain nor pleasure and from a will guided thereby, no moral judgment could be passed upon it."

ethics of Kant is unquestionably that also of the Christian philosopher[1]. Apart from the conscious volition of a person there is no such thing as moral goodness or badness. The term 'sin' and its derivatives can only be applied to the issues of will. We speak indeed of good or bad motives and of good or bad habits and characters; but only because these issue in, or result from and express, and therefore may practically be identified with, voluntary action. In the primary sense, then, a sin is a concept of *subjective* ethics. Its definition, as given above, only deals with that aspect of the sinful act which associates it with the moral responsibility and guilt of its doer; it is a transgression of the law in the sense of *his law*, what is known and recognised by him individually as constituting a moral sanction.

The nearest sense to this primary and fundamental meaning of sin is that at which we arrive on passing from the subjective law to the objective (universal) Law. We may speak of a person's act as a sin in the sense that it is contrary to the general moral conscience of mankind or of Christendom, though from the subjective point of view of its doer who, as a heathen, perhaps, knows no law on the matter, it is no sin at all. When Pelagius held that responsibility does not attach to disposition, which is not the product of the individual's will, and S. Augustine asserted that good and evil

[1] See Art. on Sin in *Lux Mundi*.

inhere in disposition and that a good disposition precedes good volition, the combatants were really arguing at cross-purposes, the one using ethical terms in the objective, and the other in the subjective, sense. And the same thing frequently happens to-day. We are reminded of a similar confusion in the history of psychology. Reid asserted that "when ten men look at the sun or moon they all see the same individual object"; to which Hamilton objected that each person sees a different sun or moon. Reid spoke of a conceptual sun, *the* sun, from the standpoint of objective or universal experience; Hamilton, on the other hand, of that which is the immediate experience of the individual, *his* sun, from the standpoint of subjective, perceptual, individual experience. Each was right from his own point of view, and their statements, rightly understood, did not clash[1]. It is the same in theological controversies as to what constitutes the 'sinful.' And it must be borne in mind that whenever 'sin' is correlated with 'guilt' it is used solely in the subjective sense. The difference between the two conceptions of sin which have so far been distinguished may be further illustrated by the following passages from S. Paul: Rom. iv. 15, "For where no law is there is no transgression"; v. 13, "For until the law sin was in the world: but sin is not imputed when there is no law"; vii. 8, "For without the law sin was dead."

[1] See Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II. 165.

We pass on to less strict uses of ethical terms. We speak commonly of a bad disposition or temperament, which is distinguished from a bad character by the fact that it is innate and not the outcome of volitional activity. Now no personal responsibility attaches to such 'natural disposition,' or to the sum of an individual's inheritances by birth which we call his 'nature.' Like the colour of his eyes or hair they belong to the class of *non-moral* things. When theologians speak of our 'sinful nature' or of our Lord's 'sinless nature,' they do not use the ethical epithet, therefore, in its primary and strict sense. And when this is done without consciousness of the change in meaning of the term employed, as would seem often to be the case, on occasions when it is of the highest concern that only the language of scientific precision should be used, serious confusion is apt to arise, which is a fertile source of fallacy. The scholastically trained Roman Catholic theologian usually shows to some advantage in this respect as compared with the less logically and philosophically equipped Anglican.

The meaning of the term 'sinful,' when thus loosely or metonymically applied to what is not the outcome of volition, is variable and consequently by no means always easy to ascertain. In fact the looseness of language usually implies, behind it, looseness of thought: especially subjection to the dominion of hypostatised abstract conceptions, as if they were actual entities, and a tendency to crystallise rhetoric into dogma.

If it is only allowable to apply ethical terms to the relation or behaviour of the will towards 'the material of sin,' it is obviously improper to bestow them upon that 'material' itself, which is necessarily non-moral. Our impulses and passions can therefore no more be called 'sinful,' in the strict sense, than alcohol or dynamite; and such use of language should be banished from what professes to be exact theology. It is easy to see how such an expression as 'sinful flesh' or 'sinful passions,' used by an Apostle, arose. The only 'activity' concerned in temptation and sin is that of the tempted will deliberating as to how it shall deal with the impulse present in consciousness, and eventually issuing in action. But our tendency to 'eject' our own activity into the objects which we figuratively speak of as 'tempting' us, makes us regard these as the 'sources' of our temptations and conceive of them as persuading or urging us into sin just as a person might do so; and so thoroughly have we personified this material, already converted into an 'agent,' that we endow it with an ethical nature and make its ascribed activity evil, and speak of the source of temptation itself as 'sinful.' Now it is natural, and indeed necessary, to call a cause evil if the nature of its effect is evil. But the 'material' of sin is not the cause of sin; the only cause of sin is will. Our passions or 'flesh' or 'nature' cannot therefore be called sinful for any such reason as this. And again, if they are called 'sinful' in popular language

because they are the 'seat' or, less figuratively, the occasion or material of sin, the *fomes peccati* of the schoolmen, i.e. the sources of impulses which, if not governed by the will, issue in sin, it must be borne in mind that the selfsame impulses which they may be said to supply are equally the source of what is good in our conduct when they *are* governed by the will according to the moral law. They are therefore neutral; even in this obviously figurative and unscientific sense the term 'sinful' is inapplicable to our nature, its impulses and passions. And further, if it were for the reason that our 'nature' supplies us with temptations and therefore with material for sin that it is spoken of as sinful, then it would follow that we could not speak of our Lord's nature as being 'sinless' without the implication that it was not a source of temptation to Him; in which case we should be committed to the position that He was incapable of being tempted, or that His nature was not really human.

Again, if the non-moral material of sin is not in itself to be called 'sinful' (which would really involve a Gnostic or Manichaean theory of evil), no more is it to be so called because of our sinful abuse of it. We make ourselves sinful thereby, but not our impulses, passions or nature; they remain, of course, as non-moral as before.

There is another sense in which sinfulness is predicated of our nature and its animal propensities; and

this is perhaps what is generally, though by no means exclusively, intended to be implied. 'Sinful' is used as a synonym for 'fallen' and therefore for 'deranged,' 'corrupted,' or 'abnormal' in some manner. We are not concerned here with the question of fact, whether or not human nature is thus abnormal and essentially different from what it was when man first came into existence. The point now under consideration is the applicability to that nature of the term 'sinful' even on the supposition that it has been so deranged. Now if this corruption or derangement is regarded as consisting in a strengthening of passion or animal impulse so that temptations, inevitable in some degree of intensity, have become more violent than God originally intended that they should be: or, what amounts to the same thing, if it consist in a weakening of the faculty we call will, or in both these things, it is easy to see that such an induced state cannot in the least involve the inheritor of our common nature in guilt: that it cannot in the strict sense be called 'sinful': and that it cannot be considered to expose the individual to the anger of God, but only to His mercy and compassion. The language of our Article, in this connexion, is extremely regrettable[1].

[1] The following passage from the *Life and Letters of Dean Church*, p. 248, puts the most pleasing construction on the language of Art. IX., and as expressing the mind of the late Dean will be of interest to the reader:

"The *fact* of what is meant by original sin is as mysterious and

If the view of human nature and human sinfulness advocated in Lecture III. be correct, and that of current teaching be found to be invalid on account of its basis in exegesis and its assumption of a theory of inspiration now abandoned, and also to involve ideas and theories incompatible with natural science and sound philosophy, it will follow that there can be no difference between our Lord's 'nature' and ours. If ours is normal, the natural product of a course of evolution whose only ultimate cause is God, and our inborn faculties have not been affected by a catastrophic Fall, our nurture alone and not our nature being marred by human sin.

inexplicable as the origin of evil, but it is obviously as much a fact. There is a fault and vice in the *race*, which, given time, as surely developes into actual sin, as our physical constitution, given at birth, does into sickness and physical death. It is of this inherited tendency to sin in our nature, looked upon in the abstract without reference to concrete cases, that I suppose the Article (IX.) speaks. How can we suppose that such a nature looks in God's eyes, according to the standard of perfect righteousness which we also suppose to be God's standard and law? Does it satisfy that standard? Can He look with neutrality on its divergence from His perfect standard? What is His moral judgment of it as a subject for moral judgment?

"What He may do to cure it...is another matter, about which His known attributes of mercy alone may reassure us, but the question is, How does He look upon this fact of our nature *in itself*, that without exception it has this strong efficacious germ of evil within it, of which He sees all the possibilities and all the consequences? Can He look on it, even in germ, with complacency or indifference? Must He not judge it and condemn it as *in itself*, because evil, deserving condemnation? I cannot see what other answer can be given but one, and this is what the Article says."

then there is no reason to distinguish the endowments of His Body and Soul, in so far as those endowments were human, from those which we inherit. His sinlessness consists in absence of actual sin: our sinfulness in the weaving of sinful acts into sinful habits and sinful character. His nature was necessarily neutral and non-moral, and the source of impulses, or bases of desire, whose indulgence would have produced sin. Without such impulses He could neither have been tempted nor have lived a moral human life. But His will never consented to such impulses when consent would have involved departure from the ideal of holiness.

There remains one other meaning which the term 'sinful' as applied to our nature might possibly bear: it might denote that its present state is caused by or due to sin, viz. the sin of Adam. It would then serve to indicate the cause of its state rather than describe its condition. This implication is perhaps sometimes commingled with those previously mentioned, but can hardly be considered to be ever prominent. It is of course equally unsatisfactory as the others.

We may conclude then that several vaguely distinguished ideas have probably been present to mind when our nature has been designated sinful and that of our Lord sinless. The most prominent is that according to which the endowments we inherit by birth are deranged and different from what they would have

been had our ancestors remained unfallen, whereas our Lord, not being descended from the first parent of the race by natural generation, was exempt from such derangement in His human nature. Whether the doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin be true or not, the terminology which has here been discussed is unsatisfactory and, when translated into language of precision, turns out to mean something different from that which it would naturally be taken to imply.

A similar charge of unsuitability to the purposes of exact theology must be brought against many expressions which are commonly used, and have long been used, in connexion with the subject under discussion.

It is hard to see what real difference there is between "instincts *per se* innocent" and a "capacity for self-will," which are sharply distinguished by Dr Liddon in his contrast between ordinary fallen human nature and that of our Lord[1]. Surely all instincts and 'capacities' are alike non-moral and, in that sense, innocent: or, if they differ in intensity, and such a difference is the basis of their distinction, how and where are we to draw the dividing line that is not purely arbitrary and artificial? In fact all such expressions as 'bias to evil,' 'tendency to sin,' 'capacity for self-will' and the well-meant statement 'sin does not belong to our nature' are based upon another conception of sin than that which sees in it an act

[1] *The Divinity of our Lord*, Note C; 15th ed. p. 522.

of will alone, and owe their existence to the tendency to *read back into the perfectly non-moral antecedents of sin*, the material out of which sin is made by the will, *the sinfulness which attaches exclusively to the consent of the will itself.*

These expressions not only involve the confusion of temptation with sin, grist with working or output of the mill, factor with product, but also are tainted with the pernicious consequences of hypostatising concepts derived by abstraction from the concrete particulars of experience, a process which makes entities out of non-entity. Another example of the same process is the term 'Sin' as distinguished from 'a sin.' We often read of sin 'as a power in us' and identified with a 'principle of evil.' Of course S. Paul speaks of sin 'entering' and 'reigning'; but he uses merely the language of figure[1]. We cannot make metaphysics out of such expressions. Abstract nouns are but conceptual shorthand useful for economy of words and thought; but it is not only in the case of mediæval realism that the concepts they denote have been the bane of exact thinking on account of the readiness with which they are personified into actual existences. When we say 'friction warms,' to take an example from a well-known text-book of logic, the proper subject of the verb is the bodies which are rubbed together;

[1] Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *Crit. Commentary on Romans*, 3rd ed. p. 145.

friction is non-existent in the real world. Similarly 'sin reigns' must be translated into 'men sin' before it can be used in precise thinking. When the terms of which a series was mentioned above are analysed into the concrete particulars from which their concepts have been derived by abstraction, they will be found to imply a definition of sin which is certainly Manichaean. Such expressions serve to conceal from view the point where knowledge fails us or where our thought has not been made clear and definite; and they generally beg the question whose answer they were intended to contain. The vague use of vague terms has seriously obscured truth.

If it has been made clear that the figurative language in terms of which temptation and sinfulness are generally described is really one of the main bulwarks of the theory of Original Sin, and that such language, owing its plausibility to the transference of epithets, only applicable to the will, to the non-moral material with which the will has to deal, is really of no scientific worth, important preparation will have been made for the reception of the argument of Lecture III. But this note has already trespassed on the subject-matter of a later chapter.

The ambiguity which has been shown to attach to the usage of the term 'sin' accompanies that also of the term 'nature.' Throughout this note, and indeed throughout these lectures, that word has been

used in its literal sense, denoting the sum of the equipments, actual and potential, with which a man is *born*: his congenital endowments, in fact, as distinguished from what is afterwards bestowed upon him, or acquired by him, from his surroundings and his education and experience. The word chiefly refers therefore to man's animal and sensuous organisation, his instincts and inborn springs of impulse, his undeveloped mental faculties. But by a man's 'nature' is also sometimes meant the notion or concept of man, his essence, the idea of what he essentially is or ideally ought to be. The signification of the term is then something like that of the expression 'higher nature.' Its meaning, used in this way, is extremely ambiguous and must of necessity be so. For how and whence is the concept of man derived? Probably differently, to some extent, in the case of every writer who uses it. And what is the criterion of validity in the case of any particular derivation and usage? Or is any one definite and comprehensive concept of man possible? He is a 'becoming' being rather than a stable and constant thing: in a state of flux, not the same throughout his history: in the most essential points he is not now what he has been, and it doth not yet appear, even as to this life, what he shall be. Consequently all 'concepts' of man except as a zoological genus are arbitrary, and all *à priori* anthropology deduced from man's essence or concept, instead of

from empirical knowledge of his course of development, is futile[1]. It is largely because the problem of sin has so generally been approached from the 'concept' of man, and from metaphysical ethics, that, even on its empirical side, it has proved so insoluble.

The ambiguity attaching to the term 'nature' of man is exemplified in the assertions that evil belongs to man's nature (Kant and, in a sense, Hegel): is contrary to his nature (most Christian theologians): and is both natural and unnatural to him (Biedermann, *Christl. Dogmatik*, S. 600).

[1] Though perhaps more relevant in another place in our discussion, the following passage may be quoted here from A. E. Taylor's *Problem of Conduct*, p. 42:

"We have only to imagine a race of intelligent beings who could support themselves, like Shelley's 'bright chameleons,' on air and dew, or whose methods of reproduction were asexual, to realise how completely the nature of the ethical ideal is conditioned by the concrete empirical facts of human history and the original data of animal appetite and instinct with which our race started on its development. Thus a consideration of the general character of rational activity seems to warrant the conclusion that ethics, unless it is to consist of mere barren tautologies, must be based not on general principles of metaphysics, but upon the study of human nature in its concrete empirical entirety, as it reveals itself to the student of psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Only from such an empirical study of human nature, as it actually is, can we deduce such a knowledge of human needs and aspirations as will enable us to give a definite answer to the questions, what type of life is the ideal, and along what lines is progress to be made towards its realisation?"

NOTE C.

ON S. AUGUSTINE'S 'PARTICIPATION' THEORY OF ORIGINAL GUILT.

THE following statement and criticism of S. Augustine's theory of imputation may be quoted from Principal Caird's *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, vol. I. pp. 210–11.

"The harshness, or rather irrationality of the notion of constructive guilt or of the transference of the demerit of one man, not merely to all other men, but to the myriads of the race who at the time of the transaction did not even exist, Augustine conceived it possible to obviate by the conception that the unborn generations were seminally present in the person of the first man. By means of this conception we do not create an impossible separation of guilt from sin, or make those to share in condemnation and punishment who were not sharers in the offence. As the whole plant is virtually present in the seed or germ, or as the embryo contains in it the whole future of the organism, so all the generations of men were virtually present in the individual man from whom they sprang, and became culpable because in a sense cooperating or consenting parties to the act by which he fell. But rightly construed, the conception of seminal guilt, or of a sin which contains or involves all

future sins, if any real meaning could be attached to it, would seem to imply that Adam was guilty of all the sins of his descendants, rather than they of his. On the other hand, the logical consequence of the idea of actual participation in the sin of one from whom we are lineally descended, would be that every successive generation is guilty of the sins of all preceding generations; that on every individual, irrespective of his personal character, rests the accumulated burden of all the sins and crimes of his ancestry, and that it is the last and not the first man on whom rests the guilt of the whole race. That such a doctrine should have been seriously propounded by Augustine, only serves to show the extravagance into which a great and subtle mind may be led by controversial exigencies."

Of course we have to allow for the age in which S. Augustine lived. The idea of personality was less clearly defined, or rather had less content, than now, and the limitations of his science and philosophy were considerable.

The work from which the above passage has been quoted contains an able review of the chief attempts to explain the nature and origin of evil, to which the reader's attention may be called[1]. Its author is

[1] For a full account of the various forms of the doctrine of imputation, Lange's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Eng. Trans.) may be consulted.

hampered, however, by his view of human nature, of which he speaks as if it were a 'constant' with a fixed 'essence.' One feels too, as one reads the chapters on the origin and nature of evil, that the root of the matter is not reached because the highly metaphorical language in which the subject is discussed unconsciously obscures, if it does not beg, many of the ultimate questions that are involved.

NOTE D.

ON THE HEREDITY OF ACQUIRED CHARACTERS.

"It would be altogether at variance with the scientific mood to sum up at present in the theoretical conclusion that acquired characters (or direct somatic modifications) cannot be transmitted in any degree. Our fathers, with few exceptions, *assumed* the affirmative; to many modern biologists (Herbert Spencer, Prof. Ernst Haeckel, Sir William Turner, Prof. E. D. Cope, Prof. G. H. Th. Eimer, and others) the hypothesis of the affirmative has seemed justified by its value in interpreting the course of events; to many medical men the affirmative is a working-hypothesis in their practice; to the majority of breeders—to whom the question means money—the affirmative is a foregone conclusion. Opinion in favour of the affirmative

answer is still wide-spread. Against this, the more critically-minded have simply to urge (1) that in endless cases there is certainly no transmission of the acquired character in any degree; (2) that in no recorded case is there secure evidence of the transmission of an acquired character as technically defined; and (3) that the facts of genetic continuity being as they are, it is difficult to conceive of the mechanism by which the transmission of a somatic modification could be effected. It *may be* that some modifications saturate so deeply into the organism that the germ-cells are affected in a manner so specific and representative that the offspring exhibit as part of their inheritance some degree of the modification which their parents acquired, but we do not at present know of any such case. Therefore we say that the scientific position at present should be one of *thätige Skepsis*, leading on to experiment, that we must at this date give a verdict of non-proven for the affirmative, and admit a strong presumption in favour of the negative answer. After many years of experiment, directed to the precise issue, a more definite position may be maintained, but we must wait with an open mind."—Prof. J. A. Thomson, *London Quart. Review*, Jan. 1902.

This statement of the present condition of the problem is most judicial, and most generous to the side which careful examination of the evidence led

its writer to abandon. The whole of the article from which it is taken should be studied as the latest pronouncement of a most cautious expert. One looks forward with interest to Prof. Thomson's forthcoming book bearing upon the whole subject, but the article referred to will probably suffice to convince the student of the extreme inconclusiveness, and frequent utter fallaciousness, of the evidence which has been collected with a view to establishing the transmissibility of acquired modifications.

Instincts, in the strict sense of the word, are extremely few in man, and such as are to be found in him are abundantly explicable as the result of natural selection working on variations of purely germinal origin. That any of the instinctive impulses of 'fallen man' arise from habit, is thus denied by a foremost investigator of animal psychology:

"There is no conclusive evidence that the secondary automatism of habit is transmitted by heredity, so as to give rise to the primary automatism of instinct."—Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct*, p. 325.

A full discussion of the evidence for and against the transmission of acquired modifications will be found in Romanes, *Darwin and after Darwin*, vol. II. Romanes' position resembles that of Galton (see *Natural Inheritance*, especially p. 14); that is to say he regards the possibility of the heredity, in some degree, of effects of environment, as an open question.

The problem of the heredity of acquired modifications is thus stated by Mr Adam Sedgwick, in a paper read before the British Association, 1899, and published in *Nature*, Sept. 21, 1899: "Is it possible by submitting an organism to a certain set of conditions, and thus causing it to acquire certain characters, so to modify its reproductive organs that the same characters will appear in its offspring as the result of the application of a different and simpler stimulus?" * * *

"While I freely admit that every alteration of an organ in response to external agents will react through the whole organisation, affecting each organ in functional correlation in an indefinite way and to a slight extent, yet I maintain that it is very hard to believe that it will have such a sharp and precise effect upon every spermatozoon and ovum subsequently produced that not merely will these products be altered generally in all their properties, but that one particular part of them—and that part always the same—will be so altered that the organisms which develope from them will be able to present the same modification on the application of a different stimulus. It is inconceivable; unless, indeed, we suppose that the very molecules of the incipient organs in the germ are more closely correlated with corresponding parts of the parent body than are the homologous parts of the parent body with one another. Now, to prove the existence of such a remarkable and intimate correlation

would surely require the very strongest and most conclusive evidence. Is there any such strong evidence? I think I may fairly answer this question in the negative."

* * * *

"To sum up the argument as it at present stands: (1) a change in conditions cannot affect the next generation unless the reproductive organs are affected; (2) from a consideration of the facts of the case, it is almost inconceivable that the effect produced upon any organ of a given organism by a change of conditions should so modify the reproductive organs of that organism as to lead to a corresponding modification in the offspring without the latter being exposed to the same conditions; (3) the only effects which are certainly known of changed conditions upon the reproductive organs are (*a*) the production of sterility; (*b*) an increase in genetic variability."

It is indeed the possibility of a *corresponding* modification, as distinguished from some indefinite change, being reproduced in the offspring, which is so hard to conceive. Protoplasmic continuity between cells, even if more general than it has been experimentally shown to be, is no help. Change of nutrition can indeed largely determine the sex of developing tadpoles; but there is no known case of an indulged appetite causing an abnormal craving in the next generation, and the possibility of such a connexion seems indeed remote.

NOTE E.

It will be plain that some at least of these objections militate equally against the old statement of the doctrine of Original Sin, based upon one act of an actual Adam, and the modified, newer expressions of it which see in the story of the Fall the epitome, symbolically written, of 'a series of facts,' a gradual declension of primitive mankind from an original state of innocence, or freedom from what is called 'the tendency to sin.' Such a statement of the doctrine of the Fall and of Original Sin occurs in the *Int. Critical Commentary on Romans* by Sanday and Headlam, 3rd ed. pp. 146-7. Much in this passage could be accepted by the present writer, but not its main conclusion. It speaks of a "mysterious seed of sin" implanted in the human race, "which like other characteristics of the race is capable of transmission"; but by these words a *depravatio naturae* seems to be implied, not merely the purely normal and non-moral 'material' of which sin is made by the will. One can further accept the statement that S. Paul, like the writer of Gen. iii., "expresses truth through symbols," though, if the argument of these lectures be sound, the 'truth' so expressed is by no means identical with what it has hitherto generally been taken to

be. Attention has been called to the view adopted in this well-known commentary because it seems to present an intermediate link between the old doctrine contained in the Articles and that which the present work endeavours to expound.

Another widely-read theologian, who has written on the relation of the doctrine of evolution to that of the Fall, is the late Canon Aubrey Moore. He also held a modified form of what may be called the conservative view. The following words are quoted from this writer's *Essays Scientific and Philosophical*, pp. 64–5: "We are not concerned with the question of the evidence of the Fall, but with the question how the Christian belief in a moral change for the worse, happening at a definite time, and yet affecting the whole human race, is consistent with what science has to tell us about evolution. We are here on the ground where natural science can help us little. Moral facts cannot be put under the microscope. And even if the Fall has left its mark on human nature in the disorder and loss of harmony of its parts, science cannot trace this back to the Fall, for it cannot compare man, as he is, with man as he came forth from his Creator's Hand. But the history alike of moral science and of religions bears testimony to the existence of a struggle, an antagonism, a disorder in human nature, and to the belief that this disorder is not natural to man, and could not have been meant

by God. And a real science of man must some day face the fact which is now persistently put on one side, that in this matter man is a great exception in the order of nature. While every other living thing is striving for its own good, man alone is found choosing what he knows to be for his hurt. No theory of evolution is complete, then, which ignores the fact of sin in man. Men have tried again and again to explain it, and they have only succeeded in explaining it away. Sin cannot be explained, for it is irrational—the one irrational, lawless, meaningless thing in the whole universe. And the wilfulness which in the Fall separated man from his true good—that is, God—is reproduced in every sin, and is everywhere a disturbing cause in the reign of law, a check to progress and a barrier to knowledge."

Aubrey Moore's defence of the traditional teaching on the Fall has always seemed to the present writer to be the weak spot in one of the best contributions to one department of the apologetic of our time. In retaining the belief "in a moral change for the worse, happening at a definite time" which "has left its mark on human nature in the disorder and loss of harmony of its parts," a disorder which "is not natural to man," he exposed himself to the full force of all the difficulties stated in Lecture I. Nothing can be made of the point which he strongly emphasised, that man alone in all creation "is found choosing what he knows to

be for his hurt"; surely man is the only being capable of such a choice, and sin is only possible in the only moral being God has made. The objection that sin "cannot be explained, for it is irrational," turns on a very obvious play on the word 'irrational.' Sin is irrational in the sense of foolish, but not in the sense of being inexplicable, as we hope to show in a subsequent lecture.

NOTE F.

MALEBRANCHE (AND GEULINCX, ETC.) ON ORIGINAL SIN.

MALEBRANCHE, like Descartes, attributes the union of the soul with the body to God, and describes with admiration the wisdom of the Creator in so constituting man:

"Ne cessez donc point d'admirer la sagesse, et l'ordre merveilleux des lois de l'union de l'âme et du corps, par lesquelles nous avons tant de divers sentiments des objets qui nous environnent."—*Entretiens sur la Métaphysique*, IV. 19.

Our passions are thus the direct creation of God:

"Les *passions* de l'âme sont des impressions de l'auteur de la nature, lesquelles nous inclinent à aimer notre corps et tout ce qui peut être utile à sa conservation; comme les *inclinations* naturelles sont des impressions de l'auteur de la nature, lesquelles nous

portent principalement à l'aimer comme souverain bien, et notre prochain sans rapport au corps."—*Recherche de la Vérité*, v. 1.

The sentence which immediately follows in this context may be quoted as containing the statement of Malebranche's occasionalism:

"La cause naturelle ou occasionnelle de ces impressions est le mouvement des esprits animaux, qui se répandent dans le corps pour y produire et pour y entretenir une disposition convenable à l'objet que l'on aperçoit, afin que l'esprit et le corps s'aident mutuellement dans cette rencontre. Car c'est par l'action continuelle de Dieu que nos volontés sont suivies de tous les mouvements de notre corps, qui sont propres pour les exécuter; et que les mouvements de notre corps, lesquels s'excitent machinalement en nous à la vue de quelque objet, sont accompagnés d'une passion de notre âme, qui nous incline à vouloir ce qui paraît alors être utile au corps."

But the laws of the relation between body and soul were altered by the Fall, which is very naturally conceived by the author of the theory of 'seeing all things in God' as consisting essentially in the transference of man's affections from God to himself:

"Sans doute la nature est présentement corrompue, le corps agit avec trop de force sur l'esprit. Au lieu de lui représenter ses besoins avec respect, il le tyrannise et l'arrache à Dieu, à qui il doit être inséparablement

uni; et il l'applique sans cesse à la recherche des choses sensibles, qui peuvent être utiles à sa conservation. L'esprit est devenu comme matériel et comme terrestre après le péché..... l'homme est corrompu en toutes ses parties depuis sa chute.....On peut dire que c'est le péché qui est la cause de l'attachement que nous avons aux choses sensibles, parce que le péché nous à détachés de Dieu par lequel seul nous pouvons nous délivrer de leur servitude."—*Ibid.* Cf. the full discussion in the 8th *éclaircissement* to the *Recherche de la Vérité*, and also I. 5 of that work itself, and the 4th *Entretien sur la Métaphysique.*

Malebranche has a curious theory of the transmission of hereditary sin. He teaches that the union of the unborn child with the mother is so close—the blood and the animal spirits being common to both—that they have the same feelings and passions. The theory is not traducianist; indeed Malebranche expressly states (*Recherche*, lib. II., Prem. Partie, c. VII. 4) that original sin is transmitted by bodily generation:

"Si l'on fait une sérieuse attention à ces deux vérités, la première, que c'est par le corps, par la génération, que le péché originel se transmet, et que l'âme ne s'engendre pas; la seconde, que le corps ne peut agir sur l'âme et la corrompre que par les traces de la partie du cerveau dont ses pensées sont naturellement dépendantes, j'espère qu'on demeurera convaincu que le péché originel se transmet de la manière que je viens d'expliquer."

The theory is briefly presented in the following words from the same section as those last quoted:

"Il est certain que les traces du cerveau sont accompagnées des sentiments et des idées de l'âme, et que les émotions des esprits animaux ne se font point dans le corps qu'il n'y ait dans l'âme des mouvements qui leur répondent. En un mot, il est certain que toutes les passions et tous les sentiments corporels sont accompagnés de véritables sentiments et de véritables passions de l'âme. Or, selon notre première supposition, les mères communiquent à leurs enfants les traces de leur cerveau et ensuite les mouvements de leurs esprits animaux.

"Donc elles font naître dans l'esprit de leurs enfants les mêmes passions et les mêmes sentiments dont elles sont touchées, et par conséquent elles leur corrompent le cœur et la raison en plusieurs manières."

Passages similar to these occur in the work *Conversations Chrétiennes* (e.g. 4me Entretien), usually included among Malebranche's writings, but whose authorship he himself, in a letter to Leibniz, disclaims and assigns to another.

Thus we read there:

"Si donc je fais voir, qu'à cause de l'union que les enfants ont avec leur mère, l'âme des enfants est nécessairement tournée vers le corps, qu'elle n'aime que les corps, et que tout son mouvement se borne à quelque chose de sensible dès l'instant qu'elle est formée,

j'aurai montré la cause du désordre général de la nature, et comment nous naissons tous dans le péché. .....L'amour de Dieu ne se communique pas comme l'amour des corps ; dont la raison est que Dieu n'est pas sensible, et qu'il n'y a point de trace dans le cerveau qui par sa nature représente Dieu."

Geulincx was an occasionalist like Malebranche, but differed from him in ecclesiastical standpoint in that he became a convert to Calvinism. He scarcely makes use of the idea of original sin, however, and, though implying its truth, distinctly hints that the doctrine lies outside the province of philosophy. Thus he says:

"Nulla ergo labes residet in ipsis passionibus,... sed tota turpitudo in effeminatione animi, seu in proclivitate illa ad agendum ex passione, constitit. Animus etiam, velut connubio quodam cum corpore copulatus, proclivitate illa sua ostendit se esse quodammodo virum uxorium, atque in ipsum quadrat illud Poetae :

'Uxori nupsit turpiter illae suae.'

"Passiones enim obveniunt nobis a corpore ; proclivem esse ad agendum propter illas, est propter corpus velle agere, et ei quasi assentiri ac abblandiri. Proclivitas illa sine dubio supponit aliquod peccatum,

quod Christiani *originale* vocaverunt. Haec vide apud ipsos, ne nos ex Philosophia nostra exorbitemus."—*Ethica*, Tract. IV. 5, De Hostibus Virtutis.

There is also a passage on original sin in *Annotata ad Metaphysicam* (ed. Land. II. pp. 301–2) from which the following sentences may be quoted:

"Protervia ista fuit primum nostrum peccatum, quod, quia nihil nos ad id invitavit, libere commisimus.

"Hoc unum peccatum postea per totam vitam semper peccamus; et constitit illud in actuali inclinatione ad id faciendum quod Deo displicet, et ad contraveniendum legi divinae. Ineptum est quod in Scholis dicitur, peccatum originale consistere in habitu quodam; in mente enim nullus potest esse habitus, utpote quae est purus actus, adeoque habitus in illam non cadit. In illo autem peccato constitit omnis nostra miseria, et non possumus illo carere, dum in humana condicione sumus."

The British empirical school did not concern itself with the question of the origin and nature of evil. Hume's brief treatment of it in the *Dialogues on Natural Religion* serves to show that the problem of evil is insoluble from purely empirical premisses, and Berkeley, who touches very lightly on the wider aspect of the question in *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Part I. 152 f., and in *Alciphron*, Dial. IV. 23, 24, says nothing as to the origin and propagation of sin.

The *Aufklärung* produced many attacks on the

dogma of the Fall and Original Sin, or rather restatements of it in terms of rationalism and allegory. These attempts were for the most part devoid of religious earnestness and theological value, and call for no notice here. D. Whitby, Töllner, Rousseau, Michaëlis may be mentioned as representatives of the movement.

NOTE G.

KANT ON THE PROPENSITY TO EVIL IN MAN.

"THE following explanation is necessary in order to define the conception of this propensity. Every propensity is either physical, that is, it appertains to man's will as a physical being; or it is moral, that is, appertaining to his elective will as a moral being. In the first sense there is no propensity to moral evil, for this must spring from freedom; and a physical propensity (founded on sensible impulses) to any particular use of freedom, whether good or evil, is a contradiction. A propensity to evil, then, can only attach to the elective will as a moral faculty. Now nothing is morally bad (that is, capable of being imputed) but what is our own *act*. On the other hand, by the notion of a propensity we understand a subjective ground of determination of the elective will *antecedent to any act*, and which is consequently not itself an act. Hence

there would be a contradiction in the notion of a mere propensity to evil, unless indeed this word 'act' could be taken in two distinct senses, both reconcilable with the notion of freedom. Now the term 'act' in general applies to that use of freedom by which the supreme maxim is adopted into one's elective will (conformably or contrary to the law), as well as to that in which actions themselves (as to their matter, that is, the objects of the elective will) are performed in accordance with that maxim. The propensity to evil is an act in the former sense (*peccatum originarium*), and is at the same time the formal source of every act in the second sense, which in its matter violates the law and is called vice (*peccatum derivatum*); and the first fault remains, even though the second may be often avoided (from motives other than the law itself). The former is an intelligible act only cognisable by reason, apart from any condition of time; the latter sensible, empirical, given in time (*factum phaenomenon*). The former is especially called, in comparison with the second, a mere propensity; and innate, because it cannot be extirpated (since this would require that the supreme maxim should be good, whereas by virtue of that propensity itself it is supposed to be bad); and especially because, although the corruption of our supreme maxim is our own act, we cannot assign any further cause for it, any more than for any fundamental attribute of our nature."—*Religion within the Limits*, etc., II. Abbott's translation, pp. 337–8.

"Now this propensity itself must be considered as morally bad, and consequently not as a natural property, but as something that can be imputed to the man, and consequently must consist in maxims of the elective will which are opposed to the law; but on account of freedom these must be looked upon as in themselves contingent, which is inconsistent with the universality of this badness, unless the ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is, by whatever means, interwoven with humanity, and, as it were, rooted in it; hence we call this a natural propensity to evil; and as the man must, nevertheless, always incur the blame of it, it may be called even a *radical badness* in human nature, innate (but none the less drawn upon us by ourselves)."—*Ibid.* III. (Abbott, *Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. 339).

"Origin (primary) is the derivation of an effect from its primary cause, that is, one which is not in its turn an effect of another cause of the same kind. It may be considered either as a *rational* or a *temporal* origin. In the former signification, it is only the *existence* of the effect that is considered; in the latter, its *occurrence*, so that it is referred as an event to its *cause in time*. When the effect is referred to a cause which is connected with it by laws of freedom, as is the case with moral evil, then the determination of the elective will to the production of it is not regarded as connected with its determining principle in time, but merely in the conception of the reason, and cannot be deduced as

from any *antecedent* state, which on the other hand must be done when the bad action, considered as an event in time, is referred to its physical cause. It is a contradiction then to seek for the time-origin of free actions as such (as we do with physical effects); or of the moral character of man, so far as it is regarded as contingent, because this is the principle of the *use* of freedom, and this (as well as the determining principle of free will generally) must be sought for simply in conceptions of reason."—*Ibid.* IV. (Abbott, p. 347).

The difference between Kant's argument and that on which the theory advocated in Lecture III. is based may be briefly stated thus: Kant takes for his premiss that our 'bias' is rightly to be called evil; therefore, he argues, in accordance with his fundamental principle, it is to be referred to the will. Our future argument, on the contrary, starts from the empirical fact that what is (illegitimately) called our evil 'bias' is not to be referred to the will, and therefore it cannot be called evil.

NOTE H.

HEGEL ON THE FALL AND ORIGINAL SIN.

THE following passages will serve to illustrate Hegel's attitude towards the problem of evil.

"The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil is loftier than the opposite, that he is naturally good, and is to be interpreted philosophically in this way. Man as spirit is a free being, who need not give way to impulse. Hence, in his direct and unformed condition, man is in a situation in which he ought not to be, and he must free himself. This is the meaning of the doctrine of Original Sin, without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom."

Philosophy of Right, Dyde's Trans. 18, Addn.

"These desires and impulses may be either good or evil. But again, owing to their mere naturalness, they are contingent, and the will, as at present constituted, takes them in a contingent character as its content and brings them under the form of particularity. It thus becomes opposed to universality, the inner objective reality or the good, which, since it involves the return of the will into itself and a consciousness aware of itself, stands at the other extreme from the direct objectivity of what is merely natural. Thus also is

this inner condition of the will evil. Man is consequently evil at once by nature or of himself and through his reflection within himself. Evil is not limited solely either to nature as such, unless it were the natural condition of a will which confines itself to its particular content, or to the reflection which goes into itself and includes cognition, unless it were to adhere to an antagonism to the good."

* * * *

[Thus evil is necessary]: "it must make its appearance, since it constitutes the division between the unreasoning beast and man. We must not, however, remain at this standpoint, or cling to the particular as though it, in contrast with the universal, were essential, but must overcome it, and set it aside as null and void."

Ibid. 139, note.

"Man exists essentially as Spirit; Spirit does not, however, exist in an immediate manner. It is, on the contrary, its essential nature to be for itself, or self-conscious, to be free, to place the natural over against itself, to escape from its immersion in nature, to sever itself from nature, and only through and as following on this severance, to reconcile itself with nature, and not with nature alone, but with its own Essence too, with its truth.

"It is this unity, which thus springs from division or dualism, which is alone self-conscious, true unity;

it is not that state of natural unity which is a oneness not worthy of Spirit, not the unity of Spirit.

"If that state be designated the state of innocence, it may appear objectionable to say that man must come out of innocence and become guilty. The state of innocence is that state in which there is nothing good and nothing evil for man: it is the condition of animals, of unconsciousness, where man does not know either good or evil, where that which he desires is not determined as either the one or the other; for if he has no knowledge of evil, he has no knowledge of good either.....

"Animals are not good, nor are they evil; but man in an animal condition is wild, is evil, is as he ought not to be. As he is by nature, he is as he ought not to be; what, on the contrary, he is, he must be by means of Spirit, by the knowing and willing of that which is right. This principle, that if a man is in accordance with nature only, he is not as he ought to be, has been expressed by saying that man is evil by nature.....

"We find in the Bible a well-known conception, called in an abstract fashion the Fall, and expressed in an outward and mythical shape. This idea is a very profound one, and represents what is not merely a kind of accidental history, but rather the everlasting necessary history of mankind.....

"Consciousness contains a double element within itself, namely this division or dualism. Now it is

true that it is sometimes said that this ought not to have been. But it is involved in the conception of man that he should reach rational knowledge, or, in other words, it is the very nature of Spirit to become that consciousness. In so far as the division and reflection represent freedom, implying that man has a choice between the two sides of the antithesis, or stands as lord over Good and Evil, we have a point of view that ought not to exist, that must be absorbed in something higher. It is not, however, one which should not make its appearance at all, the truth rather being that this standpoint of dualism, in conformity with its own nature, terminates in reconciliation."

Philosophy of Religion, I. 275 ff., Tr. of Spiers and Sanderson (Eng. and For. Phil. Library).

"The fundamental note of the account (of the Fall) is that man ought not to be natural, and in this is contained the thought expressed in true theology, that man is by nature evil. Evil consists in resting in that state; man must advance out of this state by exercising his freedom, his will. The further development of this thought accordingly involves that Spirit should once more attain to absolute unity within itself, to a state of reconciliation, and freedom is just what contains this turning back of Spirit into itself, this reconciliation with itself. Here, however, this conversion or turning back has not yet taken place; the difference has not

yet been taken up into God; i.e. has not yet reached a state of reconciliation. The abstraction of evil has not yet disappeared." *Op. cit.* pp. 203–4.

"Man is potentially good—but when that is said everything is not said; it is just in this potentiality that the element of one-sidedness lies. Man is good potentially, i.e. he is good only in an inward way, good so far as his notion or conception is concerned, and for this very reason not good so far as his actual nature is concerned.....It is just in the very fact that man is only potentially good that the defect of his nature lies.....

"What is good by nature is good in an immediate way, and it is just the very nature of Spirit not to be something natural and immediate; rather, it is involved in the very idea of Man as Spirit that he should pass out of this natural state into a state in which there is a separation between his notion or conception and his immediate existence. In the case of physical nature this separation of an individual thing from its law, from its substantial essence, does not occur, just because it is not free.

"What is meant by Man is, a being who sets himself in opposition to his immediate nature, to his state of being in himself, and reaches a state of separation.....

"It is this passing beyond his natural state, his potential Being, which first of all forms the basis of the division or disunion, and in connexion with which the disunion directly arises.

"This disunion is a passing out of this natural condition or immediacy; but we must not take this to mean that it is the act of passing out of this condition which first constitutes evil, for, on the contrary, this passing out of immediacy is already involved in the state of nature. Potentiality and the natural state constitute the Immediate; but because it is Spirit it is in its immediacy, the passing out of its immediacy the revolt or falling away from its immediacy, from its potential Being.

"This involves the second proposition: Man is by nature evil; his potential Being, his natural Being, is evil. It is just in this condition as one of natural Being that his defect is found: because he is Spirit he is separated from this natural Being, and is disunion. One-sidedness is directly involved in this natural condition. When Man is only as he is according to Nature, he is evil.

"The natural Man is Man as potentially good, good according to his conception or notion; but in the concrete sense that man is natural who follows his passions and impulses, and remains within the circle of his desires, and whose natural immediacy is his law.

"He is natural, but in this his natural state he is at the same time a being possessed of will, and since the content of his will is merely impulse and inclination, he is evil. So far as form is concerned, the fact that he is evil implies that he is no longer an animal,

but the content, the ends towards which his acts of will are directed, are still natural. This is the standpoint we are concerned with here, the higher standpoint according to which Man is by nature evil, and is evil just because he is something natural.

"The primary condition of man, which is superficially represented as a state of innocence, is the state of nature, the animal state. Man must be culpable; in so far as he is good, he must not be good as any natural thing is good, but his guilt, his will, must come into play, it must be possible to impute moral acts to him. Guilt means the possibility of imputation.

"The good man is good along with and by means of his will, and to that extent because of his guilt. Innocence implies the absence of will, the absence of evil, and consequently the absence of goodness. Natural things and the animals are all good, but this is a kind of goodness which cannot be attributed to Man; in so far as he is good, it must be by the action and consent of his will."

Op. cit. III. 46–48.

The following quotations from McTaggart's *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology* will further define Hegel's doctrine of Sin, and serve as a basis for the estimate given in Lecture II.

"There is no trace in Hegel of any feeling of absolute humility and contrition of man before God. Indeed, it would be scarcely possible that there should

be. Sin, for Hegel, is so much less real than man, that it is impossible for man ever to regard himself as altogether sinful. Sin is a mere appearance. Like all appearance, it is based on reality. But the reality it is based on is not sin. Like all reality it is perfectly good. The sinfulness is part of the appearance.

"Man's position is very different; God is a community, and every man is part of it. In a perfect unity, such as God is, the parts are not subordinate to the whole. The whole is in every part, and every part is essential to the whole. Every man is thus a perfect manifestation of God. He would not be such a manifestation of God, indeed, if he were taken in isolation, but, being taken in the community, he embodies God perfectly.

"Such a being is perfect in his own right and sin is superficial with regard to him, as it is with regard to the Absolute. *Sub specie aeternitatis* he is sinless. *Sub specie temporis* he is destined to become sinless, not from any external gift of divine grace, but because he is man—and God." pp. 243–4.

"(Hegel) regards conscious and deliberate sin as evil. But he regards it as less evil than that mere innocence (Unschuldigkeit) which has its root, not in the choice of virtue, but in ignorance of vice. As compared with the deliberate choice of the good, the deliberate choice of the bad is contingent and particular—and therefore evil. But to make a deliberate choice even of the

bad implies some activity of the reason and the will. And so it has a universality in its form, which Innocence has not. It is true that Innocence has a universality in its content, which Sin has not. So far they might seem to be on a level. But Sin is so far superior that it has advanced one step nearer to the goal of Virtue. The man who has sinned may not have mounted higher in doing so. But he has at any rate started on the only road which can eventually lead him upwards.

"And the advance from Innocence to Virtue can only be through Sin. Sin is a necessary means to Virtue." p. 234.

If Hegel's meaning, in the statements of his teaching last quoted, were that no particular virtue can be attained by any individual without his first wallowing in the corresponding vice, it would be astoundingly at variance with experience. This, however, we are told, is not the case (*op. cit.* p. 167); "revolt and reconciliation are not the only road of moral advance"; and the exception which thus emerges to the universality of the Hegelian formula is provided for in the Logic. When the necessary qualifications, which are discussed in Dr M^c^Taggart's chapter on Sin, have been made, the Hegelian doctrine assumes a much more modest form than it at first sight seems to wear. It then appears that we *are* left with the definite consequence that "Sin *must* lead to increase of Virtue, and that there

is no Virtue which is not based on Sin." But here again the test of experience is eluded. Either Hegel could have considered that what was an actual process in the race was only a tendency in the individual, or that the harvest of virtue which sin inevitably yields is to be reaped in a future life. Inasmuch as the race is but the sum of its individuals and no more, it is difficult to see that a process which can by no means be generally applied to the parts separately can be wholly and necessarily true of them collectively. Of the other alternative one can only say that it involves a reversal of all expectations derivable from universal human experience, according to which sin, of itself, produces nothing but further sin, and makes amendment ever less possible.

NOTE J.

SCHLEIERMACHER ON SIN AND ORIGINAL SIN.

It is impossible to offer here full quotations from so prolix a writer as Schleiermacher on all the points raised in the discussion of his speculations in Lecture II., but the following headings of some of the sections of *Der christliche Glaube* will perhaps suffice to show what are the essential elements of his very obscure and vacillating doctrine of Sin.

§ 66. S. 361. Wir haben das Bewusstsein der Siinde so oft dass in einem Gemüthszustand mitgesetzte oder

irgendwie hinzutretende Gottesbewusstsein unser Selbstbewusstsein als Unlust bestimmt; und begreifen deshalb die Sünde als einen positiven Widerstreit des Fleisches gegen den Geist.

67. S. 364. Wir sind uns der Sünde bewusst als der Kraft und des Werkes einer Zeit in welcher die Richtung auf das Gottesbewusstsein noch nicht in uns hervorgetreten war.

68. S. 367. Wir können die Sünde, wiewol sie aus der ungleichmässigen Entwicklung der Einsicht und der Willenskraft so zu begreifen ist, dass durch ihr Vorhandensein der Begriff der ursprünglichen Vollkommenheit des Menschen nicht aufgehoben wird, doch nur als eine Störung der Natur auffassen.

69. S. 372. Wir sind uns der Sünde bewusst theils als in uns selbst gegründet, theils als ihren Grund jenseit unseres eignen Daseins habend.

70. S. 376. Die vor jeder That eines Einzelnen in ihm vorhandene und jenseit seines eignen Daseins begründete Sündhaftigkeit ist in Jedem eine nur durch den Einfluss der Erlösung wieder aufzuhebende vollkommene Unfähigkeit zum Guten.

71. S. 381. Die Erbsünde ist aber zugleich so sehr die eigene Schuld eines Jeden, der daran Theil hat, dass sie am besten als die Gesammtthat und Gesammtschuld des menschlichen Geschlechtes vorgestellt wird, und dass ihre Anerkennung zugleich die der allgemeinen Erlösungsbedürftigkeit ist.

72. S. 389. Wenn wir die bisher entwickelte Vorstellung auch nicht gerade so auf die ersten Menschen übertragen können: so ist doch kein Grund vorhanden, die allgemeine Sündhaftigkeit aus einer in ihrer Person durch die erste Sünde mit der menschlichen Natur vorgegangenen Veränderung zu erklären.

73. S. 408. Aus der Erbsünde geht in allen Menschen immer die wirkliche Sünde hervor.

79. S. 437. Göttliche Eigenschaften, welche sich auf das Bewusstsein der Sünde, wenn auch nur, so wie durch dieselbe die Erlösung bedingt ist, beziehen, können nur aufgestellt werden, sofern Gott zugleich als Urheber der Sünde betrachtet wird.

80. S. 439. Sofern Sünde und Gnade in unserm Selbstbewusstsein entgegengesetzt sind, kann Gott nicht auf dieselbe Weise als Urheber der Sünde gedacht werden, wie er Urheber der Erlösung ist. Sofern wir aber nie ein Bewusstsein der Gnade haben ohne Bewusstsein der Sünde, müssen wir auch behaupten, dass uns das Sein der Sünde mit und neben der Gnade von Gott geordnet ist.

81. S. 444. Wenn die kirchliche Lehre diesen Widerspruch auszugleichen sucht durch den Satz, dass Gott nicht Urheber der Sünde, sondern diese in der Freiheit des Menschen gegründet ist: so bedarf dieser doch der Ergänzung, Gott habe geordnet, dass die jedesmal noch nicht gewordene Herrschaft des Geistes uns Sünde werde.

NOTE K.

JULIUS MÜLLER'S THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF SINFULNESS.

MÜLLER'S theory deserves a somewhat fuller notice than has been accorded to it in Lecture II.; not so much for its intrinsic merits as because of its historical importance as the unconscious acknowledgement of the inadequacy of all attempts to explain the empirical origin of sin apart from the fact of human development.

As we have already seen, Müller sets out from the antinomy clearly brought out in Kant's treatment of the problem: the contradiction subsisting between these two characteristics of sin which, if we adhere to the data of experience, we are equally obliged to maintain, viz., its universality as deep-rooted in human nature, and its guilt as resting upon everyone. He shows conclusively that the Augustinian theory leaves the problem unsolved; "while fully recognising the one truth, it leaves the other unexplained." Had he written at the present day instead of sixty years ago, he would have been able to make use also of the insuperable arguments against its validity derived respectively from natural science and from the results of modern study of the Scriptures and the newer

exegetical method. He would also have found the Ritschlian treatment of the problem unsatisfactory, and would have denied its claim to have transcended, with its idea of 'the kingdom of sin,' the controversy associated with the names of Augustine and Pelagius.

But we have to look rather at his own attempt at positive reconstruction. He retains the old assumption of inborn sinfulness as indissolubly connected with guilt: the assumption whose repudiation is to constitute our future starting-point; and this determines the direction of his speculation. He is thereby necessarily compelled to an attitude similar to that of Kant, or rather, similar to that of Origen or of Schelling. He is driven to the idea of a sinfulness "lying beyond our individual existence in time," and having its origin in our personal self-decision. There was no universal (extra-temporal) fall; it was the spiritual act of each individual being. Only thus can the guilt of inborn sinfulness be maintained. The act manifests itself in the consciousness of an original guiltiness attaching to our nature in its present state; but we neither have, nor can have, memory of this pre-temporal fall. This theory explains the capacity in Adam to be tempted and to sin.

Müller also held that the first Adam might have become in a limited measure what the second Adam really is in the highest sense, "the originator of a development liberating the will from its original

variance, provided that he had transmitted to his posterity a sensuous nature untainted by sin." He did not do so, however, and therefore his posterity received from him, by heredity, a corrupted sensuous nature, in addition to the spiritual nature depraved by each one for himself. Müller therefore retains the doctrine of the Fall but, in order to regard the individual as responsible for his inborn 'sinfulness,' he supplements the received teaching with the supposition of an individual pre-temporal fall. "Whoever, therefore," he concludes, "considers that a perverted self-decision preceding our temporal life is inconceivable, must at any rate maintain alike the *Universality of Sin* and *individual guilt*, and must acknowledge the *antinomy* still subsisting between these two principles, until perhaps someone else shall offer a more satisfactory solution[1]."

We hope to show in the next lecture that such a 'more satisfactory solution' has been supplied since Dr Müller wrote. Meanwhile it remains to point out that Müller's theory is defective.

In the first place it only puts the difficulty of accounting for the universality of guiltiness further back, and substitutes a celestial for a terrestrial Pelagianism. If each being fell independently of others, in the pre-temporal state, and that state was one in which man was not beset with the sensuous nature

[1] *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, tr. Urwick, 2nd ed., II. 401.

which is the main source of his temptations here, this universality of self-perversion becomes more difficult to account for than before. As in the case of popular dualism, the origin of sin is at once postponed and made more mysterious and inexplicable.

Secondly, just as Kant's relegation of freedom to the noumenal side of man deprives his empirical life of all moral significance, so does the doctrine of predetermination empty the earthly life of man of the meaning with which Christianity would have us regard it full. The dualism between reason and sense, presupposed by Kant, and also by Müller whom he so profoundly influenced, has been rendered untenable by psychology; and the doctrine of predetermination which naturally grows out of it is less assimilable with the Christian *Weltanschauung* than with any other.

This last remark does not of course contain a philosophical refutation of theories of pre-existence or even of transmigration. They must be discussed on their own merits. It is true that future immortality does not demand previous existence, and it is equally true that the experience of our present life yields no indication, apart from alleged inborn sinfulness in Müller's sense, which points toward such a state. It is but a dim conjecture, which Lotze calls "strange and improbable[1]." This, however, as Dr McTaggart

[1] *Metaphysic*, E. T. vol. II. p. 182.

has recently insisted [1], is no very serious objection. Nay, from the standpoint which this writer represents, there would seem much to be said for the view that the self has different lives "not only as bound together in a chain of efficient causality, but as developing towards an end according to final causality." That standpoint, however, is based on a view of the Absolute and its relations to the finite which would scarcely be acceptable to the Christian theologian.

And the philosopher who regards the true *à priori* to be the "*à priori* which embraces the empirical" will be shy of invoking the existence of what is beyond the bounds of possible knowledge, and the true field of metaphysic, unless there be a very urgent necessity for its assumption. The necessity, in the present case, does not, however, exist; for it will be seen that the expression 'inborn sinfulness' denotes more than empirical knowledge will allow to be attributed to the state of man as he is born.

[1] *Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 49 f.

NOTE L.

O. PFLEIDERER, *PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION*. ENG. TR. OF 2ND GERMAN ED., VOL. IV. pp. 34–38.

"THE psychological genesis of evil is not difficult to understand, if we set out from the fact that the tendency towards the satisfaction of his natural impulses is as necessary to man as it is to every other living being. This tendency, which lies in the essence of the will, or indeed is that essence, is not in itself evil; but that evil comes out of it, and how evil comes out of it may be very easily seen, as soon as we look at the facts of man's general psychological life, without prejudice or dogmatic prepossessions. The impulse towards the satisfaction of the natural impulses is at first purely natural, unaccompanied, that is to say, by any moral judgment as to the 'should' or 'should not'; it is not checked by any consciousness of a law, it is directed unconditionally and without any limitation to the satisfaction of every impulse, however and whenever it may arise; the natural desire is thus at first the sole-ruling, unbroken, power of the man's life. Now, however, comes the law, first of all in the form of the requirements coming from without, of guardians, of society, of the ruling authorities, and imposes a limit on naïve desire, by the prohibition, 'Thou shalt not

covet.' Thus to desire, which hitherto has been quite unrestricted, there is now added an obstructing check, represented as an opposing will; but is the effect of this new element of consciousness immediately to do away with desire as a fact, to break and overcome it? Everyone knows that this is not the case, and it is easy to see how such a thing is not possible. Natural self-will has on its side the real power of the impulse to live, and to natural feeling this appears to be the sole and only right in life: and how then should self-will at once come to an end at the mere idea of the opposing (forbidding) foreign will? That the foreign will which forbids has a higher right to be obeyed than man's own desire, which till now has been unlimited and has thus appeared to be alone entitled to regard, is a perception which cannot by any means be assumed to have been present from the first, and which is not given implicitly along with the prohibition, but can only be the result of a series of real experiences, in which the awakening moral consciousness makes the practical discovery, that the foreign will which forbids is really as against man's own desire a higher power, and one which is able to lend force to its prohibition, to break the resistance of man's self-will by its resultlessness or by the disagreeable consequences connected with it. The idea of repeated real experiences of this kind supplies the first effectual motive for subordinating self-will to the prohibiting other will; and to this there further come the

feelings of sympathy, regard and piety, which suggest a new and more ideal motive in the fear of offending the higher will which lays its commands upon us. Last of all comes the perception of rightness, of the inner foundation in the nature of the case, or the reasonable necessity, of the command or prohibition. This perception is the highest motive, and confirms the others, though naturally itself varying from the dimmest suspicion of the rightness of the other will to full (autonomous) recognition of its reasonableness. Only from the summation of all these various motives does there gradually arise as the total result of them the recognition of the moral right of the will which gives the law, and of the obligation resting on man to subordinate his self-will to its prohibition and command; in short, the moral consciousness of the *shall*, which is thus seen to be a complex result arrived at by various processes of consciousness and various moral experiences before morality, by no means a thing immediately given in the mind and developed from the first. The theologians who assume it is the latter cannot possibly understand the genesis of evil; and we may be allowed to remark that a little more psychological and pædagogical insight would do no harm to theological dogmatics and ethics, and would at least secure those who seek to understand these things in sober psychological fashion, from the absurd reproach of an 'unethical way of thinking!'

"If, then, it cannot be disputed that the moral recognition of the law which forbids cannot be present from the first, but is a result arrived at by many different processes of consciousness, it follows of itself that the warning prohibition 'Thou shalt not covet!' can at first do nothing but call forth the opposition of natural desire; far from adapting itself willingly to the limit which thus meets it, self-will is only stimulated by this opposition to an obstinate insistence on its own purpose (hence self-will appears as the earliest form of evil in children). With this the feeling of self becomes intensified, and also the strength of the will, that precious and indispensable foundation of independence of character; but there arises at the same time a habitual inclination to struggle against every limit, a contrariety to the law which, as the higher power, and more and more also as the higher right, asserts itself against self-will. Thus, as man's moral consciousness gradually awakens, he finds himself at once in the midst of the conflict between 'would' and 'should'; for he feels a rooted antipathy to the law, which yet he is obliged to recognise as the good which has authority, and this antipathy makes obedience to the law partly impossible to him, inasmuch as moral motives do not powerfully enough oppose his natural tendencies, and partly at least painful and oppressive; in any case the Ego finds in itself, when its moral consciousness awakens, a *powerful inclination of self-will to lawlessness, i.e.*

an evil inclination, which, because originated before moral consciousness, and therefore before all free moral self-determination, appears as a natural, innate, radical defect of the will. To this extent, a certain basis of fact and truth undoubtedly underlies the assertion of the presence in man of a natural evil or of 'original sin.' On the other hand, however, it must be admitted, that this notion is not strictly accurate; the element which is natural in man, viz., self-willing, and the effort after self-satisfaction, cannot properly be called evil; and that which is evil in man, the tendency of will which asserts itself against law, cannot properly be called natural, as it does not belong to the naïve stage antecedent to morality, but to the morally conscious Ego.

"But the transition from the former to the latter is a gradual one, and consists in a process of consciousness passing through experiences, acts, and states which to some extent have not ceased to be natural, but are already moral; and this fact gives support to the peculiar dialectic of the relation between the natural and evil, which is packed into a paradox in the doctrine of 'Original Sin.' In this dialectical relation, or in the relativity of the whole moral process of development, lies the reason why we cannot properly speak of a first sin, cannot fix a definite point as the boundary between action which is natural and indifferent ('innocent'), and action which is

moral and involves responsibility, and therefore can draw no abstract distinction between the mere possibility and the actuality of evil, the first of which might be asserted to be universal, but not the latter. No one can arrive at the actual consciousness of good and evil, these inner determinations of the will, without having in some way or other, to a greater or less degree, made experience in himself of the antithesis, without having learned to know in movements of his own will, more or less protracted and intense, that divergence of 'would' from 'should,' which itself amounts to some degree of the presence of evil. Imputation and guilt are similarly to some extent relative; in the fullest sense they belong only to the personal moral act—i.e. to a conscious self-determination against the moral norm; before there is any consciousness of a 'should' there is no imputation of guilt for natural action which is morally indifferent, innocent. Nor can the act of another or its effects ever be imputed to any one as guilt; the notion of an original sin which is deserving of condemnation must be entirely rejected. But from the point when moral consciousness awakes, there is imputation, in exact proportion to the possibility which exists at each particular stage of the development of conscience, of overcoming lawless inclinations, by summoning as motives to contend with them the moral insight and impulses existing at the time.

"Every step in the development of conscience, every widening of the moral view, every increase in refinement of judgment or in instinctive feeling of right and wrong, augments the possibility of reaction against abnormal impulses, of overcoming the bad motives by good ones, and thus increases with man's moral freedom his responsibility also for what he does and leaves undone."

NOTE M.

(LECTURE III. p. 85.)

SINCE this lecture was delivered my attention has been called to a popular statement of a similar view in a work by Mr Beeby entitled *Doctrine and Principles*. I am also now enabled to refer to an interesting work entitled *Geschichte und Kritik der kirchl. Lehre von der urspriingl. Vollkommenheit und vom Sündenfall*, by R. Rüetschi, Leiden, 1881, containing a history and criticism of the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin, and attempting its reconstruction under the guidance of the idea of development. This treatise, however, starts towards restatement from certain somewhat mysterious categories reminding us of those of Schleiermacher, instead of from the facts supplied by empirical science. And it retains the supposition that

natural concupiscence is *evil*, being directly perceived as such in the moral consciousness, as if it were something which ought not to be, instead of something which only ought not to be volitionally realised. The position reached is therefore only one of compromise between the traditional view and that represented by Pfleiderer and elaborated in Lecture III. of this work.

With Rüetschi's treatment of the question of the origin of sin that of W. Herrmann in his recent *Ethik* may be compared. Herrmann, one of the leaders of the Ritschlian school, retains Kant's contentless categorical imperative which, he asserts, cannot be derived by any or all of the empirical sciences, and supplies its content from the spiritual society. Like Rüetschi (and Ritschl and Schleiermacher also), he uses the conception of development so far as to recognise that we are natural before we are moral beings, and that sin arises from the clashing of acquired moral law with innate impulses; and, similarly to Rüetschi, he teaches that "we make ourselves responsible not only for not overcoming this opposition but also for its arising in us in such a manner" (S. 63). As soon as we have perceived anything in us as contrary to the moral law we make ourselves responsible for it. Hence arises the fact covered by the doctrine of Original Sin. It is made impossible for us to rest with the observation that our conflict with the good has its natural grounds. Man's morally grounded thought on his own nature must be the truth

for him. The inevitable opposition of our nature to the good becomes radical evil in the will as soon as our being stands in the light of moral knowledge.

The flaw in the position thus taken up by Herrmann and by Rüetschi is that they start, after the fashion of Schleiermacher, with whose method they have much in common, from the deliverance of the moral consciousness as the source of ultimate truth for man without any previous criticism of that deliverance. In this case the judgment accepted as final is simply an uncriticised judgment of the unreflective mind. All such "common sense philosophy" is guilty of what Kant would have called dogmatism: the assumption of premisses which are not self-evident nor for which any demonstrative proof can be supplied.

NOTE N.

ON THE MORAL SOLIDARITY OF THE RACE.

It has been assumed by many writers that there is no alternative between such solidarity in sin as the doctrine of the Fall implies and the atomistic conception of the race which is associated with Pelagianism. Thus, to take one example, we read in Trench's *S. Augustine as an Interpreter of Scripture*, 1869, p. 116:

"This chapter (Rom. v.) is the rock on which all Pelagian schemes of theology, which ground themselves

on an extenuation of the Fall, on a denial of the significancy of Adam's sin (save in the way of evil example) to any but himself,—which break up the race of mankind into a multitude of isolated atoms, touching, but not really connected with, one another, instead of contemplating it as one great organic whole,—must for ever shiver and come to nothing." But, of course, the 'organic solidarity' of mankind, as it is called, is as much recognised by the theory advocated in Lecture III. as by the doctrine of S. Augustine or the teaching of S. Paul. What we have maintained to be common to the race in virtue of its physical unity is not, however, a corrupted or depraved nature, but the perfectly normal instincts, impulses, and inborn endowments which we inherit, and which form what has been called the raw material of which the will *may* produce sin and depravity. This inheritance, universally received by individual men, is sufficient to reconcile the universality of sinfulness with individual freedom of will; and it implies that the human race is 'one great organic whole.'

Our theory of the propagation of sinfulness is also compatible with the fullest recognition of the influence of the members of society upon one another: a fact which is also embraced by the term 'moral solidarity,' but which must be kept quite distinct from that of which we have just spoken. Our free-will is conditioned not only by our common nature, but also by

our nurture. The world is a moral order, and there is a sense in which 'sin is in each the work of all and in all the work of each.' Though each of us has a unique individuality and inviolable responsibility, yet our being is not capable of being wholly sundered from that of our fellows. Our very opportunities, for instance, are largely determined for us by our infinitely complex relations with other lives. We are linked both to the processes of nature and to the chain of human sins and sorrows. The degradation of the individual affects society, and the moral tone of society largely conditions the moral attainment of the individual. "The solidarity of mankind links the crimes of each to the sorrows of all[1]." All this is true independently of any theory of inborn sinfulness, and is consistent with a doctrine which repudiates a Fall as well as with one which presupposes some such universal moral catastrophe; for this kind of solidarity refers to actual sin alone, to environment and not to physical nature.

Thus the solidarity of the race is expressed in the view of the propagation of sin expounded in Lecture III. so as to escape the errors both of Pelagianism and of Augustinianism. It is neither true that man is born bad, "with his whole essence shattered and unsound," in consequence of his organic connexion with previous generations, nor, as Rousseau taught, that man is born

[1] Royce, *The World and the Individual*, II. 389. The chapter in this work on 'The Struggle with Evil' is most suggestive.

good and depraved by society. He is born normal and neutral, and, influenced more or less according to circumstances by society, makes himself bad or good. In thus restating the old truth of the moral solidarity of the race one has sought to detach its essential significance from inaccurate expressions by which it has been distorted, and, in doing so, to present to Christian thought the real content of the deliverances of experience and of the Christian consciousness.

NOTE O.

DR MARTINEAU ON THE LIMITS OF DIVINE IMMANENCE IN MAN.

"THE whole external universe, then (external, I mean, to self-conscious beings), we unreservedly surrender to the Indwelling Will, of which it is the organised expression. From no point of its space, from no moment of its time, is His living agency withdrawn, or less intensely present than in any crisis fitly called creative. But the very same principle which establishes a *Unity* of all external causality makes it antithetic to the internal, and establishes a *Duality* between our own and that which is other than ours; so that, were not our personal power known to us *as one*, the cosmical power would not be guaranteed to us as *the other*. Here, therefore, at the boundary of

the proper Ego, the absorbing claim of the Supreme will arrests itself, and recognises a ground on which it does not mean to step. Did it still press on and annex this field also, it would simply abolish the very base of its own recognisable existence, and, in making itself all in all, would vanish totally from view. It is precisely in *not being unitary* that causation is accessible to thought at all; and if our own will does not exercise it, we are excluded from even the search for it elsewhere." *A Study of Religion*, II. 166 (2nd ed.).

"To the doctrine thus shaped it may perhaps be objected that, while it admits the Divine action as immediately present in the lower provinces of the cosmos, it excludes that action from the highest, viz. our moral life,—precisely the sphere that is nearest to God and would seem most congenial to Him. Are we then to find Him in the sunshine and the rain, and to miss Him in our thought, our duty, and our love? Far from it; He is with us in both: only in the former it is His *immanent* life, in the latter His *transcendent*, with which we are in communion. It is not indeed *He* that, under the mask of our personality, does our thinking, and prays against our temptations, and weeps our tears: these are truly our own: but they are in presence of a sympathy free to answer, spirit to spirit; neither merging in the other; but both at one in the same inmost preferences and affections." *Op. cit.* p. 179.

NOTE P.

THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN IN HOLY SCRIPTURE.

THE passages of Scripture which are relevant to the subject of original sin have been dealt with in Lecture IV. as fully as is possible in the present work. A few words, however, are due with regard to a phrase which is very often appealed to as an argument for the view that S. Paul held a doctrine similar to that which is expressed, for instance, in our IXth Article. I allude to the words of Eph. ii. 3, "and were by nature children of wrath," which from the time of S. Augustine have commonly been supposed to assert original sin. The arguments given in the *International Critical Commentary* on the Epistle to the Ephesians by Dr T. K. Abbott would seem, however, to be conclusive against such exegesis. In the first place, the context treats of actual sin; secondly, φύσει does not necessarily mean 'by birth,' and its position almost forbids our bestowing upon it the emphasis which such an interpretation would require; and thirdly, the words καὶ ἤμεθα must then be taken to refer to, or at least include, a time prior to that implied by ἐν οἷς καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἀνεστράφημέν ποτε, which seems impossible. Dr Abbott is of course not alone amongst modern

commentators in his opinion as to the exegesis of this verse.

In illustration of the remark made at the end of Lecture IV., that the importance attached in theological literature to the doctrine of the Fall has been altogether exaggerated, the following words of Dr Dale and Dr Jowett may be quoted:

"It is, however, in every way deserving of notice that, although the Christian redemption assumes that the race has fallen, this particular conception of the manner of the fall is neither expressed nor implied in any passage of the New Testament except Rom. v. 12–21 and 1 Cor. xv. 22. The truths which are of the substance of the Christian Gospel hold together: they are organically one. It was said of a great anatomist that he could reconstruct an extinct animal from a single bone; and it might almost be said that the whole of the Christian Gospel might be reconstructed from any one of its characteristic doctrines. But the theory of the relation between Adam and his posterity, which is incidentally stated in Rom. v. 12–21 and 1 Cor. xv. 22, has no such organic relation to the general body of Christian truth. If these two passages had not been written, or if they had been lost, there is nothing in the rest of the New Testament to suggest this account of the effects of the sin of 'one man.' The New Testament assumes that all men are sinners, and that all men are mortal; as to how they became sinners

or how they became mortal there is nothing said, explicitly or implicitly, except in these two passages. And even in these passages it is not Paul's direct purpose to explain the cause of either human sin or human mortality; his direct object is to declare that in Christ men are made righteous and are to rise from the dead. His reference to the effects of Adam's sin is merely for the purpose of illustration."

Dale, *Christian Doctrine*, 1895, pp. 325–6.

"For example, how slender is the foundation in the New Testament for the doctrine of Adam's sin being imputed to his posterity!—two passages in St Paul at most, and these of uncertain interpretation. The little cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, has covered the heavens. To reduce such subjects to their proper proportions, we should consider: First, what space they occupy in Scripture; secondly, how far the language used respecting them is literal or figurative; thirdly, whether they agree with the more general truths of Scripture and our moral sense, or are not 'rather repugnant thereto'; fourthly, whether their origin may not be prior to Christianity, or traceable in the after-history of the Church; fifthly, whether the words of Scripture may not be confused with logical inferences which are appended to them; sixthly, in the case of this and some other doctrines, whether even poetry has not lent its aid to stamp them in

our minds in a more definite and therefore different form from that in which the apostles taught them; lastly, how far in our own day they are anything more than words."

Jowett, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, pp. 180–1.

* * * *

No attempt has been made to meet in anticipation many of the possible objections which may be brought against the destructive and reconstructive arguments contained in these Lectures; and it has been expressly stated that there has been no intention to deal with the possible *consequences*, in other departments of theological doctrine, which may logically follow from the change of view which they have advocated. Though it is keenly felt that it is in this direction that the obstacles which will prevent a considerable circle of possible readers from easily accepting the author's position will chiefly arise, it has been thought advisable to leave consequences to take care of themselves, or rather to leave to others the task of suggesting such readjustments as may be requisite in case the views here contended for should stand the test of criticism.

A few words, however, may be added in reference to the bearings of the theory of sin which has here been advocated upon the doctrine of Baptism. If there is no such thing as original guilt, meriting condemnation, there can be no need of its remission. If in

place of 'original sin,' an inborn and hereditary taint, corruption or disease, resulting from the sin of our first parent, we substitute the inherited non-moral propensities of the race which have passed down to it from its animal ancestors, there is no question as to whether baptism does or does not remove inherited taint. So far the doctrine of Baptism as formulated in the Anglican Articles, for instance, is rendered superfluous, or needs revision. Further than this, the evolutionary view of Sin does not affect the doctrine of Baptism. It has no relevancy to other aspects of regeneration than the doing away with original sin and the remission of original guilt. It has nothing to say of baptism as the means of effecting union with Christ. It serves, however, to put increased emphasis on that aspect of baptism which is concerned with initiation into the Christian Society. In shifting the origin of individual sinfulness from supposed defects or blemishes in our 'nature' to the volition of the moral personality, and in calling attention to the strong influences of nurture and environment in moulding the spiritual life of the child, it brings into clear light the importance, from the very first, of a surrounding Christian atmosphere. The physical solidarity of the race falls into a second place as compared with the power of social heredity and nurture; and in so far as Christian nurture is secured or pledged through Christian baptism, the more is this significance of the sacrament made prominent.

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CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.